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1. The States of Texas, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah, and the 
Commonwealths of Kentucky and Puerto Rico, by and through their Attorneys General 
(collectively, the “Plaintiff States”), in the above-styled action, file their Second Amended 
Complaint (“Complaint”) against Google LLC (“Google”) under federal and state antitrust laws 
and deceptive trade practices laws and allege as follows:  
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
2. The halcyon days of Google’s youth are a distant memory. Over twenty years ago, two 
college students founded a company that forever changed the way that people search the internet. 
Since then, Google has expanded its business far beyond search and dropped its famous “don’t be 
evil” motto. Its business practices reflect that change. As internal Google documents reveal, 
Google sought to kill competition and has done so through an array of exclusionary tactics, 
including an unlawful agreement with Facebook, its largest potential competitive threat, to 
manipulate advertising auctions. The Supreme Court has warned that there are such things as 
antitrust evils. This litigation will establish that Google is guilty of such antitrust evils, and it seeks 
to ensure that Google won’t be evil anymore. 
3. Google is an advertising company that makes billions of dollars a year by deceptively 
using individuals’ personal information to engage in targeted digital advertising. Google has 
extended its reach from search advertising to dominate the online advertising landscape for image-
based ads on the web, called “display ads.” In its complexity, the market for display ads resembles 
the most complicated financial markets; publishers and advertisers trade display inventory through 
brokers and on electronic exchanges and networks at lightning speed. As of 2020, Google is a 
company standing at the apex of power in media and advertising, generating over $161 billion 
annually with staggering profit margins, almost all from advertising.  




4. Google’s advertising apparatus extends to the new ad exchanges and brokers through 
which display ads trade. Indeed, nearly all of today’s online publishers (be they large or small) 
depend on one company—Google—as their middleman to sell their online display ad space in “ad 
exchanges,” i.e., the centralized electronic trading venues where display ads are bought and sold. 
Conversely, nearly every consumer goods company, e-commerce entity, and small business now 
depends on Google as their respective middleman for purchasing display ads from exchanges in 
order to market their goods and services to consumers. In addition to representing both the buyers 
and the sellers of online display advertising, Google also operates the largest exchange, AdX. In 
this electronically traded market, Google is pitcher, batter, and umpire, all at the same time. 
5. The scale of online display advertising markets in the United States is extraordinary. 
Google operates the largest electronic trading market in existence. Whereas financial exchanges 
such as the NYSE and NASDAQ match millions of trades to thousands of company symbols daily, 
Google’s exchange processes about 11 billion online ad spaces each day. In Google’s words, 
“[h]undreds of thousands of publishers and advertisers use [Google’s] AdX [exchange] to transact 
inventory, and more daily transactions are made on AdX than on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
combined.” At the same time, Google owns the largest buy-side and sell-side brokers. As one 
senior Google employee admitted, “[t]he analogy would be if Goldman or Citibank owned the 
NYSE.” Or more accurately, the analogy would be if Goldman or Citibank were a monopoly 
financial broker and owned the NYSE, which was a monopoly stock exchange. 
6. Google, however, did not accrue its monopoly power through excellence in the 
marketplace or innovations in its services alone. Google’s internal documents belie the public 
image of brainy Google engineers having fun at their sunny Mountain View campus while trying 
to make the world a better place. Rather, to cement its dominance across online display markets, 




Google has repeatedly and brazenly violated antitrust and consumer protection laws. Its modus 
operandi is to monopolize and misrepresent. Google uses its powerful position on every side of 
online display markets to unlawfully exclude competition. It also deceptively claims that “we’ll 
never sell your personal information to anyone,” but its entire business model centers on targeted 
advertising—the purchase and sale of advertisements targeted to individual users based on their 
personal information. From its earliest days, Google’s carefully curated public reputation of “don’t 
be evil” has enabled it to act with wide latitude. That latitude is enhanced by the extreme opacity 
and complexity of digital advertising markets, which are at least as complex as the most 
sophisticated financial markets in the world.  
7. The fundamental change for Google dates back to its 2008 acquisition of DoubleClick, 
the leading provider of the ad server tools that online publishers, including newspapers and other 
media companies, use to sell their graphical display advertising inventory on exchanges. After 
acquiring the leading middleman between publishers and exchanges, Google quickly monopolized 
the publisher ad server and exchange markets by engaging in unlawful tactics. For instance, 
Google started requiring publishers to license Google’s ad server and to transact through Google’s 
exchange in order to do business with those in another market in which Google possessed 
monopoly power: the one million plus advertisers who used Google as their middleman for buying 
inventory. So Google was able to demand that it represent the buy-side (i.e., advertisers), where it 
extracted one fee, as well as the sell-side (i.e., publishers), where it extracted a second fee, and it 
was also able to force transactions to clear in its exchange, where it extracted a third, even larger, 
fee.  
8. Within a few short years of executing this unlawful tactic, Google successfully 
monopolized the publisher ad server market and grew its ad exchange to number one, despite 




having entered those two markets much later than the competition. With a newfound hold on 
publisher ad servers, Google then proceeded to further foreclose publishers’ ability to trade in non-
Google exchanges. Google imposed a one-exchange-rule on publishers, barring them from routing 
inventory to more than one exchange at a time. At the same time, Google’s ad server blocked 
competition from non-Google exchanges through a program called Dynamic Allocation and 
falsely told publishers that Dynamic Allocation maximized their revenue. As internal documents 
reveal, however, Google’s real scheme with Dynamic Allocation was to permit its exchange to 
snatch publishers’ best inventory at the expense of publishers’ best interests. One industry 
publication put it succinctly: “[t]he lack of competition was costing pub[s] cold hard cash.” 
9. In an attempt to reinject competition in the exchange market, a new innovation called 
header bidding was devised. Publishers could use header bidding to simultaneously route their ad 
inventory to multiple exchanges in order to solicit the highest bid for the inventory. At first, header 
bidding promised to bypass Google’s stranglehold on the exchange market. By 2016, about 70 
percent of major online publishers in the United States had adopted the innovation. Advertisers 
also migrated to header bidding in droves because it helped them to purchase from exchanges 
offering the same inventory for the lowest price. 
10. Google quickly realized that this innovation substantially threatened its exchange’s 
ability to demand a very large—19 to 22 percent—cut on all advertising transactions. Header 
bidding also undermined Google’s ability to trade on inside and non-public information from one 
side of the market to advantage itself on the other—a practice that in other markets would be 
considered insider trading or front running. Google deceptively told the public that “we don’t see 
header bidding as a threat to our business. Not at all.” But privately, Google’s internal 




communications make clear Google viewed header bidding’s promotion of genuine competition 
as a major threat. In Google’s own words, header bidding was an “existential threat.”  
11. Google responded to this threat through a series of anticompetitive tactics. First, 
Google appeared to cede ground and allow publishers using its ad server to route their inventory 
to more than one exchange at a time. However, Google secretly made its own exchange win, even 
when another exchange submitted a higher bid. Google’s codename for this program was Jedi—a 
reference to Star Wars. And as one Google employee explained internally, Google deliberately 
designed Jedi to avoid competition, and Jedi consequently harmed publishers. In Google’s words, 
the Jedi program “generates suboptimal yields for publishers and serious risks of negative media 
coverage if exposed externally.” Next, Google tried to come up with other creative ways to shut 
out competition from exchanges in header bidding. During one internal debate, a Google employee 
proposed a “nuclear option” of reducing Google’s exchange fees down to zero. A second employee 
captured Google’s ultimate aim of destroying header bidding altogether, noting in response that 
the problem with simply competing on price is that it “doesn’t kill HB [header bidding].” Google 
wanted to be more aggressive. 
12. Google grew increasingly brazen in its efforts to undermine competition. In March 
2017, Google’s largest Big Tech rival, Facebook, announced that it would throw its weight behind 
header bidding. Like Google, Facebook brought millions of advertisers on board to reach the users 
on its social network. In light of Facebook’s deep knowledge of its users, Facebook could use 
header bidding to operate an electronic marketplace for online ads in competition with Google. 
Facebook’s marketplace for online ads is known as “Facebook Audience Network” or FAN. 
Google understood the severity of the threat to its position if Facebook were to enter the market 
and support header bidding. To diffuse this threat, Google made overtures to Facebook. Internal 




Facebook communications reveal that Facebook executives fully understood why Google wanted 
to cut a deal with them: “they want this deal to kill header bidding.” 
13. Any collaboration between two competitors of such magnitude should have set off the 
loudest alarm bells in terms of antitrust compliance. Apparently, it did not. Internally, Google 
documented that if it could not “avoid competing with FAN,” then it wanted to collaborate with 
Facebook to “build a moat.” Indeed, Facebook understood Google’s rationale as a monopolist very 
well. An internal Facebook communication at the highest level reveals that Facebook’s header 
bidding announcement was part of a pre-planned long-term strategy—an “18 [month] header 
bidding strategy”—to draw Google in. Facebook decided to dangle the threat of competition in 
Google’s face so it could then cut a deal to manipulate publishers’ auctions in its favor. 
14. In the end, Facebook curtailed its involvement with header bidding in return for Google 
giving Facebook information, speed, and other advantages in the ~43 billion auctions Google runs 
for publishers’ mobile app advertising inventory each month in the United States. As part of this 
agreement, Google and Facebook work together to identify users using Apple products. The parties 
also agreed up front on quotas for how often Facebook would win publishers’ auctions—literally 
manipulating the auction with minimum spends and quotas for how often Facebook would bid and 
win. In these auctions, Facebook and Google compete head-to-head as bidders. Google’s internal 
codename for this agreement, signed at the highest-level, was Jedi Blue—a twist on the Star Wars 
reference.  
15.  Above and beyond its unlawful agreement with Facebook, Google employed a number 
of other anticompetitive tactics to shut down competition from header bidding. Google deceived 
non-Google exchanges into bidding through Google instead of header bidding, telling them it 
would stop front running their orders when in fact it would not. Google employees also deceived 




publishers, telling one major online publisher that it should cut off a rival exchange in header 
bidding because of a strain on its servers. After this misrepresentation was uncovered, Google 
employees discussed playing a trick—a “jedi mind trick”—on the industry to nonetheless get 
publishers to cut off exchanges in header bidding. Google wanted to “get publishers to come up 
with the idea to remove exchanges … on their own.” Google then proceeded to cripple publishers’ 
ability to use header bidding in a variety of ways.  
16. Having reached its monopoly position, Google now uses its immense market power to 
extract a very high tax of 22 to 42 percent of the ad dollars otherwise flowing to the countless 
online publishers and content producers such as online newspapers, cooking websites, and blogs 
who survive by selling advertisements on their websites and apps. These costs invariably are 
passed on to the advertisers themselves and then to American consumers. The monopoly tax 
Google imposes on American businesses—advertisers like clothing brands, restaurants, and 
realtors—is a tax that is ultimately borne by American consumers through higher prices and lower 
quality on the goods, services, and information those businesses provide. Every American suffers 
when Google imposes its monopoly pricing on the sale of targeted advertising.  
17. From its earliest days, the internet’s fundamental tenet has been its decentralization: 
there is no controlling node, no single point of failure, and no central authority granting permission 
to offer or access online content. Online advertising is uniquely positioned to provide content to 
users at a massive scale. However, the open internet is now threatened by a single company. 
Google has become the controlling node and the central authority for online advertising, which 
serves as the primary currency enabling a free and open internet.  
18. Google’s current dominance is also merely a preview of its future plans. Google’s latest 
announcements with respect to its Chrome browser and privacy will further its longstanding plan 




to create a “walled garden”—a closed ecosystem—out of the otherwise-open internet. At the same 
time, Google uses “privacy” as a pretext to conceal its true motives.  
19. In sum, Google’s anticompetitive conduct has adversely and substantially affected the 
Plaintiff States’ economies, as well as the general welfare in the Plaintiff States. Google’s illegal 
conduct has reduced competition, raised prices, reduced quality, and reduced output in each of the 
Plaintiff States. This conduct has harmed the Plaintiff States’ respective economies by depriving 
the Plaintiff States and the persons within each Plaintiff State of the benefits of competition. 
20. As a result of Google’s deceptive trade practices and anticompetitive conduct, 
including its unlawful agreement with Facebook, Google has violated and continues to violate 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, as well as state antitrust and consumer 
protections laws. Plaintiff States bring this action to remove the veil of Google’s secret practices 
and put an end to Google’s anticompetitive abuses of its monopoly power in online advertising 
markets. Plaintiff States seek to restore free and fair competition to these markets and to secure 
structural, behavioral, and monetary relief to prevent Google from ever again engaging in 
deceptive trade practices and abusing its monopoly power to foreclose competition and harm 
consumers. 
II. PARTIES 
21. Plaintiff States, by and through their respective Attorneys General, bring this action in 
their respective sovereign capacities and as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens, general 
welfare, and economy of their respective States under their statutory, equitable, or common law 
powers, and pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.  
22. Google is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. Google is an online 
advertising technology company providing internet-related products, including various online 




advertising technologies, directly and through subsidiaries and business units it owns and controls. 
Google is owned by Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company incorporated and existing under the 
laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain View, California. 
III. JURISDICTION 
23. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 & 4; Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26; and under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1337. 
24. In addition to pleading violations of federal antitrust law, the Plaintiff States allege 
violations of state antitrust and consumer protection laws and seek civil penalties, restitution, 
disgorgement, damages, equitable relief, and/or other relief, as applicable, under those state laws. 
All claims under federal and state law are based upon a common nucleus of operative facts, and 
the entire action commenced by this Complaint constitutes a single case that would ordinarily be 
tried in one judicial proceeding. 
25. This Court has jurisdiction over the non-federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as 
well as under principles of pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction will avoid unnecessary 
duplication and multiplicity of actions and should be exercised in the interests of judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness.  
26. This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Google because Google conducts 
business in this District. Google has established sufficient contacts in this District such that 
personal jurisdiction is appropriate. Google sells the products at issue throughout the United States 
and across state lines. Google is engaged in, and its activities substantially affect, interstate trade 
and commerce. Google provides a range of products and services that are marketed, distributed, 
and offered to consumers throughout the United States, in the Plaintiff States, across state lines, 
and internationally. 





27. Venue is proper in this District under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiff 
States’ claims occurred in this District. Google transacts business and is found within this District. 
V. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
28. The internet revolutionized the way people consume content, and along with it, the 
types of advertisements that companies can purchase to reach consumers. Image-based ads on the 
internet (called “display ads”), as well as audio and video ads in the online world, have largely 
supplanted their traditional print, radio, and television counterparts. In addition, the internet 
ushered in completely new advertising formats, including targeted text-based ads on search 
engines, shareable ads on social media, and specialized ads inside mobile phone applications.  
29. For online publishers and advertisers alike, the different online advertising formats are 
not interchangeable. Online media companies that operate websites and mobile applications 
(“online publishers”) are necessarily restricted in the types of ad formats they can sell. A news 
website, for example, can generally sell display ads alongside its news articles but cannot generally 
sell search or audio ads to monetize the same content. At the same time, advertisers on the other 
end of the transaction purchase one format or another to serve their different goals. For instance, 
advertisers usually purchase search ads to reach consumers actively looking to make a purchase, 
whereas they typically purchase display ads to increase brand awareness. 
30. In addition to introducing new advertising formats, the internet changed how online 
publishers sell their advertising inventory. Online publishers sell their inventory to advertisers 
either directly or indirectly through ad marketplaces. The “direct” sales method refers to 
campaigns that the publisher itself sells directly to advertisers, including those campaigns sold by 
the publisher’s internal sales staff and through the publisher’s private auctions. For example, USA 




Today, as an online publisher, could negotiate directly with Disney, as an advertiser, to display 
Disney ads atop the USA Today homepage one million times in a particular month. But a publisher 
cannot always predict how many of its ad spaces will be available to sell directly to advertisers 
because its inventory depends on how many users actually visit the publisher’s website. Publishers 
can therefore find themselves with unsold surplus inventory, and this was the original impetus for 
the development of a specialized “indirect” distribution channel whereby publishers sell their ad 
inventory indirectly to advertisers. 
31.  “Indirect” sales occur through centralized electronic trading venues called “ad 
exchanges” and through “networks” of publishers and advertisers. Publishers selling this way 
permit ad exchanges to auction off some or all of their inventory to advertisers in real time (and in 
return, the ad exchange will retain a portion of proceeds).  
32. Whether online publishers sell their web display inventory directly or indirectly, the 
advertisements can target specific users in real time. When a user views a website or mobile app, 
advertisers purchase the individual spaces for ads (“impressions”) targeted to that user.  
33. Because publishers can target ads to specific users in real time, online publishers 
manage highly varied, or “heterogeneous,” inventory. One might think that a website with three 
pages and three different ad slots (i.e., impressions) per page would have a total of nine unique ad 
units to sell. But because online ads are targeted at individual users, the same site with 1,000,000 
readers actually has 9,000,000 different ad units to sell: each of the website’s impressions targeted 
to each unique reader. Consequently, an online publisher’s inventory is akin to the inventory of 
seats at a baseball stadium: no two pieces of inventory are the exact same and each is valued by its 
particulars. In online advertising, this includes the particulars of each person viewing each ad.  




34. Google likes to claim that it will “never sell your personal information to anyone,” with 
Google CEO Sundar Pichai deceptively claiming that such a policy is “unequivocal.” But Google 
leverages intimate user data and personal information to broker billions of daily online ad 
impressions between publishers and advertisers that target individual users based almost entirely 
on their personal information. Internal documents confirm that Google knows its users are 
deceived by its misrepresentations, even as it reaps billions from ads that use personal data to target 
those users. In Orwellian terms, it’s a beautiful thing for Google, the destruction of words like 
“sell” and “personal.” 
A. Online Display Advertising Markets  
35. Online publishers and advertisers depend on several different, distinct, and non-
interchangeable products to sell their web display inventory. These products include: (1) the ad 
server, which acts as the publisher’s inventory management system and helps the publisher sell its 
inventory, (2) the marketplaces that match buyers and sellers of display ads (exchanges and 
networks, separately), and (3) the ad buying tools that advertisers must use as their middleman to 
buy display inventory from exchanges. These products conduct the complex tasks associated with 
pricing, clearing, executing, and settling billions of display impressions every month in the United 
States. Google possesses monopoly power in each of these distinct markets. Imagine if the 
financial markets are controlled by one monopoly company, say Goldman Sachs, and that 
company then owns the NYSE, which is the largest financial exchange, that then trades on that 
exchange to advantage itself, eliminate competition, and charge a monopoly tax on billions of daily 
transactions. Obviously, no free, fair and functioning market could operate that way. Yet, that is 
today’s world of online display advertising.  




1. Publishers’ Inventory Management Systems: Ad Servers  
36. Large publishers such as CBS, Time, ESPN, Weather.com, and NPR depend on a 
sophisticated inventory management system called an ad server to holistically manage their display 
inventory on the web. Ad servers keep track of publishers’ heterogeneous ad inventory and help 
them sell that inventory both directly and indirectly through exchanges, with the stated goal of 
maximizing their advertising revenue. Publishers typically use a single ad server to manage all of 
their web display inventory; using multiple ad servers would substantially frustrate a publisher’s 
ability to effectively optimize management of their inventory and maximize revenue. 
 
37. When using an ad server, online publishers necessarily relinquish control over 
inventory management and revenue maximization. While a publisher can adjust some of the ways 
their ad server manages and sells inventory, an ad server’s features and limitations ultimately limit 
the publisher’s control. Publishers also rely on the specialization of their ad server to help them 
navigate the complexities of electronic trading: ad server account analysts individually advise 




online publishers on how to adjust the ad server’s parameters to increase revenue. Put simply, in a 
competitive market, ad servers advance publishers’ interests.  
38. To holistically manage a publisher’s web display inventory, the ad server performs 
three internal critical tasks related to selling ad space. First, the ad server identifies the users 
visiting the publisher’s webpage in order to manage ad inventory and maximize yield. When a user 
visits a webpage, the ad server—on behalf of and with the permission of the publisher—identifies 
the user through identification technology facilitated by the user’s web browser (e.g., Chrome or 
Safari) and/or mobile device (e.g., Android or iOS). To keep track of individual users, the ad server 
assigns each user a unique user ID (e.g., 5g77yuu3bjNH). By essentially “tagging” users with a 
unique user ID, an ad server helps publishers, ad exchanges, and advertisers know the identity and 
characteristics of each particular user associated with a publisher’s ad space. For example, an 
advertiser can correlate a user’s pseudonymous ID (e.g., 5g77yuu3bjNH) with the user’s identity 
(e.g., John Connor) and use that identity “link” to look up additional information about the user 
(e.g., John Connor lives in Los Angeles, drives Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and wears Oakley 
sunglasses). This, in turn, allows an advertiser to place a value on the ad space each individual user 
will see. User IDs are also used for “frequency capping,” which limits the number of times a user 
is shown a particular ad to avoid oversaturating the user. Additionally, user IDs facilitate 
evaluation of ad campaigns’ effectiveness by allowing publishers and advertisers to track whether 
a user took a subsequent action (e.g., clicking on an ad, signing up for a service, or purchasing a 
product). This “attribution” is critical for some ad campaign billing models, including cost-per-
conversion models whereby advertisers are charged only when users take a specified action.  
39. The second critical task ad servers perform is managing how publishers sell ad space 
indirectly through advertising marketplaces such as ad exchanges. Publisher ad servers connect 




with multiple marketplaces and let publishers automatically route their inventory into them for sale 
as the users load publishers’ webpages. As the middleman between a publisher and marketplaces 
(exchanges and networks), the ad server controls how the different marketplaces can access and 
compete for a publisher’s inventory.  
40. The third critical task performed by ad servers is routing inventory correctly between a 
publisher’s direct and indirect sales channels. As Google’s internal documents show, only a tiny 
percentage of publishers’ ad impressions are considered “high value,” which refers to impressions 
targeted to users likely to make a purchase. Indeed, publishers generally make almost all (~80 
percent) of their revenue from just a small portion (~20 percent) of their impressions. When a 
publisher like ESPN sells their most valuable inventory directly to an advertiser like Fanatics.com 
for premium prices, they rely on their ad server to allocate the impressions targeted to high-value 
users—e.g., sports fanatics who have a propensity for buying merchandise for their favorite sports 
team—to those direct deals. 
 
41. Because the ad server sits between a publisher and the publisher’s indirect sales 
channel, the ad server can obstruct competition between the multiple exchanges competing for 
publishers’ impressions in a variety of ways. For example, the ad server might interfere with a 
publisher’s ability to share full information about its impressions with exchanges (e.g., the user 




IDs associated with each publisher impression). Alternatively, an ad server might prevent 
publishers from understanding how their inventory performs in one exchange versus another. 
Without this transparency of information, a publisher cannot reward a better-performing exchange 
with more of its business. Transparency fuels competition between marketplaces to maximize 
value for publishers, and ultimately, for the consumer.  
42. Despite the relative complexity of ad servers, prior to Google’s entrance into the 
publisher ad server market, ad servers were “a commodity good.” They neutrally routed 
publishers’ inventory to exchanges (thereby helping publishers maximize their inventory yield) 
and charged a low cost-per-impression rate or monthly subscription fee. Google’s conduct 
substantially changed this market. 
43. Now, Google monopolizes the publisher ad server market for display inventory through 
its product called Google Ad Manager (GAM). Google originally acquired its publisher ad server 
in 2008 from DoubleClick. In 2011, Google acquired and integrated AdMeld, a yield optimization 
technology that further helped publishers efficiently route inventory to exchanges and networks. 
Today, GAM controls over 90 percent of this product market in the United States. Essentially 
every major website (including, e.g., USA Today, ESPN, CBS, Time, Walmart, and Weather.com) 
uses GAM. GAM, as the middleman between publishers and exchanges, has the power to foreclose 
competition in the exchange market. 
2. Electronic Marketplaces for Display Advertising: Exchanges and Networks 
44. The vast majority of online publishers in the United States today sell at least some of 
their inventory to advertisers indirectly through advertising marketplaces (exchanges and 
networks). Large publishers like CNN and The Wall Street Journal predominantly use ad 
exchanges, whereas smaller publishers like local newspapers and individual blogs typically use ad 
networks. 




i. Display Ad Exchanges 
45. Ad exchanges for display ads are real-time auction marketplaces that match multiple 
buyers and multiple sellers on an impression-by-impression basis. A publisher’s ad server can 
route the publisher’s inventory to exchanges in real time as users load webpages. The exchanges 
then connect with advertisers through their respective middleman (ad buying tools). In other 
words, the entities that have a “seat” to bid on exchanges are not the actual advertisers (e.g., Ford 
or a local car dealership), but their respective agents. In addition, exchanges do not bear inventory 
risk. That is, the ad exchange serves as an intermediary, connecting publishers’ inventory with 
willing buyers in real time. 
 
 
46. Ad exchanges are mostly intended for large online publishers. To sell in ad exchanges, 
online publishers must meet minimum impression or spend requirements. For example, Google’s 
AdX exchange is only open to publishers that have 5 million page views or 10 million impressions 
per month. These requirements put exchanges out of reach for many small online publishers such 
as local newspapers and blogs.  
47. Google owns and operates the largest display ad exchange in the United States, 
historically called the Google Ad Exchange or “AdX.” Google compares its ad exchange to 




financial exchanges like the NYSE and Nasdaq. However, contrary to Google’s comparison, AdX 
is not an open exchange like the NYSE.  
48. Ad exchanges charge publishers a share of transaction value, which is currently 5 to 20 
percent (or more) of the inventory’s clearing price. Google’s exchange charges publishers 19 to 
22 percent of exchange clearing prices, which is double to quadruple the prices of some of its 
nearest exchange competitors. For example, if Google’s exchange sells $100,000 worth of a 
publisher’s inventory, Google will extract at least $19,000. The dramatically higher price (or “take 
rate”) of Google’s exchange evidences its substantial market power. 
49. Google’s exchange fees are also exponentially higher than analogous exchange fees on 
a stock exchange where, by contrast, fees are low and set by volume instead of transaction value. 
Imagine if the NYSE charged an individual a fee equivalent to a double-digit percentage of the 
value of the overall stock trade—e.g., $19,000 as a transaction fee on a $100,000 stock trade. That 
is how much Google charges on transactions between an online publisher like ESPN and an 
advertiser like Fanatics.  
50. Internally, Google concedes that an electronic exchange such as its own should not 
normally be able to extract such high fees in the market. As one Google employee frankly 
conceded, “an exchange shouldn’t be an immensely profitable business” like Google’s AdX, but 
should instead be “like a public good used to facilitate buyers and sellers.” As this litigation will 
make clear, Google can charge these fees for one simple reason: Google uses its monopoly over 
publishers’ ad servers to unlawfully foreclose competition in the exchange market. 
51. By controlling publishers’ inventory through its ad server and simultaneously operating 
the largest ad exchange, Google has inherent conflicts of interest between publishers’ best interests 
and its own. Google charges a low cost for acting as publishers’ sell-side intermediary but then 




makes substantially higher fees when selling those publishers’ inventory in its exchange. 
Accordingly, Google incentivizes itself to steer publishers’ inventory towards its exchange, where 
it can extract double to quadruple the rate of some of its nearest exchange competitors. 
 
ii. Ad Networks for Display and Ad Networks for Mobile In-App 
Inventory 
52. Whereas large online publishers typically sell their inventory through ad exchanges, 
small online publishers predominantly sell their inventory in marketplaces called “ad networks.” 
Ad networks cater almost exclusively to the needs of smaller and lower-traffic online publishers 
such as local online newspapers and independent content creators’ websites and apps. Like ad 
exchanges, ad networks match publishers’ inventory with their advertisers’ demand. But unlike 
exchanges, networks do not require publishers to meet high monthly minimum impression or 
spend requirements. Rather, networks obscure prices within auctions, which enables them to 
capture undisclosed margins; neither the buyers nor sellers will know whether the network takes, 




e.g., 20 or 50 percent of matched trades. Moreover, networks often carry inventory risk. That is, 
they purchase (and then sell) impressions on their own behalf, as opposed to purchasing on behalf 
of an advertiser or buy-side middleman.  
53. In the network market, there are networks for publishers that sell web display inventory, 
and separately, networks for mobile applications that sell in-app inventory. Google operates the 
leading web display network, as well as the leading mobile app network.  
54. Google’s display advertising network, known as the Google Display Network 
(“GDN”), is described by Google as “the largest ad network in the world.” GDN operates as a 
closed marketplace accessible only by advertisers who use one of Google’s products to buy 
publisher ad inventory. Here, Google charges even higher fees—around 32 to 40 percent of each 
transaction—to the small publishers and advertisers using GDN than it does to the large players 
on AdX.  
55. Google also owns AdMob, the largest ad network selling mobile app inventory on 
behalf of mobile app developers such as Spotify. Google’s closest competitor in the mobile app 
network market is Facebook’s Audience Network, FAN, although Google internal documents 
suggest that Google’s share of the market is eight times larger than FAN’s. Advertisers can use 
Facebook’s website to purchase ads on Facebook and Instagram, as well as mobile app inventory 
from third-party apps like Shazam or Huffington Post who sell their inventory via FAN. In the 
discrete market for mobile app networks competing to sell third-party app publishers’ impressions 
to advertisers, Google and Facebook compete head-to-head.  
56. In sum, millions of websites and mobile apps sell their inventory in Google’s exchange 
for display ads and its ad networks for display and mobile in-app ads. As a result, competition on 




the buy-side among the middlemen that serve advertisers depends on access to Google’s exchange 
and networks. Google is the bottleneck between publishers and advertisers.  
 
3. Ad Buying Tools for Large and Small Advertisers 
57. Just as publishers rely on ad servers to sell their inventory in ad exchanges, advertisers 
use specialized middlemen, ad buying tools, to represent their own interests. Large advertisers use 
ad buying tools called demand-side platforms (“DSPs”), while small businesses use pared-down 
analogues. Google analogizes these buying tools to “brokerage houses” in financial markets, with 
small advertisers using a “fund manager to pick stocks for you” and large advertisers “using 
ETrade to pick stocks yourself.”  
58. Just as publishers typically use only a single ad server, small advertisers tend to use 
just one intermediary at a time to optimize buying across multiple exchanges and/or networks. Ad 
buying tools let advertisers set parameters integral to their purchasing decisions, including details 




about the types of users they want to target and the maximum bids they are willing to submit for 
various types of display ad inventory. On an advertiser’s behalf, an ad buying tool uses these 
parameters to automatically bid on ad space in exchanges and networks in an effort to acquire it at 
the lowest cost. Some enterprise buying tools, including The Trade Desk, compete by minimizing 
conflicts of interest and not simultaneously operating an exchange or sell-side ad server. 
59. Ad buying tools for large advertisers (DSPs) offer robust and complex bidding and 
trading options ill-suited for smaller and less sophisticated advertisers. In fact, DSPs are so 
complex that they are frequently not used or managed by the actual advertisers (e.g., Ford), but by 
the advertisers’ specialized ad buying team (e.g., an ad agency or specialized division at an agency 
called a “trading desk”). The different types of ad buying tools are also sold at different price 
levels. DSPs usually require high minimum monthly spend commitments, sometimes $10,000 or 
more, whereas ad buying tools for small advertisers can require just a few dollars to get started. 
For example, Amazon’s DSP requires a monthly commitment of over $35,000, while Google’s 
buying tool for small advertisers (Google Ads) requires no monthly minimum spend.  
 




60. When a user visits a publisher’s website, the ad server can route the publisher’s 
available impressions to exchanges, along with information about the impression, including the 
user’s ID, the ad slot’s parameters, and any rules about pricing. Each exchange then sends a “bid 
request” to the ad buying tools who have a “seat” to bid in the exchange and act as advertisers’ 
middlemen. These bid requests also contain information about the impression at issue and convey 
a “timeout,” which is the amount of time the advertisers have to respond with their “bid response.” 
Within this timeframe, which is typically a mere fraction of a second, each ad buying tool must 
unpack the information contained in the bid request, gather and deploy personal information about 
the user, determine the appropriate price to bid on behalf of the prospective advertiser, and return 
a bid response to the exchange. When time expires, each exchange closes its auction, excludes any 
late bids, and chooses a winner. The publisher’s ad server then selects the advertisement associated 
with the highest exchange bid and returns it on the user’s page before the page has even finished 
loading. The user simply sees a display ad adjacent to the web content they are reading. This 
leveraging of personal information in a real-time auction happens every minute of every day for 
millions of Americans browsing the internet. 





61. To compete effectively in an exchange’s auction, not only must ad buying tools return 
bids to exchanges before their timeout expires, but they must be able to adequately identify relevant 
characteristics of the user associated with each impression (e.g., an impression targeted to John 
Connor the motorcycle enthusiast verses an impression targeted to a user who has shown no 
interest motorcycles). An exchange as large as Google’s can exclude and harm competition 
between the bidders in its auction by giving a subset of bidders an advantage in terms of, e.g., 
information (e.g., more robust information about the user) or speed (e.g., longer timeouts, which 
translates to more time to calculate and return bids).  
62. Google operates the largest buy-side middlemen for advertisers, i.e., the ad buying tools 
for both large and small advertisers. Google’s DSP (enterprise buying tool for large advertisers 
such as Toyota or Nestle) is called DV360; it arose from Google’s acquisition of the DSP Invite 
Media. Google’s ad buying tool for small advertisers, on the other hand, is called “Google Ads,” 
and it is designed for (what Google calls) the “smaller, less sophisticated advertisers.” DV360 
charges advertisers an 8 to 9 percent commission to purchase inventory from exchanges, whereas 




Google Ads charges small advertisers a much higher and undisclosed 15 percent commission when 
purchasing inventory from Google’s exchange. 
63. Although Google executives considered “creating a completely neutral platform like 
the NYSE,” they ultimately chose instead to stack the deck in their favor by owning the exchange 
and giving preferred access to Google’s buy-side middlemen. Indeed, Google’s exchange gives 
Google Ads and DV360 information and speed advantages when bidding on behalf of advertisers. 
Such preferred access helps explain why Google’s ad buying tools win the overwhelming 
majority—over 80 percent—of the auctions hosted on Google’s dominant ad exchange, AdX.  
64. Google’s ad buying intermediaries also do not always act in the best interests of their 
clients. For instance, Google subjects the smaller and less sophisticated advertisers to complicated 
arbitrages that are extraordinarily difficult to understand. Specifically, when bidding on behalf of 
those advertisers on Google’s exchange, Google can manipulate or adjust their bids. Google also 
processes their bids through two auctions, keeps a spread between the two, and does not disclose 
to the advertiser the price that ad space actually cleared on Google’s exchange. Google discloses 
this in fine print distributed across multiple separate documents. When Google ultimately explains 
why it “automatically” routes advertisers’ bids across multiple markets, the language is 
misleading: “If you go butterfly hunting during the height of summer, the bigger your butterfly 
net, the more butterflies you’ll be able to catch.” Google, however, does not clarify who it is 
hunting.  




VI. THE RELEVANT MARKETS AND GOOGLE’S MARKET POWER 
A. Publisher Inventory Management: Publisher Ad Servers  
1. Publisher ad servers for web display inventory in the United States are a 
relevant antitrust market. 
65. Publisher ad servers for web display inventory (“publisher ad servers”) in the United 
States are a relevant antitrust product market. Publisher ad servers are inventory management 
systems that publishers use to holistically manage their online display advertising inventory—the 
image-based graphical ads shown alongside web content. Ad servers provide publishers with 
features such as: (1) reservation-based sales technology to support the publisher’s direct sales 
efforts; (2) inventory forecasting technology to help the publisher determine what inventory will 
be available to sell; (3) a user interface through which the publisher’s sales team can input ad 
requirements and parameters; (4) co-management of direct and indirect sales channels; (5) report 
generation of ad inventory performance; (6) invoicing capabilities for the publisher’s direct 
campaigns; (7) a decision engine for determining what ad will ultimately serve on the publisher’s 
page; and (8) yield management technology.  
66. Generally, ad servers charge publishers based on the volume of ads served. Most 
publishers “single home,” using just one ad server to holistically manage all of their web display 
inventory. When a publisher sells more than one type of inventory (e.g., web display, in-app, 
and/or video), they might use one ad server for their display inventory and a second for their in-
app or video inventory, or they might still use a single ad server that manages all of their ad formats. 
Using multiple ad servers for the same format, however, would create conflicts between the ad 
servers, thereby defeating the point of the ad servers’ crucial inventory management functions.  
67. Publisher ad servers are unique. They are not interchangeable with exchanges, 
networks, advertiser ad servers, or ad buying tools for large or small advertisers. None of those 




products can manage a publisher’s direct sales channel or offer the reporting, invoicing, or 
forecasting functions publishers need to holistically manage their inventory and optimize yield. 
68. Advertising marketplaces, including ad networks and exchanges, are not effective 
substitutes for publisher ad servers. For example, Google’s exchange is not, and cannot serve as, 
an ad management platform for direct sales. Google said as much when seeking to acquire 
DoubleClick, making explicit representations to the United States Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) regarding the non-interchangeability of ad servers and networks. Indeed, Google 
described any suggestion that ad servers and ad networks are interchangeable as “seriously flawed 
and utterly divorced from commercial reality.” More specifically, Google represented that its 
existing display ad network (then called AdSense) and the ad server it sought to (and then did) 
acquire (DFP) “are not direct substitutes” (emphasis added), explaining that “[i]f the price of DFP 
were increased by a small but significant amount, customers would switch to other publisher-side 
ad serving products, such as those provided by 24/7 Real Media, Atlas/aQuantive.” In other words, 
Google has long acknowledged that while publisher ad servers are substitutes for each other, ad 
networks and other advertising marketplaces are not.  
69. Building an ad server is not a substitute for licensing an ad server. Building an ad server 
from scratch requires scale, substantial capital, and deep access to highly sophisticated engineering 
resources; it is a viable option usually only for the very largest online publishers (e.g., Facebook). 
And the few publishers who have built in house ad server technology do not license it to third 
parties. So, neither building an ad server from scratch nor licensing another publisher’s in house 
ad server is an alternative to licensing a publisher ad server. 
70. Publisher ad servers’ customers are large and medium online publishers who need to 
manage both direct and indirect sales channels, including, e.g., CBS, Spotify, Time, ESPN, Major 




League Baseball, Walmart, Weather.com, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, eBay, 
NBC, Pandora, Trip Advisor, NPR, Buzzfeed, and many more. But smaller publishers lacking 
significant direct sales volume do not use publisher ad servers. Google advertises this distinction 
to potential customers: “Google Ad Manager is an ad management platform for large publishers 
who have significant direct sales.”  
71. The relevant geographic market for publisher display ad servers is the United States. 
Publisher ad servers available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute for ad servers 
available in the United States.  
2. Google has monopoly power in the publisher ad server market. 
72. Google has monopoly power in the publisher ad server market in the United States. 
Google’s monopoly power in this market is supported and evidenced by its high market share. 
More than 90 percent of large publishers use Google’s publisher ad server, Google Ad Manager 
(“GAM” f/k/a “DFP”), according to published reports. Google internal documents show that GAM 
served the vast majority—75 percent—of all online display ad impressions in the United States in 
the third quarter of 2018. 
73. Google’s own documents confirm that it has held a consistent monopoly position in the 
publisher ad server market for at least a decade. By 2012, just four years after Google acquired 
DoubleClick, Google estimated that 78 percent of large online publishers in the United States used 
Google’s ad server. Since then, Google’s closest competitors have either exited the market entirely 
or have been relegated to negligible market shares.  
74. As above, Google urged the FTC to permit its acquisition of DoubleClick by positing 
that several competing publisher ad servers—24/7 Real Media and Atlas/aQuantive—were viable 
alternatives for publishers if Google were to increase DFP’s prices. Those competitors have since 
exited the market. 




75. Google’s monopoly power in the publisher ad server market is further confirmed by 
direct evidence. Defying the existence of competitive restraints, Google has degraded quality and 
charged supra-competitive fees in the publisher ad server market. For example, Google’s ad server 
now charges publishers for routing their inventory to exchanges and networks. When deciding 
how much to charge publishers for routing their inventory to non-Google exchanges, Google 
arbitrarily landed on 5 percent of gross spend; they did not consider competitive constraints such 
as what the market would bear. On top of this, Google’s ad server charges a 10 percent fee of gross 
transactions for routing publishers’ inventory to non-Google ad networks. When publishers route 
their inventory to exchanges and networks using a non-Google routing service called header 
bidding, publishers pay no fee whatsoever for routing to exchanges and networks. Google’s 
unilateral ability to extract non-competitive ad server fees demonstrates its monopoly power.  
76. Instead of pursuing and providing procompetitive welfare-enhancing innovations with 
its publisher ad server, many of Google’s product changes actually degraded quality, thereby 
further illustrating Google’s monopoly power and the utter lack of real competitive constraints in 
the publisher ad server market. Examples are numerous and discussed throughout this Complaint; 
they include unpopular changes such as Dynamic Allocation, Enhanced Dynamic Allocation, and 
Google’s prohibition on publishers setting different price floors for different ad exchanges and ad 
buying tools (which depresses publishers’ inventory yield for Google’s direct benefit). Despite 
widespread publisher dissatisfaction over the price and quality of Google’s ad server, Google has 
not suffered any loss to its ad server market share or dominance.  
77. Google’s market power in the publisher ad server market is protected by significant 
barriers to entry and expansion, notably including high switching costs. For publishers, switching 
ad servers is both risky and resource intensive. Some publishers have inventory on hundreds of 




thousands, or even hundreds of millions, of webpages, which makes switching ad servers 
exceedingly expensive, difficult, and time consuming. Moreover, the switching process also entails 
significant revenue risk, as even minor glitches during the transition can disrupt and prevent 
delivery of advertiser campaigns. Industry experts compare a change in ad servers to “switching 
engines in mid-flight.” Google’s internal documents confirm publishers’ high switching costs. 
Because switching costs are high, publishers are effectively locked in. 
78. In addition to high switching costs in the ad server market, Google’s own 
anticompetitive conduct imposes additional barriers to entry and expansion. The most notable is 
probably Google’s tying of its publisher ad server with its ad exchange, ad network, and ad buying 
tools. As addressed further in the Anticompetitive Conduct section below, once Google had both 
a publisher ad server (acquired from DoubleClick) and an ad exchange (launched in 2009), they 
made it so the massive number of advertisers using Google Ads (the ad buying tool for smaller 
advertisers to bid on display space) could transact only in Google’s own ad network and/or ad 
exchange, not in any non-Google network or exchange. With so many advertisers funneled 
exclusively into Google’s exchange, Google also made it so that publishers could receive bids 
from these advertisers (necessary for maximizing yield) only by licensing Google’s ad server and 
transacting in Google’s exchange. The resulting situation imposes near-insurmountable barriers to 
entry and expansion for any potential or actual provider of publisher ad server technology. 
Moreover, this situation further illustrates how Google’s pricing power is unencumbered by 
competitive constraints: Google demanded that it represent the buy-side, where it extracted one 
fee, as well as the sell-side, where it extracted a second fee, and it also forced transactions to clear 
in its own network and exchange, where it extracted even more fees. 




B. Ad Exchanges 
1. Exchanges for web display inventory in the United States are a relevant 
antitrust market.  
79. Exchanges for web display inventory (“exchanges”) in the United States are a relevant 
antitrust product market. They are marketplaces in which publishers’ display inventory is 
auctioned off to end-advertisers (through advertisers’ middlemen) on an impression-by-impression 
basis and in real time. On the sell-side, exchanges generally interface with publishers through the 
publishers’ ad server (e.g., Google’s ad server). On the buy-side, they interface with advertisers 
through ad buying tools, including those for large advertisers (e.g., Google’s DV360) and for small 
advertisers (e.g., Google Ads), and sometimes, even ad networks.  
80. Exchange marketplaces exhibit several unique features. First, they do not bear 
inventory risk. Instead, they connect a publisher’s inventory with an immediate willing buyer, as 
opposed to purchasing and then reselling ad space. Second, exchanges monetize by charging the 
publisher with a transparent percentage of transaction value, as opposed to monetizing via 
arbitrage or taking a non-transparent fee. Third, to sell directly on an exchange, most exchanges 
require publishers to meet minimum monthly requirements for impression volume and/or spend. 
This puts direct relationships with exchanges out of the reach of smaller publishers, who are 
effectively relegated to selling their inventory in the less-transparent marketplaces called networks 
(addressed below). Finally, large advertisers (e.g., Procter & Gamble) purchase primarily in 
exchanges, not networks; so in order to efficiently sell ad space to these large advertisers, 
publishers must also transact there.  
81. The publishers who license Google’s ad server and sell their display inventory through 
marketplaces primarily do so through exchanges, not networks. For example, one major online 




publisher in the United States sold over 80 percent of their indirect display inventory to exchanges, 
not networks.  
82. Ad exchanges are unique and not interchangeable with publisher ad servers, ad 
networks, or ad buying tools for large or small advertisers; those products serve different types of 
customers (e.g., advertisers on the buy-side rather than publishers on the sell-side). They also have 
vastly different sets of features and price points. A small but significant increase in the price of an 
ad exchange does not cause publishers to switch, e.g., to an ad server, ad network, or ad buying 
tool, as none of those products provide a real-time auction marketplace with the features unique to 
exchanges.  
83. Ad exchanges are also not interchangeable with direct sales channels. For publishers, 
selling inventory directly requires substantial investment in and development of expertise around 
managing, selling, and serving online ad campaigns; it is an expensive proposition for publishers. 
For advertisers, buying inventory directly likewise requires considerable expertise and ongoing 
investment. For direct deals, publishers and advertisers alike typically must hire and maintain 
internal staff to manage these one-to-one relationships. As a result, the direct sales channel tends 
to be reserved for very high-value publisher-advertiser transactions. For instance, a large online 
publisher like The Wall Street Journal would generally not directly transact with a local Ford 
dealership, as the monthly value of those transactions would probably be no more than a few 
thousand dollars. They would, however, gladly transact with that dealership indirectly through an 
ad exchange, even if the total value of monthly transactions was just a few dollars. Reflecting these 
differences, ad servers and exchanges charge publishers completely different prices. Ad servers 
tend to charge publishers a low fixed-cost per volume of ads served, whereas exchanges tend to 
charge publishers anywhere from 5 to in excess of 20 percent of each impression’s clearing price. 




Ultimately, a small but significant increase in price for ad exchanges does not cause customers to 
switch to publisher ad servers, and the barrier to switching outweighs the cost.  
84. The relevant geographic market for display ad exchanges is the United States. Display 
ad exchanges available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute for display ad exchanges 
available in the United States.  
2. Google has monopoly power in the exchange market. 
85. Google has monopoly power in the United States in the display ad exchange market. 
Despite an early competitive landscape, Google’s ad exchange (historically called AdX) has 
enjoyed dominance in the United States since at least 2013. By October 2019, it transacted over 
60 percent of all display ad inventory sold on ad exchanges in the United States, and that 
percentage has increased substantially since Google’s introduction of Unified Pricing rules in late 
2019 (as addressed further in the Anticompetitive Conduct section below).  
86. Finally, for online publishers with high-value users, Google’s exchange transacts an 
even greater share of impressions. For example, Google’s exchange transacts over 80 percent of 
one major online publisher’s exchange impressions, even though the publisher routes and sells its 
impressions in at least six other exchanges.  
87. The closest competitors to Google’s exchange include the exchanges provided by 
Magnite, AT&T’s Xandr, and Index Exchange. But those exchanges transact much smaller shares 
of publishers’ exchange impressions; in comparison to the more-than 60 percent of indirect 
impressions flowing through exchanges that Google’s exchange routinely transacts, Google’s 
closest exchange competitors typically transact a mere 4 to 5 percent of the same publishers’ 
exchange impressions.  
88. Direct evidence confirms Google’s monopoly power in the display ad exchange 
market. Google’s exchange has the power to control prices. It is able to charge supra-competitive 




prices, which are 19 to 22 percent of every trade. By contrast, the prices charged by Google’s 
closest exchange competitors are considerably lower: from 15 percent down to a mere 5 percent. 
Despite their lower prices, these competing exchanges are simply unable to grow their market 
share. 
89. Additionally, Google’s ability to increase prices (i.e., its take rate) in the exchange 
market further demonstrates its durable monopoly power. Google’s 2018 internal documents 
observed that “[r]ecent market dynamics ... are putting pressure on the 20% fee.” Nevertheless, 
Google did not reduce its average exchange take rate from 2017 to 2020. In fact, Google increased 
its exchange take rate from 2017 to 2019 (from 20 percent for third-party buyers buying through 
AdX in 2017 to 22 percent in 2019). The fact that Google did not lower its take rates, and instead 
increased them, demonstrates that Google has insulated its exchange from any of the competitive 
market dynamics that would otherwise incentivize them to lower their prices.  
90. Google’s monopoly power is also evidenced by the fact that its exchange does not lose 
market share when competitors drop their prices. For example, when rival exchanges attempted to 
gain market share by lowering their prices in 2017, Google’s exchange maintained or even 
increased prices and still increased its market share. Competing exchanges have not been able to 
meaningfully increase their market shares, despite some cutting their take rates by half. 
91. Google’s market power in the exchange market is also protected by significant barriers 
to entry and expansion. The first is a sort of chicken-and-egg problem; a new entrant must achieve 
a sufficient scale of both publishers and advertisers on its exchange to become viable. A second 
barrier is imposed by Google itself. Employing a variety of anticompetitive tactics, Google 
unilaterally captures a large volume of the transactions otherwise available to competing 
exchanges by causing its publisher ad server to preferentially route transactions to its exchange (as 




addressed further in the Anticompetitive Conduct section below). Moreover, Google imposes yet 
another barrier by exclusively and preferentially routing the bids of advertisers who use DV360 
and Google Ads to Google’s exchange (through a separate set of anticompetitive conduct 
addressed below). 
C. Ad Networks  
1. Networks for web display inventory in the United States are a relevant 
antitrust market. 
92. The market for web display ad networks (“networks”) in the United States is a relevant 
antitrust product market. Display ad networks are a type of indirect marketplace that differ from 
exchanges in their features and price points. While networks, like exchanges, match publishers’ 
ad inventory with advertisers, networks do not necessarily do this on a real-time impression-by-
impression basis. Moreover, networks often carry inventory risk. That is, they purchase (and then 
sell) impressions on their own behalf, as opposed to purchasing on behalf of an advertiser or buy-
side middleman. Networks often do not provide impression-by-impression price transparency to 
the sell- or buy- sides of the transaction (i.e., the publishers or the advertisers). Instead, networks 
obscure prices within auctions, which enables them to capture undisclosed margins; neither the 
buyers nor sellers will know whether the network takes, e.g., 20 or 50 percent of matched trades. 
The qualitative differences between exchanges and networks result in two entirely different price 
points: networks are more expensive than exchanges on a per transaction basis.  
93. Compared to exchanges, networks tend to match smaller advertisers’ ads with ad space 
from smaller publishers. Smaller publishers (e.g., local newspapers, niche websites, and blogs with 
a comparatively lower volume of impressions) are attracted to networks because, unlike 
exchanges, networks rarely require publishers to meet minimum impression or spend 
requirements. For example, Google does not impose monthly page view or impression 




requirements on publishers who sell through Google’s network (the Google Display Network or 
“GDN”). Additionally, networks tend to be more restrictive on the buy-side, often refusing to 
accept bids from ad buying tools for large advertisers (DSPs).  
94. Ad networks are unique. They and not interchangeable with publisher ad servers, 
exchanges, or ad buying tools for large or small advertisers; those products serve different types 
of customers (e.g., advertisers on the buy-side rather than publishers on the sell-side). They also 
have vastly different sets of features and price points. A small but significant increase in the price 
of an ad network does not cause publishers to switch, e.g., to an ad server, an ad exchange, or an 
ad buying tool, as none of those products provide smaller publishers and advertisers with the 
features unique to network marketplaces.  
95. The relevant geographic market for display ad networks is the United States. Display 
ad networks available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute for display ad networks 
available in the United States.  
2. Google has monopoly power in the network market. 
96. Google has monopoly power in the web display ad network market in the United States. 
Google describes its ad network (GDN) as “the largest ad network marketplace in the world.” 
GDN reaches more user impressions and websites than any other display network, including over 
2 million small online publishers globally. No other display ad network in the United States reaches 
as many publishers and advertisers. Google has immense scale amongst the long tail of small 
online publishers. 
97. Direct evidence confirms Google’s monopoly power in the display ad network market. 
GDN charges high double-digit commissions of at least 32 percent on advertising transactions, 
which, according to public sources, is double the “standard rate” elsewhere in the industry. 
Internally, Google acknowledges that its fees are very high and that it can demand them because 




of its market power. For example, in an internal 2016 conversation, Google executives commented 
that Google’s ad networks make “A LOT of money” with its commission, and they acknowledged 
that they do this because, quite simply, “we can.” “Smaller pubs don’t have alternative revenue 
sources,” explained one Google employee when addressing the lack of viable competing ad 
networks available to its customers.  
98. Significant barriers to entry and expansion protect Google’s display ad network 
monopoly power. Employing a variety of anticompetitive tactics, Google unilaterally captures a 
large volume of the transactions otherwise available to competing networks by causing its 
publisher ad server to preferentially route transactions to its display ad network (as addressed 
further in the Anticompetitive Conduct section below). Moreover, Google imposes yet another 
barrier by preferentially routing the bids of advertisers who use Google’s ad buying tool for small 
advertisers (Google Ads) to its own GDN ad network (through a separate set of anticompetitive 
conduct addressed below). Scale also operates as a barrier to entry. Ad networks need scale on 
both the supply and demand sides; natural network effects make it difficult for any new networks 
to enter and achieve scale. 
D. Ad Buying Tools for Large and Small Advertisers 
99. Just as publishers use ad servers to advance their own interests (e.g., inventory 
management and maximizing revenue), advertisers use ad buying tools to advance their own 
interests (e.g., accessing and purchasing ad inventory appropriate for their campaigns at the lowest 
prices). Broadly speaking, ad buying tools let advertisers set parameters integral to their purchasing 
decisions, including details about the types of users they want to target and the maximum bids they 
are willing to submit for various types of display ad inventory. Ad buying tools then use these 
parameters to automatically bid (on the advertiser’s behalf) for ad space in exchanges and 
networks. 




100. But there are two distinct types of ad buying tools—those for small advertisers and 
those for large advertisers—and they are not usually interchangeable with each other. Ad buying 
tools for small advertisers are, in essence, pared-down analogues of the ad buying tools for large 
advertisers, which are typically referred to as DSPs (demand-side platforms).  
101. These two different types of ad buying tools differ widely in both the features they offer 
and the pricing and minimum spend requirements they impose. Fundamentally, DSPs serve and 
are designed for a different type of advertiser than ad buying tools for small advertisers. DSPs 
offer robust and complex bidding and trading options ill-suited for smaller and less sophisticated 
advertisers. In fact, DSPs are so complex that they are frequently not used or managed by the actual 
advertisers (e.g., Ford), but by the advertisers’ specialized ad buying team (e.g., an ad agency or 
specialized division at an agency called a “trading desk”). Conversely, ad buying tools for small 
advertisers usually do not meet the transparency, optimization, sophistication, or bidding needs of 
large advertisers.  
102. Furthermore, the different types of ad buying tools are also sold at different price levels. 
DSPs usually require high minimum monthly spend commitments, sometimes $10,000 or more, 
whereas ad buying tools for small advertisers can require just a few dollars to get started. For 
example, Amazon’s DSP requires a monthly commitment of over $35,000, while Google’s buying 
tool for small advertisers (Google Ads) requires no monthly minimum spend. In 2020, Google Ads 
had thousands of advertisers that spent less than $250 per month on web display inventory in the 
United States; none of those advertisers would have been able to switch to Amazon’s DSP or The 
Trade Desk because each has minimum spend requirements of over $1,000 per month. So while 
Amazon’s DSP and The Trade Desk compete with Google’s DV360, they do not compete for the 
small advertisers using Google Ads. Thus, a small but significant increase in price of an ad buying 




tool for small advertisers does not cause advertisers to switch to ad buying tool for large 
advertisers. 
1. Web display ad buying tools for small advertisers in the United States 
constitute a relevant antitrust market. 
103. The market for web display ad buying tools (“ad buying tools”) for small advertisers 
in the United States is a relevant antitrust market. These tools provide an interface that smaller 
advertisers (e.g., real estate agents, plumbers, builders, doctors, and car dealerships) can use to bid 
on and purchase the display ad inventory available on ad exchanges and in ad networks. These 
tools allow small advertisers to optimize for their own interests, including purchasing the best 
quality display ad inventory for the lowest prices.  
104. As above, ad buying tools for small advertisers are not usually interchangeable with 
the ad buying tools for large advertisers. Nor are ad buying tools for small advertisers 
interchangeable with ad servers, ad networks, or ad exchanges; those products do not provide small 
advertisers with an interface to bid on and purchase ad inventory in exchanges or networks. Those 
products also differ significantly from ad buying tools for small advertisers insofar as they serve 
different types of customers, have different features sets, and come with different price and entry 
points. Those products are not viable alternatives in response to a small but significant price 
increase because they do not provide small advertisers with the features of an ad buying tool at an 
affordable price point. 
105. The relevant geographic market for display ad buying tools for small advertisers is the 
United States. Display ad buying tools for small advertisers available in other countries are not a 
reasonable substitute for the display ad buying tools for small advertisers available in the United 
States.  




2. Web display ad buying tools for large advertisers in the United States 
constitute a relevant antitrust market. 
106. The market for web display ad buying tools for large advertisers in the United States is 
a relevant antitrust market. These tools provide an interface that large advertisers (e.g., Ford or 
Nike) use to bid on and purchase display ad inventory on ad exchanges and in ad networks. These 
tools allow large advertisers to optimize for their own interests, including purchasing the best 
quality display ad inventory on exchanges for the lowest prices.  
107. As above, ad buying tools for large advertisers are not usually interchangeable with the 
ad buying tools for small advertisers. Nor are ad buying tools for large advertisers interchangeable 
with ad servers, ad networks, or ad exchanges; those products do not provide large advertisers with 
an interface to bid on and purchase ad inventory in exchanges. Those products also differ 
significantly from ad buying tools for large advertisers insofar as they serve different types of 
customers, have different features sets, and come with different price and entry points. Thus, a 
small but significant increase in price of an ad buying tool for large advertisers, would not cause 
those advertisers to switch to an ad server, an exchange, or network.  
108. The relevant geographic market for display ad buying tools for large advertisers is the 
United States. Display ad buying tools for large advertisers available in other countries are not a 
reasonable substitute for the display ad buying tools for large advertisers available in the United 
States. 
3. Google has monopoly power in the web display ad buying tool market for small 
advertisers.  
109. Google’s ad buying tool Google Ads has monopoly power in the United States in the 
web display ad buying tool market for small advertisers. Ad buying tools for small advertisers 




serve startups and local businesses such as real estate agents, doctors, dentists, restaurants, 
automotive repair shops, craftsmen, electricians, hair salons, architects, and landscapers.  
110. Google’s records reveal that advertisers using Google Ads purchase at least half of the 
impressions in Google’s ad exchange (which is the largest ad exchange), and over 60 percent of 
the impressions on Google’s display network, GDN (which is the largest ad network).  
111. The market power of Google Ads is also evidenced by the fact that Google’s exchange 
charges supra-competitive fees for exclusive access to Google Ads advertisers. Google’s 
documents confirm as much, describing its exchange’s ability to charge double to quadruple the 
prices of some of its nearest exchange competitors because of exclusive access to Google Ads 
advertisers. The ability to extract such rents, dependent on Google Ads exclusivity, demonstrates 
Google Ads’ monopoly power. Moreover, running sequential auctions allows Google to extract 
additional non-transparent margins, which it does not disclose to advertisers. 
112. Google Ads also has market power over the small advertisers it serves because most 
rely on a single ad buying tool for a given advertising format (e.g., display ads). These small 
advertisers tend to single home because using multiple ad buying tools imposes substantial 
additional costs in terms of the time, effort, training, and expenses that would be necessary to 
manage campaigns across different ad buying tools. Google Ads also does not permit small 
advertisers to completely export the data they need to easily switch to another ad buying tool. As 
a result, while very large advertisers might be able to absorb the costs of using multiple ad buying 
tools at a time, small advertisers almost always use just one at a time.  
113. Google’s market power with Google Ads is protected by at least four critical barriers 
to entry and expansion. First, Google Ads charges opaque fees and does not let advertisers readily 
audit the ad inventory Google purchases on their behalf. These act as barriers because they impede 




advertisers from switching to, e.g., a lower-cost or higher-quality provider. Second, Google’s 
practice of withholding YouTube video inventory from rival ad buying tools (addressed below) 
effectively locks single-homing small advertisers into Google’s ad buying tool. In addition, other 
providers of ad buying tools indicate that it does not make economic sense to try to compete with 
Google Ads for small advertisers, because they cannot achieve sufficient scale with smaller 
advertisers who want to buy display, YouTube, and even search ads, through just one tool. Finally, 
advertisers use ad buying tools to keep track of the users they have targeted with ads, the users that 
have made purchases, and the users that they want to keep targeting with more ads. Google Ads 
limits advertisers from accessing and taking this data with them to another tool. As a result, 
advertisers are locked in and have high switching costs; switching to a different ad buying tool 
provider means abandoning the valuable data and intelligence they already gathered in Google 
Ads and starting over from scratch.  
E. YouTube 
1. Instream online video advertising is a relevant antitrust market in the United 
States. 
114. The market for instream online video advertising in the United States is a relevant 
antitrust market. Online instream ads occur within the video stream of a video the user is watching 
(e.g., a video ad before, during, or after a YouTube video), while outstream ads occur when the 
user scrolls through other content (e.g., a video ad that automatically plays when scrolling through 
an article). Instream online video advertising is not interchangeable with other types of online 
advertising, like search or display advertising. Instream online video advertising typically serves 
distinct campaign goals for advertisers and usually commands significantly higher prices than 
online display ads, suggesting that online display ads do not constrain the prices of instream online 
video ads. Instream online video advertising is also not interchangeable with outstream video 




advertising since the end-user behavior differs significantly—an end-user passively watches 
instream video but scrolls through outstream video—leading advertisers to view the ad spaces 
differently. 
2. Google has market power in the instream online video advertising market. 
115. YouTube has market power in the instream online video advertising market. 
YouTube’s share of the overall online video advertising market is at least 43 percent in the United 
States, and potentially much higher for instream online video advertising. Further, YouTube has 
immense reach amongst consumers in the United States, reaching approximately 190 million such 
consumers. Among younger U.S. consumers, 77 percent of U.S. internet users aged 15-25 used 
YouTube, as measured in Q3 2020. Even amongst older age-groups, YouTube’s reach was at least 
67 percent. YouTube’s substantial reach among U.S. consumers makes it a “must-have” source of 
online instream video inventory for advertisers and is considered a “strategic anchor” by Google 
for its buying tool DV360. Accordingly, Google wields significant market power in the instream 
online video ads market, as demand for YouTube content is unique compared to other online video 
publishers that sell instream online video advertising adjacent to short-form user created video 
content. 
116. The relevant geographic market for online instream video advertising is the United 
States. Online instream video advertising available in other countries is not a reasonable substitute 
for the online instream video advertising available in the United States.  
VII. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
117. Google unlawfully forecloses competition in the market for publisher ad servers, in the 
market for ad buying tools for large advertisers, in the market for ad buying tools for small 
advertisers, and in the separate markets for ad exchanges and ad networks. Google excludes 
competition by engaging in conduct unlawful under settled antitrust precedent, including through 




unlawful tying arrangements, a pattern and practice of exclusionary conduct targeting actual and 
potential rivals, and even a market allocation and price fixing agreement with Facebook, its largest 
potential competitive threat in the publisher ad server and ad network markets.  
A. Google forces publishers to license Google’s ad server and trade in Google’s ad 
exchange. 
118. Prior to Google’s anticompetitive conduct, the markets for ad exchanges and publisher 
ad servers were competitive. When Google originally entered the ad exchange market in 2009, 
publishers and advertisers had been trading in exchanges for some time. Google was late to enter 
the ad exchange market and faced significant competition from large and well-funded players like 
Microsoft and Yahoo!. In 2009, the Yahoo! exchange alone, for example, processed nine billion 
daily ad impressions. After launching that same year, Google’s exchange transacted fewer than 
200 million daily impressions. At the time, Google also faced significant competition in the 
publisher ad server market. Google acquired its publisher ad server from DoubleClick in 2008 but 
faced competition from companies such as 24/7 Real Media (owned by WPP PLC), aQuantive 
(owned by Microsoft), and ValueClick (publicly traded).  
119. Google, however, quickly began pursuing an unlawful strategy to foreclose 
competition in both markets. At the time, Google operated an ad buying tool for small advertisers 
and already had significant power in that market. Nearly one million small advertisers across the 
country—including restaurants, clothing stores, doctors, and electricians—used Google’s ad 
buying tool to bid on display ad space. Immediately after acquiring a publisher ad server and 
launching its exchange in 2009, Google began to require that the small advertisers bidding through 
Google Ads transact in both Google’s ad network and Google’s ad exchange. Google also required 
that the large publishers wanting to receive bids from this enormous group of small advertisers 
trade in Google’s exchange and license Google’s ad server. In essence, Google demanded that it 




represent the buy-side, where it extracted one fee, as well as the sell-side, where it extracted a 
second fee, and it also forced transactions to clear in its own exchange, where it extracted a third 
fee. 
120. Google was able to force publishers and advertisers to trade in Google’s exchange, and 
publishers to license Google’s ad server, because Google’s ad buying tool for small advertisers 
has had substantial market power in the United States for at least a decade. Google originally called 
its product for small advertisers AdWords, but it is now known as Google Ads. In 2009, some 
250,000 small and medium advertisers in the United States used this ad buying tool to purchase 
search and display ads. And since then, the number of advertisers using this tool to purchase 
display inventory on exchanges has rapidly increased even further. In 2013, the number of 
advertisers using Google Ads doubled to two million. Today, millions of small- to medium-sized 
businesses use Google Ads to bid on and purchase display ad space trading in Google’s AdX 
exchange, and those advertisers do not have alternative tools to use. Other ad buying tools 
attempting to compete reached far fewer advertisers, and most have now exited the market 
altogether, leaving advertisers without alternatives to Google’s dominance.  
121. Google gained its monopoly in the market for ad buying tools for small advertisers in 
part due to its monopoly in the display ad network market and its significant scale in search 
advertising. By 2009, Google’s ad network GDN was the leader in reach (unique visitors to 
publishers’ sites); Google leveraged this fact by requiring the use Google Ads by any advertiser 
seeking to purchase ad space through GDN. Similarly, Google required small advertisers to use 
Google Ads to purchase search ads on Google Search. Google’s relationships with small 
advertisers seeking to purchase display advertising is based on its enormous scale in search 
advertising. Having already established a relationship with small advertisers by selling search 




advertising, the marginal cost for selling display advertising to those same small advertisers is 
negligible. Google’s competitors, by contrast, find it uneconomical to reach a sufficient number of 
small advertisers at scale to offer buying tools to compete with Google Ads.  
122. Google Ads also had market power over its small advertisers because those advertisers 
almost always use just one ad buying tool at a time. When deciding which ad buying tool to use, 
most advertisers chose Google’s because it was the only way to purchase Google Search ads and 
display ads on Google’s leading display network, GDN.  
 
123. Google monopolized the exchange and ad server markets by forcing publishers to 
license Google’s ad server and trade in Google’s exchange in order to receive bids from the more-
than one million advertisers using Google’s buying tool, Google Ads. First, Google automatically 
routed small advertisers’ ad network bids to Google’s exchange. Additionally, Google refused to 
route advertisers’ bids to non-Google exchanges. Next, Google programmed its exchange to return 
real-time bids only to those publishers using Google’s new publisher ad server. As Google’s  
 wrote in an internal PowerPoint presentation in 2014, “AdX is 
also the only platform with direct access to the entirety of AdWords demand, one of the world’s 
largest ad networks.”  




124. Through this conduct, Google acted against the best interests of the small advertisers 
bidding through Google Ads. If Google were serving the interests of the small businesses using 
Google Ads, Google would have routed their bids to the exchanges that offered the lowest prices 
for the identical inventory, just as competing ad buying tools did. In a competitive market, 
advertisers prefer to buy across multiple exchanges in order to reach the largest possible pool of 
supply at the best possible prices, thereby enabling and fostering competition between the 
exchanges.  
125. Internal Google documents reveal that Google imposed these bid routing restrictions 
for the express purpose of foreclosing competition. In a Display Strategy document from August 
2012, Google noted that they “are artificially handicapping [their] buyside [Google Ads] to boost 
the attractiveness of [their] sell-side (AdX). Specifically, to limit [Google Ads] to buying only on 
AdX, an exclusivity that makes AdX more attractive to sellers.”  
126. Because publishers are interested in exchanges returning real-time bids for their 
inventory, Google effectively required publishers to use its ad server in order to work with its 
exchange. Publishers also only use a single ad server at a time to manage their inventory, so they 
had to forgo either (a) using any competing ad server or (b) access to the enormous pool of 
advertisers using Google Ads and bidding into Google’s exchange. From the first days of Google’s 
AdX exchange, advertisers bidding through Google Ads made up the vast majority of purchases 
in Google’s exchange: around half of total transactions by revenue within a year of AdX’s launch, 
59 percent of total transactions a few years later, and about two-thirds of all transactions today.  
127. An article in The Wall Street Journal explained Google’s conduct as follows: “Using 
Google’s [ad server] DoubleClick for Publishers is the only way to get full access to Google’s 




AdX exchange, publishers say. For many years, Google’s AdX was the only ad exchange that had 
access to this fire hose of ad dollars.” 
128. Google’s conduct successfully foreclosed competition in the publisher ad server and 
exchange markets. When Google acquired the DoubleClick ad server in 2008, Google’s share of 
the publisher ad server market was around 48 to 57 percent, and Google faced competition in both 
the ad server and ad exchange markets. In the ad server market, Google has now effectively 
foreclosed publisher ad server competition from companies that included 24/7 Real Media, 
aQuantive, and ValueClick. As internal Google documents show, by coupling its ad server with 
its substantial market power on the buy-side, Google prevented publishers from switching to 
competing ad servers and quickly cornered the remainder of the market. By 2011, approximately 
78 percent of publishers in the United States used Google’s ad server, and by 2019, Google’s share 
of the market increased to over 90 percent of large publishers.  
129. Google maintained its monopoly power over ad servers and its stranglehold in the ad 
exchange market by continuing the same type of exclusionary conduct. In 2016, Google started 
routing the bids of small advertisers from Google’s buying tool to non-Google exchanges, but 
significantly and intentionally restrained the routing of bids to non-Google exchanges for the 
express purpose of continuing to exclude and suppress competition. Google’s exchange also 
continues to return live bids only to publishers using Google’s ad server. In sum, Google did not 
want to actually undo its Google Ads—exchange—ad server tie.  
130. Google similarly requires publishers seeking access to large advertisers’ bids to trade 
in Google’s exchange (and pay Google’s exchange fees) and to license Google’s ad server (and 
pay Google’s ad server license fees). Google’s strategies here are numerous and discussed 
throughout this Complaint. For instance, Google uses mandatory price floors (discussed below in 




paragraphs 273-279) and other auction manipulations like project Bernanke (discussed below in 
paragraphs 148-154) to force publishers to transact with DV360 advertisers in Google’s exchange. 
Uniform Price floors are not competition on the merits. Google deployed another project called 
project Poirot to detect and reduce spending on non-Google exchanges. Finally, Google makes 
many of the features in DV360 (e.g., affinity audiences targeting) unavailable to advertisers if they 
participate in exchanges other than Google’s, which results in many advertisers using Google’s 
exchange even though they would not do so in a competitive market. Because Google’s exchange 
then only routes live bids to publishers using Google’s publisher ad server, publishers are 
effectively forced to use Google’s publisher ad server to receive bids from DV360 advertisers. 
This conduct enables Google to maintain its monopoly power in the publisher ad server market 
and exclude competition in the exchange market. Google has specifically discussed this “lock in” 
effect internally.  
B. Google uses its control over publishers’ inventory to block exchange competition. 
131. In addition to forcing publishers and advertisers to transact in its own exchange, Google 
used its control over publishers’ inventory and its status as publishers’ agent to foreclose exchange 
competition through a host of anticompetitive conduct. Google restricted publishers from selling 
their inventory in more than one exchange at a time, blocked competition from non-Google 
exchanges under a false pretense, and blocked publishers from accessing and sharing information 
about their heterogeneous inventory with non-Google exchanges. In doing so, Google foreclosed 
competition in the exchange market, enabling its exchange to charge very high fees that even 
Google could not actually justify. Google internally admits that an exchange should be more of “a 
public good used to facilitate buyers and sellers” and not “an immensely profitable business,” as 
it is for Google. Google’s anticompetitive conduct, however, ensured that publishers and 
advertisers could not benefit from competition. 




1. Google blocks publishers from sending their inventory to more than one 
marketplace at a time. 
132. Around 2009-2010, advertising exchanges (including Google’s AdX) started to 
compete with one another by submitting real-time bids for publishers’ inventory. As the market 
migrated to real-time bidding, Google used its new control over publishers’ inventory through its 
publisher ad server to thwart competition between marketplaces. Google accomplished this by 
forcing publishers to route their ad space to a single exchange, one at a time, rather than all at once. 
Google foreclosed exchange competition in this manner from 2009 through 2016. The industry 
referred to this practice as waterfalling.  
133. Waterfalling reduced publishers’ yields because it blocked competition between 
exchanges. Routing ad space into multiple exchanges at the same time would permit publishers to 
benefit from access to greater advertiser demand. One exchange might have an advertiser willing 
to bid a $2 CPM (cost per thousand) for a publisher’s impression, but another exchange might have 
a different advertiser willing to bid a $3 CPM. Being forced to route to one exchange at a time 
deprives publishers of the opportunity to receive these higher bids (and therefore higher sales 
prices). 
134. Waterfalling also impeded take rate and quality competition between exchanges. 
Competition between exchanges forces exchanges to compete on quality and take rates, regardless 
of whether they operate in financial markets or, as here, in openly traded online display ads. The 
sellers and buyers in an exchange measure an exchange’s efficiency using the tightness of the bid-
ask spread, i.e., the difference between the bid (the amount for which buyers are willing to sell the 
instrument) and the ask (the amount for which sellers are willing to sell the instrument). 
Competition between electronic exchanges leads to pressure on exchange prices and results in 




efficiency gains through smaller bid-ask spreads. Google, however, foreclosed exchange 
competition in this manner from 2009 through 2016.  
2. Google blocks competition from non-Google exchanges and deceives 
publishers about Dynamic Allocation. 
135. In addition to blocking real-time competition between exchanges, Google’s ad server 
foreclosed exchange competition by preferentially routing publishers’ inventory to Google’s new 
exchange through a process it called Dynamic Allocation.  
136. At a high level, Dynamic Allocation granted Google’s exchange a superior right of first 
refusal on all of the impressions a publisher made available to exchanges. Google’s ad server let 
Google’s exchange compete for publishers’ impressions by returning live bids, while requiring 
non-Google exchanges to compete for the same impressions with static non-live bids. Usually, an 
exchange’s static bid was set to equal the overall price the exchange historically paid for 
publishers’ impressions. Google’s ad server passed the rival’s static bid to Google’s exchange and 
permitted Google’s exchange to purchase the impression by paying just one penny more. In other 
words, Google used its control over publishers’ inventory to let its exchange view a publisher’s 
valuable impression—like a box seat at a baseball game—and purchase that impression for just a 
penny more than the average price that a non-Google exchange paid for any old impression—just 
like the average price for any seat in the stadium.  
137. Google’s adoption of Dynamic Allocation in 2010 ended DoubleClick’s neutrality as a 
seller’s agent. Prior to Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick, DoubleClick operated a publisher ad 
server but did not have an operational exchange. The DoubleClick publisher ad server also routed 
publishers’ impressions to exchanges and networks in a neutral manner to maximize publishers’ 
yield. Under Google’s control, Dynamic Allocation ended the neutrality of the DoubleClick ad 
server and highlighted the problems with Google’s conflicts of interest.  




138. With waterfalling and Dynamic Allocation, Google’s ad server delivered a one-two 
punch to competition in the exchange market. Google used waterfalling to block other exchanges 
from competing simultaneously for impressions. Then, through Dynamic Allocation, Google’s ad 
server passed inside information to Google’s exchange and permitted Google’s exchange to 
purchase valuable impressions at artificially depressed prices. Competing exchanges were 
deprived of the opportunity to compete for inventory and left with the low-value impressions 
passed over by Google’s exchange. 
139. Once Google routed publishers’ impressions to Google’s exchange, Google further 
harmed publishers by foreclosing competition between the bidders in its exchange auction. Google 
considered, but ultimately decided against “creating a completely neutral platform like the NYSE.” 
Instead, Google chose to craft a rigged exchange to benefit its own ad buying tools. In other words, 
Google chose to “stack the deck in favor of Google [demand].” As a result, Google’s exchange 
suppresses competition in its auction, permitting Google’s ad buying tools (Google Ads and 
DV360) to win over 80 percent of the auctions in Google’s exchange.  
140. Google, mirroring the duties of financial brokers to their clients, promised publishers 
that its publisher ad server would act in their best interests. Google told publishers, for instance, 
that Dynamic Allocation maximized their inventory yield; it “maximizes revenue,” Google 
advertised about its publisher ad server. Google also told publishers that, with Dynamic Allocation, 
publishers have a “risk-free way to get the highest real-time revenues for all their non-guaranteed 
impressions.”  
141. In fact, Google concealed the nature of its conduct and knew that Dynamic Allocation 
did not in fact maximize publishers’ yield. Google internally discussed how publishers could make 
more money selling their inventory if exchanges really competed. Internal Google documents 




reveal Google’s knowledge of its own misrepresentations, stating that “the optimal publisher set 
up includes multiple exchanges in order to capture the largest demand pool and increase RPMs 
[revenue per impression] through [exchange] competition.” In fact, according to one Google study, 
competition between exchanges increased publishers’ clearing prices by an average of 40 percent. 
In other words, Dynamic Allocation had permitted Google’s exchange to clear publishers’ 
inventory for depressed prices. One industry publication put it succinctly, “[t]he lack of 
competition was costing pub[s] cold hard cash.”  
3. Google restricts information to foreclose competition and advantage itself. 
142. Google further foreclosed competition in the exchange and ad buying tool markets by 
blocking publishers’ ability to access information about their heterogenous inventory. Google’s ad 
server manages that inventory and promises to maximize publishers’ inventory yield. On behalf of 
publishers, the ad server is what identifies the site visitors associated with the publishers’ 
inventory, assigning individual IDs to each visitor. In 2009, Google’s ad server started hashing or 
encrypting publishers’ ad server user IDs, prohibiting publishers from sharing those IDs with non-
Google exchanges and non-Google ad buying tools. Thus, Google strategically prevented 
publishers’ users from being easily identified, with one critical caveat: Google enables itself to use 
that very same information for its own trade decisions.  
143. At the time of the DoubleClick acquisition, Google made representations to both the 
FTC and the United States Congress regarding publishers’ control and ownership over their critical 
ad server data. Google assured Congress that DoubleClick “data is owned by the customers, 
publishers and advertisers, and DoubleClick or Google cannot do anything with it.” And Google 
represented to the FTC that “customer and competitor information that DoubleClick collects 
currently belongs to publishers, not DoubleClick,” and “[r]estrictions in DoubleClick’s contracts 
with its customers, which those customers insisted on, protect that information from disclosure.” 




Google then “committed to the sanctity of those contracts.” In essence, DoubleClick’s contracts 
rendered publishers’ data confidential and non-public, thereby prohibiting Google from using that 
data to act against publishers’ interests. 
144. In order to sell an ad impression at a price reflective of its true value, publishers (and 
the exchanges that sell on their behalf) need to be able to adequately identify the user associated 
with the impression. User IDs permit publishers and their exchanges to understand the value of 
inventory, cap the number of times users see the same ad, and effectively target and track online 
advertising campaigns. When exchanges cannot identify users in auctions (e.g., through cookies), 
the prices of impressions on exchanges can fall by about 50 percent, according to one Google 
study.  
145. However, despite the representations made during its acquisition of DoubleClick, in 
2009, Google started restricting publishers’ ability to access and share their ad server user IDs. 
Google accomplished this by hashing or encrypting the user IDs differently for each publisher 
using Google’s ad server (e.g., John Connor = user QWERT12345), as well as for each advertiser 
bidding through Google’s ad buying tools (e.g., John Connor = user YUIOP67890). This change 
interfered with publishers’ ability to share consistent user IDs with non-Google exchanges and 
networks. As a result, publishers, along with their advertisers, exchanges, and networks, could not 
easily know that two different user IDs actually belonged to the same user.  
146. While Google blocked publishers from accessing and sharing these user IDs with non-
Google exchanges and networks, Google shared the same raw IDs with Google’s own network 
and exchange, as well as with Google’s own ad buying tools (DV360 and Google Ads). So for 
Google’s network, exchange, and ad buying tools, John Connor is always HJKLM54321. In other 
words, the only way for publishers and advertisers to easily know that two different user IDs 




actually related to the same individual was to use Google’s ad buying tools and trade in Google’s 
exchange.  
i. Information asymmetry causes publishers and advertisers to trade on 
non-Google exchanges at their own risk. 
147. The restrictions Google imposed on publishers’ access to ad server user IDs meant that 
publishers and advertisers trading on non-Google exchanges did so at their own risk. By blocking 
publishers’ ability to access and share their ad server user IDs, Google’s exchange would always 
have better information about publishers’ heterogenous inventory. As a result, advertisers bidding 
through a non-Google ad buying tool or exchange could not efficiently know if they are bidding 
on valuable impressions, cap the frequency that consumers see their same ads, target audiences, 
or avoid bidding against themselves in second-price exchange auctions. But, of course publishers 
and advertisers could simply transact in Google’s exchange using Google’s ad buying tools and 
thereby avoid all of these harms Google artificially created. In essence, by scrambling the 
DoubleClick ad server user IDs, Google created a “heads I win, tails you lose” scenario.  
ii. Google forecloses competition by using inside information to win 
auctions.  
148. Google is able to further exploit its monopoly in ad servers to the detriment of 
publishers. Google’s next step was to begin using its exclusive access to publishers’ raw ad server 
user IDs to develop a number of internal non-transparent auction programs that exclude 
competition in both the exchange and ad buying tool markets. Google uses its artificial information 
advantage to engage in various forms of price discrimination and opportunity allocation, 
engineering auction outcomes that are different than those that would result from a free and open 
bid process. These programs ensured that publishers’ impressions, especially the high value ones, 
would transact through Google’s exchange and ad buying tools. So while Google publicly says its 




products and product features are good for publishers and advertisers, they are not. Behind the 
scenes, Google manipulates the bidding process to maximize its own profits, rather than to 
maximize the profits of individual publishers and advertisers. 
149. Google’s New York-based quantitative team “gTrade” designed one such program 
called Reserve Price Optimization (“RPO”). Google’s RPO program uses exclusive access to 
publishers’ user IDs to dynamically adjust the price floors in Google’s exchange on a per-buyer 
basis depending on what Google knows a particular buyer will actually pay. For example, if a 
publisher had set its floor price to a $10 CPM, RPO can increase the floor price to just below a 
buyer’s predicted willingness to pay, e.g., a $14.50 CPM; this would force advertisers in Google’s 
second-price exchange auctions to pay the RPO floor set by Google, as opposed to the amount bid 
by the auction’s second-highest bidder. In other words, Google would manipulate the bid 
belonging to a small business advertiser (e.g., a local doctor) from one price to another higher price 
(e.g., from $8 CPM to $14.50), without disclosing the manipulation to the advertiser. By adjusting 
floors in this manner, Google ensures that its own exchange transacts publishers’ most valuable 
impressions, even though an advertiser in a non-Google exchange would have otherwise won. 
Competing exchanges cannot similarly adjust their floors because Google blocks publishers from 
accessing and sharing their ad server user IDs.  
150. Google’s gTrade team launched another program called Dynamic Revenue Share 
(DRS) that leverages exclusive access to publishers’ ad server user IDs to exclude exchange 
competition in a second way. Google automatically opted publishers into the DRS program under 
the misrepresentation that it would make publishers more money. DRS dynamically adjusts the 
take rate that Google’s exchange charges in order to win more impressions, most particularly the 
high-value impressions. For example, if a publisher offers an impression for sale in Google’s 




exchange, but the highest bid cannot clear the publisher’s price floor due to Google’s take rate, 
DRS can dynamically lower Google’s take rate to ensure that the impression will still transact in 
Google’s exchange. In order to know when and by how much Google should vary its take rate 
with DRS, Google must be able to accurately determine the value of impressions, which depends 
upon its access to publishers’ ad server user IDs. Google forecloses competition in the exchange 
market by blocking publishers from sharing their ad server user IDs with non-Google exchanges.  
151. In 2013, Google’s gTrade team designed Project Bernanke, yet another program to 
exclude competition. Named after the former Federal Reserve Chairman, Project Bernanke uses 
privileged access to detailed information regarding what advertisers historically bid to help 
advertisers using Google Ads beat the advertisers bidding through competitors’ ad buying tools. 
The Bernanke program helped advertisers bidding through Google’s ad buying tool win 
publishers’ valuable impressions in Google’s exchange. The Bernanke program is designed so that 
it is not transparent to publishers. 
152. To illustrate how Bernanke works, suppose an advertiser using Google Ads (e.g., a 
local doctor) bids a $10 CPM for a USA Today ad impression targeted to John Connor. And 
suppose a different advertiser (e.g., Ford) bids a $12 CPM through The Trade Desk ad buying tool. 
Both ad buying tools then route the advertisers’ bids to Google’s exchange. In the absence of the 
Bernanke program, Ford’s $12 bid would win and Google would extract only one fee (its exchange 
fee). But the Bernanke program changes the outcome. Bernanke effectively manipulates the 
doctor’s bid without their knowledge (or anyone’s knowledge) before routing it to Google’s 
exchange, ensuring that the doctor nonetheless wins the impression targeted to John Connor. In 
this situation with Bernanke, Google will extract both its exchange fee and a second ad buying 




tool fee. In this regard, Bernanke excludes competition from advertisers using non-Google ad 
buying tools.  
153. According to internal Google documents, prior to Bernanke’s introduction, advertisers 
bidding through competitors’ ad buying tools were actually beating the advertisers bidding through 
Google’s ad buying tools. Google’s idea with Bernanke was to trade on inside information to help 
Google reverse this trend. The program permitted Google to radically influence the amount of 
trading executed through Google Ads and in Google’s exchange. Google looked back at the 
Bernanke program’s success as follows: “In the last year, the team launched Project Bernanke, 
which uses novel trading strategies to increase GDN’s win rate on AdX by +20%, reversing a 
worrisome 2013 trend of AdX buyers growing at GDN’s expense.” In just the first year of launch, 
the Bernanke program alone swelled trading in Google’s exchange enough to increase annual 
revenue by $230 million. 
Screenshot of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the namesake of Project Bernanke, 
discussing quantitative easing on Google’s exchange: 
  
154. The preceding gTrade programs represent an illustrative but incomplete sample of the 
sophisticated auction programs Google uses to exclude competition in the exchange and ad buying 
tool markets. Google’s gTrade team developed other programs, including Bell and Elmo, that also 
use inside information to privilege Google’s exchange over rival exchanges. These programs 




depend on Google cutting off access to publishers’ ad server user IDs and rendering access to those 
IDs exclusive for Google. The programs create inefficiencies in the allocation of impressions and 
reduce competitors’ ability to compete on price.  
155. Moreover, these programs account for substantial additional Google revenue at the 
direct expense of harm to competition. RPO alone accounts for an additional $250 million dollars 
of annual recurring revenue, while various other auction programs shift substantial additional 
revenue to Google: DRS ($250m), Bernanke ($230m), Bell ($140m), and Elmo ($220m). In short, 
Google uses its monopoly power to manipulate auctions through algorithms that modify the 
exchange architecture in order to extract hundreds of millions of dollars in additional revenue and 
harm consumers by foreclosing competition. 
iii. While Google cites “privacy” as the justification for restricting access 
to user IDs, Google does not actually care about privacy.  
156. Google’s publicly stated reason for its publisher ad server cutting off publishers’ ability 
to share their ad server user IDs with non-Google exchanges is the purported protection of users’ 
privacy. But Google does not actually care about users’ privacy. Rather, Google wants to prevent 
companies from creating deeper and more comprehensive user profiles by combining different sets 
of user data. However, Google’s ad server shares those very user IDs with Google’s exchange and 
buying tools. Google then does what it wants to prevent others from doing: it combines the data 
sets to create more comprehensive user profiles and deliver more targeted advertising.  
157. To be clear, this meant that contrary to Google’s privacy justifications, Google 
prevented consumers from having similar privacy benefits when a publisher or advertiser used 
Google’s network, or Google’s exchange, or when an advertiser used Google’s ad buying tools. 
At the same time, Google fails to provide consumers with benefits derived from allowing 
publishers to maximize competition for their ad space on all exchanges. The higher advertising 




revenue publishers make from exchanges permits publishers to offer consumers better quality 
content and lower-priced or free access to their content. 
158. Furthermore, the egregious ways that Google violates users’ privacy further evidence 
the pretextual nature of Google’s purported concerns for privacy. Indeed, Google knowingly failed 
to disclose the lack of privacy of its Google Drive service, and it has also met secretly with 
competitors to “slow down” efforts to enhance user privacy.  
(a) Google violates the privacy of 750+ million Android users. 
159. Google’s violation of the privacy of 750+ million Android users illustrates the pretext 
of Google’s privacy concerns. Around July of 2015, Google, through its cloud back up service 
Google Drive, entered into an exclusive agreement with Facebook’s private messaging service 
WhatsApp. As provided in that agreement, starting around October 2015, WhatsApp users on 
Google-Android devices were presented with the option to back up their WhatsApp messaging 
history, photos, video, and audio files to Google Drive. 
160. Users at the time were led to believe that their WhatsApp messages were private and 
not accessible to third parties such as Google or Facebook. WhatsApp started encrypting users’ 
WhatsApp messages in 2013, completed end-to-end encryption on Android users’ messages in 
2014, and completed all end-to-end encryption in 2016. 
161. WhatsApp prominently marketed the fact the messages that users sent and received 
using WhatsApp and through its encryption protocol were not accessible by third parties. The 
WhatsApp website in 2016 and 2017 read: “Many messaging apps only encrypt messages between 
you and them, but WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption ensures only you and the person you're 
communicating with can read what is sent … messages are secured with a lock, and only the 
recipient and you have the special key needed to unlock and read them.”  




Screenshot of the WhatsApp mobile application the time assuring users that no third party 
could read or listen to their communications:  
 
162. The privacy of communications from third party access was not a minor issue. Many 
consumers demanded communications applications that ensured their communications were 
walled off from anyone else from having access.  
163. Media reports reinforced the idea that no third party had access to users’ WhatsApp 
communications, including those backed up to Google Drive. For example, Mike Isaac with The 
New York Times wrote in 2016, “WhatsApp, the messaging app owned by Facebook and used by 
more than one billion people, on Tuesday introduced full encryption for its service, a way to ensure 
that only the sender and recipient can read messages sent using the app.” In a similar vein, a 2016 
report from Lifehacker, a technology site launched by Gawker Media, stated: “WhatsApp can also 
backup your messages to Google Drive, though they’re encrypted so that shouldn’t be that big of 
a deal. Even if law enforcement requested it from Google, they wouldn’t be able to read it.”  
164. However, this was not true. Conceding this fact in a June 2016 memo, Google wrote 
that “when WhatsApp media files are shared with 3rd parties such as Drive, the files are no longer 
encrypted by WhatsApp.” The memo continued, “For clarity, all of the [WhatsApp] data stored in 
Drive is currently encrypted with Google holding the keys.” What this meant was that Google, as 
a third party, could in fact access the photos, videos, and audio files, that users thought they had 
shared privately on WhatsApp.  




165. Google knew users were misled about the privacy of their communications. The same 
June 2016 memo acknowledges: “WhatsApp’s current messaging around end-to-end encryption is 
not entirely accurate.” The memo also states: “WhatsApp currently markets that all 
communications through its product are end-to-end encrypted, with keys that only the users 
possess. They have failed to elaborate that data shared from WhatsApp to 3rd party services does 
not get the same guarantee. This includes backups to Google Drive.”  
166. Google also knew that it was important for Google Drive users to know the truth: that 
Google as a third party had access to their communications. The same June 2016 Google memo 
memorialized, “It’s important for users to know that when WhatsApp media files are shared with 
3rd parties such as Drive, the files are no longer encrypted by WhatsApp.”  
167. But Google did nothing to correct this misunderstanding. Rather, it failed to disclose 
the relevant information to its customers, with the intent to sign up more users of Google Drive. 
For example, in an October 7, 2015 Google blog post explaining the WhatsApp-Google Drive 
partnership to consumers, Google affirmed that users’ WhatsApp backups were private backups: 
“WhatsApp for Android lets you create a private backup of your chat history, voice messages, 
photos, and videos in Google Drive.” In addition, the Google Drive website, the Google Drive 
mobile application, and the Google Drive Terms and Privacy policy all failed to disclose to users 
that Google as a third party had access to their WhatsApp communications. The Google Drive 
terms of service at the time even permitted Google the ability to use its access to users’ private 
WhatsApp communications in Google Drive to sell advertising. 
168. Google also concealed the fact that it could access users’ WhatsApp communications. 
Normally, users can log into their Google Drive account and view their files contained there. But 
according to an internal Google memo, Google was “opaquely” backing up users’ WhatsApp 




communications to Google Drive. As a result, users could not log into Google Drive to discover 
that Google had access to their decrypted WhatsApp communications.  
169. Google’s privacy affirmations, omissions, and concealment resulted in increased 
demand for Google’s back up service. Users rapidly signed up for Google Drive backup of 
WhatsApp communications. By June of 2016, about 434 million WhatsApp users backed up 
approximately 345 billion WhatsApp files to Google Drive, netting for Google Drive about a 
quarter of a billion new Google Drive customers. By May of 2017, Google Drive had gained 
approximately 750 million new WhatsApp back up accounts. In short, Google had no problem 
violating the privacy of almost a billion users if it helped them to grow their business.  
(b) Google secretly met with competitors to discuss competition and 
forestall consumer privacy efforts.  
170. The manner in which Google has actively worked with Big Tech competitors to 
undermine users’ privacy further illustrates Google’s pretextual privacy concerns. For example, in 
a closed-door meeting on August 6, 2019 between the five Big Tech companies—including 
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft—Google discussed forestalling consumer privacy efforts. In a 
July 31, 2019 document prepared in advance of the meeting, Google memorialized: “we have been 
successful in slowing down and delaying the [ePrivacy Regulation] process and have been working 
behind the scenes hand in hand with the other companies.”  
171. Google also sought a coordinated effort to forestall and diminish child privacy 
protections in proposed regulations by the FTC and in proposed legislation by Senators Markey 
and Hawley. According to the same July 31, 2019 document, Google wanted to use the upcoming 
meeting with the other Big Tech firms to “find areas of alignment and narrow gaps in our positions 
and priorities on child privacy and safety.” Google expressed particular concern that Microsoft 
was taking child privacy more seriously than Google and sought to rein in Microsoft. “Whether at 




this meeting or at another forum, we may want to reinforce that this is an area of particular 
importance to have a coordinated approach,” read the memo.  
172. Not unlike concerns for defections in a price-fixing cartel, Google expressed frustration 
that companies like Facebook were not aligning with Google to reduce users’ privacy. “We’ve had 
difficulty getting FB to align on our privacy goals and strategy, as they have at time[s] prioritized 
winning on reputation over its business interest in legislative debates,” said Google, referring to 
Facebook.  
173. Google also sought to encourage Microsoft to not compete on privacy and to stop 
increasing “subtle privacy attacks” against Google and other Big Tech companies, which Google 
described as “their industry colleagues.” “We have direction from Kent [Walker] to find alignment 
with MSFT where we can but should be wary of their activity [in promoting privacy] and seek to 
gain as much intel as possible.”  
174. In addition to outlining discussions that Google wanted to have to forestall privacy 
efforts, the June 31, 2019 memo also outlined that Google wanted to discuss “competition” and 
“ways we can work together.”  
175. Google presents a public image of caring about privacy, but behind the scenes Google 
coordinates closely with the Big Tech companies to lobby the government to delay or destroy 
measures that would actually protect users’ privacy. Of course, effective competition is concerned 
with both price and quality, and the fact that Google coordinates with its competitors on the quality 
metric of privacy—one might call it privacy fixing—underscores Google’s selective promotion of 
privacy concerns only when doing so facilitates its efforts to exclude competition.  




4. Google blocks competing exchanges from accessing publishers’ high-value 
inventory and reaps the benefits for itself. 
176. Google foreclosed exchange competition for publishers’ valuable impressions through 
a program called Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (“EDA”). Historically, publishers sold their best 
impressions to advertisers directly for premium prices. With EDA, Google’s ad server let Google’s 
exchange compete for and purchase valuable impressions that the ad server would previously 
allocate to publishers’ premium direct deals. Google blocked non-Google exchanges from 
competing for those same impressions. 
177. Before EDA, when a publisher sold their inventory to an advertiser through a direct 
deal for premium prices, Google’s ad server made it a priority to allocate impressions to that direct 
deal. But with EDA, Google would evaluate each impression’s value and then, based on that value, 
decide whether to allocate the impression towards meeting a direct deal’s reservation goal or to 
instead re-direct it to an exchange auction.  
178. In a review of revenue and impressions on AdX in the United States, Google found that 
the vast majority—80 percent—of web publishers’ ad revenue is generated from a much smaller 
percent—just 20 percent—of impressions. Google refers to this internally as “cookie 
concentration.”  
179. As a result of this “cookie concentration” dynamic, EDA made it so only Google’s 
exchange could trade publishers’ most valuable inventory. However, competition in the exchange 
market depends on being able to trade both volume and valuable impressions. By blocking non-
Google exchanges from competing against Google’s exchange, Google foreclosed competition in 
the exchange market and shielded Google’s exchange from competition. 
180. At the same time, EDA permitted Google’s exchange to purchase publishers’ 
impressions for depressed prices. Specifically, Google’s ad server permitted its exchange to 




purchase impressions for one penny more than the reserve price floor it instituted and called the 
“temporary competing price.” If Google had set this price to a $7 CPM, but a competing exchange 
would have returned a $14 CPM bid, Google let itself nonetheless win for $7.01. In other words, 
EDA let Google’s exchange acquire publishers’ impressions at depressed and non-competitive 
prices. 
181. EDA also excluded competition from publishers’ direct sales channel (direct deals). 
Google’s ad server let its exchange cherry pick the valuable impressions and then funnel lower-
value impressions to publishers’ direct deals. Advertisers who paid high prices for premium 
inventory through direct deals unknowingly received publishers’ lower quality inventory in return. 
Over time, as a consequence of this behavior, the value of direct-sold inventory declined and 
advertisers re-allocated spending towards Google’s exchange (where they must pay Google’s high 
exchange fees).  
182. Similar to Google’s strategy with Dynamic Allocation, Google invited publishers to 
enable EDA under a false pretense. Wearing their publisher ad server hat, Google falsely told 
publishers that EDA “maximizes yield.” EDA did not, however, maximize publishers’ yield. 
Internally, Google understood that the EDA program was a scheme to let Google’s exchange 
simply “cherry-pick [publishers’] higher-revenue impressions.” In fact, cherry-picking the best 
impressions under EDA helped Google make an additional $150 million per year.  
183. To make matters worse, Google’s practice of scrambling user IDs (discussed above in 
paragraphs 142-147) concealed the true nature of Google’s conduct. Publishers could not easily 
know that, with EDA, Google was cherry-picking impressions. By scrambling the IDs differently 
for publishers and advertisers, publishers could not easily work with advertisers to confirm that 




advertisers were receiving the valuable impressions (e.g., ads shown to users with high net worth) 
as opposed to the low value ones (e.g., ads shown to a 10-year-old child with no purchasing power).  
184. In summary, Google’s actions at issue here—including waterfalling and Dynamic 
Allocation, the encryption of IDs for users that consent to ID sharing, and EDA—were all unlawful 
schemes to exclude competition. Without being able to compete for publishers’ impressions or 
receive full information about their inventory, non-Google exchanges could not compete on quality 
(volume) or price (take rate). As a result, even large and powerful companies like Microsoft and 
Yahoo! exited the market. By blocking competition outright, Google is able to charge very high 
19-22 percent commissions on transactions, which is two to four times higher than the 
commissions charged by competing exchanges. These extra costs invariably are passed onto 
American consumers, who are harmed through higher prices and lower-quality goods and services. 
C. A new industry innovation called “header bidding” promotes exchange competition; 
Google wants to kill it. 
185. In 2014, publishers rapidly adopted a new innovation called “header bidding” (also 
known as “HB”) that permitted them to route inventory to multiple exchanges. Publishers, 
advertisers, and exchanges quickly adopted the method to facilitate exchange competition. Google, 
however, did not welcome the competition. Instead, Google wanted to “kill” header bidding. First, 
Google introduced an alternative that secretly routed publishers’ inventory back to Google’s 
exchange, even when another exchange returned a higher bid. In time, Google’s goal became to 
destroy header bidding entirely. In an October 13, 2016 meeting, Google employees discussed 
“options for mitigating growth of header bidding infrastructure.” One Google employee,  
 proposed the “nuclear option” of reducing Google exchange fees down to zero. Another 
employee,  rejected even that idea: “problem is that this doesn’t kill HB.”  




1. Header bidding facilitates competition among ad exchanges. 
186. Header bidding involves a creative piece of code that publishers could insert into the 
header section of their webpages to facilitate competition between exchanges. When a user visited 
a page, the code enabled publishers to direct a user’s browser to solicit real-time bids from multiple 
exchanges, before Google’s ad server could prevent them from doing so. Instead of being subject 
to the restraints of Google’s ad server, header bidding shifted routing from the ad server to the 
browser. Publishers then sent the highest exchange bid in header bidding into their Google ad 
server. In short, header bidding created a technical workaround for publishers to circumvent 
Google’s efforts to foreclose competition in the exchange market.  
187. So, header bidding became quite popular. Some of the biggest tech companies 
(including, e.g., Amazon) participated in header bidding, and by 2015, publishers and advertisers 
alike were rapidly adopting the innovation. By 2016, approximately 70 percent of major publishers 
in the United States were using header bidding to route their inventory to multiple exchanges, 
sometimes as many as twenty.  
188. Publishers in particular adopted the protocol because they came to realize what Google 
already knew. Waterfalling, Dynamic Allocation, and EDA did not actually maximize publishers’ 
yield. Instead, as Google discussed behind closed doors, “pitting multiple exchanges against one 
another fostered price competition, which was good for [publishers’] business.” In fact, it was 
incredibly good for publishers. With header bidding, publishers saw their ad revenue jump 
overnight simply because exchanges could actually compete. One Google employee conceded 
internally how ending exclusivity with Google’s exchange caused the ad revenues of Weather.com 
to jump by 30 percent. Some publishers’ revenue jumped by 40 to over 100 percent. 
189. Header bidding was also a positive development for advertisers and consumers. For 
advertisers, header bidding allowed them to transact through an exchange of their choosing, 




including exchanges imposing less than Google’s monopolistic 19-22 percent fees. Internally, 
Google conceded its fees were supra-competitive and not “likely justified by value.”  
190. Moreover, consumers benefited by virtue of the increased revenue realized by 
publishers as well as the fees saved by advertisers. With more ad revenue, publishers produce more 
content and better subsidized content access. Lower exchange take rates also reduced deadweight 
costs that advertisers ultimately pass on to consumers. Consumers benefit through higher-quality 
and lower-priced goods and services. 
191. Based on a review of Google’s internal documents, Google wanted to quash this header 
bidding innovation for three basic reasons: avoiding price competition, permitting itself to continue 
to trade on inside information, and foreclosing competition against its publisher ad server 
monopoly. 
192. First, Google wanted to eliminate header bidding in order to protect its high exchange 
take rates from competition. As Google discussed internally, “20% for just sell-side 
platform/exchange isn’t likely justified by value.” Google employee  emailed 
internally in November 2017 that she thought exchange “margins will stabilize at around 5 percent. 
Maybe it will happen by this time next year or in early 2019. This creates an obvious dilemma for 
us. AdX is the lifeblood of our programmatic business. … What do we do?” Such a dramatic 
reduction to Google’s exchange take rates toward competitive rates was an obvious threat posed 
by header bidding competition. 
193. Second, Google wanted to destroy header bidding because the innovation threatened 
Google’s practice of trading on inside information. Secretly, Google’s ad server shared competing 
bids on publishers’ inventory with Google’s ad buying tools (DV360 and Google Ads), thereby 
allowing those tools to use the information to win auctions. This is similar to a form of insider 




trading, whereby Google is the only one able to bid with knowledge of others’ bids. As Google 
discussed the predicament internally, header bidding caused Google to “lose[] visibility” into the 
“prices on a per-competitor basis,” which are “important data pieces of our own optimization.”  
194. Finally, Google wanted to eliminate header bidding to foreclose competition with its 
publisher ad server monopoly. The companies involved with header bidding would have a foothold 
on a key function of Google’s ad server: routing publishers’ inventory to exchanges. With that, a 
major player like Amazon or Facebook using header bidding would be well-positioned to 
eventually compete directly with Google’s monopoly ad server. Without control over publishers’ 
inventory, Google would lose the ability to block exchange competition and tilt trading towards 
itself. 
195. Google discussed how competition was a problem and deliberated over what to do 
about it. Rather than compete with other exchanges on price or quality, Google adopted a long list 
of overt and anticompetitive acts with the express purpose to “kill HB.”  
2. Google creates an alternative to header bidding that secretly stacks the deck 
in Google’s favor. 
196. Google tried to eliminate competition from exchanges in header bidding by creating an 
alternative that secretly stacked the deck in Google’s favor. Google’s ad server started to let 
publishers route their inventory to more than one exchange at a time with a new program Google 
marketed as Exchange Bidding, later renamed to Open Bidding. However, Google secretly devised 
the program in a way to foreclose exchange competition and codenamed it “Jedi.” Google 
measured Jedi’s success not by financial targets or output increases, but by how much it stopped 
publishers from using header bidding.  
197. Google devised Exchange Bidding to exclude competition from exchanges in at least 
four ways. First, Google diminished the ability of non-Google exchanges to return competitive 




bids by further decreasing their ability to identify users associated with publishers’ ad space in 
auctions. Header bidding let each exchange access a cookie on the user’s page, which permitted 
those exchanges to recapture some information about the user’s identity. Google’s new program 
prohibited exchanges from directly accessing the user’s page. As a result, they identified users in 
auctions even less often, causing them to bid and win less often.  
198. Second, Google foreclosed exchange competition by charging publishers an additional 
5 to 10 percent penalty fee for selling inventory in a non-Google exchange. The fee made 
advertisers’ bids through rival exchanges less competitive than advertisers’ bids through Google’s 
exchange—because Google’s exchange did not pay the additional fee. As Google understood it, 
because publishers and advertisers measure an exchange’s performance in part based on its take 
rate, this gave Google’s exchange a “‘moat’ in performance” when competing against competing 
exchanges.  
199. Third, Google foreclosed exchange competition by forcing its publisher ad server 
customers to use Google’s exchange. When publishers chose to route their ad space from Google’s 
ad server directly to multiple exchanges at the same time, Google’s new program required them to 
route that inventory through Google’s exchange, even if they did not want to do so.  
200. Fourth, Google foreclosed exchange competition by secretly rigging the Exchange 
Bidding program to let Google win. Google designed Exchange Bidding to provide Google’s 
exchange a special “prioritization,” which Google kept secret. Google made it so its own AdX 
exchange won publishers’ inventory even over another exchange’s higher bid. In the following 
email, Google employee  explained how the Exchange Bidding program returned 
results that were “suboptimal for pubs yield”: a Google AdX bid of $6 would win even though 
another exchange (“EB SSP”) submitted a higher $8 bid. 
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of the deal for Google. Internal Facebook communications reveal that Facebook knew Google’s 
motivation for the deal was to “kill” header bidding. “They want this deal to kill header bidding,” 
wrote Facebook deal executive  to other Facebook executives in an October 30, 2017 
email. 
204. The principal impetus for this deal began many months before, in March 2017, when 
Facebook publicly announced it would support header bidding. By doing so, Facebook would 
enable web and mobile app publishers and advertisers to bypass the fees associated with 
transacting through Google’s ad server. When bidding into Google’s ad server’s Open Bidding 
(f/k/a Exchange Bidding) program, Google required networks (e.g., Facebook’s network FAN) to 
bid into exchanges. And on these transactions, publishers had to pay exchange fees. But Google’s 
exchange fee was very high, about 19-22 percent of the value of the transaction. Because header 
bidding cost nothing, Facebook’s use of header bidding would let web publishers, mobile app 
publishers, and advertisers save on these fees altogether.  
205. Google feared that Facebook’s support of header bidding would crack Google’s 
publisher ad server monopoly and unlock exchange competition. Google executive  
 outlined that Google’s priorities for 2017 
included stopping Facebook from supporting header bidding. In a company deck, he outlined the 
“top priorities” for 2017, writing, “Need to fight off the existential threat posed by Header Bidding 
and FAN. This is my personal #1 priority. If we do nothing else, this need[s] to [be] an all hand[s] 
on deck approach.”  
206. The wider industry also thought Facebook was prepared to challenge Google’s 
monopoly. The same day as Facebook’s March 2017 header bidding announcement, industry 
publication AdAge wrote that Facebook was poised to execute a “digital advertising coup against 




rival Google and its DoubleClick empire.” A Business Insider headline the same day read: 
“Facebook made an unprecedented move to partner with ad tech companies – including Amazon 
– to take on Google.” 
207. Google started monitoring Facebook’s initiative in header bidding. According to 
metrics posted in Facebook’s public blog, Facebook was helping publishers and advertisers match 
two to three times more users in auctions and increase third-party publishers’ revenue by 10-30 
percent. As part of its internal monitoring efforts, Google referenced this blog post in an email 
circulated amongst the management team.  
208. These cost efficiencies for publishers and advertisers were not welcome news to 
Google. Even before Facebook’s March 2017 announcement, Google was concerned about large 
entrants supporting header bidding. Internal Google documents show that Google’s mandate at the 
time was to stop its competitors from supporting header bidding, to forestall innovation around 
header bidding, and to consider aggressive options. In an October 5, 2016 presentation to senior 
Google executives, a Google employee expressed concern about Amazon, Criteo, and Facebook 
enabling the growth of header bidding, stating “to stop these guys from doing HB we probably 
need to consider something more aggressive.” The presentation plainly asserted that Google’s 
“goal/mandate” was to “[f]orestall major industry investment in HB & HB wrapper infrastructure.”  
209. Conversely, internal Facebook communications indicate that Facebook’s March 2017 
announcement was mainly intended to signal Facebook’s willingness to compete with Google in 
the markets for publisher ad servers and ad networks. Facebook knew that Google would see its 
participation in header bidding as a major threat. Evidently, Facebook was merely executing a 
planned long-term strategy—“18 month ‘header bidding’ strategy to minimize “[the Open 




Bidding] tax”—by threatening to expose the hidden costs Google charges publishers. In other 
words, Facebook wanted to draw Google in. 
210. Facebook’s maneuvers proved successful when Google made the first move. 
According to internal Facebook communications, Google tried to bring Facebook to the 
negotiating table as early as June 6, 2016. In one email, a Facebook employee noted that Google 
had made a general outreach but that Google had indicated it was unsure of Facebook’s appetite: 
“Google’s product team would be interested in talking about broader/larger options, but uncertain 
as to our appetite.”  
211. Within months of Facebook’s official header bidding announcement, Google and 
Facebook began formal negotiations. According to an internal Google presentation from 
November 2017 discussing a potential Facebook partnership for Google's “Top Partner Council,” 
Google stated that their endgame was to “collaborate when necessary to maintain status quo.” 
Google documented internally that it was interested in a collaboration and the status quo. 
212. Facebook clearly understood Google’s motivations. In an October 30, 2017 email, 
senior Facebook executive  discussed the deal and explained to another Facebook 
executive,  “they want this deal to kill 
header bidding.” Facebook knew Google’s intent was to cut a deal to get Facebook to curtail its 
support of header bidding. 
213. At this time, and extending into 2018, Google and Facebook were engaged in high-
stakes brinksmanship. A truce between the two advertising giants was by no means guaranteed. In 
an August 9, 2018 internal Google presentation, one slide averred that if Google could not “avoid 
competing with FAN,” then it would instead collaborate with Facebook to “build a moat.” Google 
was interested in using Facebook to build a moat. 




214. Facebook was highly interested in a successful outcome to these negotiations between 
horizontal competitors in the ad network market and potential competitors in the publisher ad 
server market. As internal Facebook documents reveal, Facebook “believed strongly” that 
partnering with Google was “relatively cheap compared to build/buy and compete in zero-sum ad 
tech game.” Facebook did not want to play zero-sum games. 
215. Facebook’s  was explicit that “[t]his is a big 
deal strategically” in an email thread that included Facebook . When the 
economic terms had taken their form, the team sent an email addressed directly to  
 “We’re nearly ready to sign and need your approval to move forward.” In making the 
case to , the team outlined that Facebook had four options: to “invest hundreds 
more engineers” and spend billions of dollars to lock up inventory to compete, exit the business, 
or do the deal with Google.  wanted to meet with  and his other 
executives before making a decision.  
216. The companies’ collective efforts to avoid competition were successful. Facebook 
chose to cut a deal with Google. The ultimate outcome of the negotiations was a September 2018 
Google-Facebook agreement signed by Philipp Schindler, the head of Google advertising sales 
and operations, and , Facebook’s  and member of Facebook’s 
Board of Directors, and who  was one-time head of . 
217. Google internally used the code phrase “Jedi Blue” to refer to the 2018 Google-
Facebook agreement. This phrase was a twist on the reference to Star Wars. Google generally kept 
this code phrase secret and non-public. Google does not use code words to uniquely refer to any 
other Open Bidding or Network Bidding agreement.  





218. As a result of their bidding agreement, Facebook significantly curtailed its header 
bidding initiatives and would instead bid through Google’s ad server. In return, Google agreed to 
give Facebook a leg up in its auctions. In an internal Google memo titled “FAN deal discussion,” 
Google memorialized that “FAN requires special deal terms, but it is worth it to cement our value.” 
The parties agreed up front on when and how often Facebook would bid in auctions, and when and 
how often Facebook would ultimately win.  
1. Google gives Facebook a leg up in its auctions in return for Facebook backing 
off from header bidding. 
219. Facebook agreed to shift from routing bids through header bidding to routing bids 
through Google’s ad server in exchange for a number of special auction advantages. Traditionally, 
when bidding into Google’s ad server through Open Bidding, networks for web inventory like 
FAN had to bid into exchanges and pay exchange fees. But with the Jedi Blue agreement, Google 
made Facebook a large-scale concession and let FAN circumvent exchanges and bid directly into 
Google’s ad server. Instead of paying exchange fees, Google charged Facebook a lower 5 to 10 
percent fee and prohibited Facebook from speaking publicly about its special lower pricing terms. 
Publishers and advertisers measure the efficiency of trading through buy-sell spreads. The lower 
fees Google imposes on some marketplaces (like FAN) puts those marketplaces at an advantage 
when competing against the marketplaces with higher fees.  




220. Google also provided Facebook with a speed advantage in auctions. Google subjects 
other marketplaces competing for publishers’ inventory in Open Bidding to 160 millisecond 
timeouts. Competitors have actively complained that 160ms is not enough time to recognize users 
in auctions and return bids before they are excluded. By comparison, Google nearly doubled 
timeouts, extending them to 300 milliseconds, for Facebook. These longer timeouts granted by 
Google were presumably designed to aid FAN in winning more auctions to abide by the spirit of 
the Jedi Blue agreement.  
221. Google further induced Facebook to help Google “kill HB” by letting Facebook have 
direct billing and contractual relationships with publishers. This term was advantageous to 
Facebook because Google prohibits other exchanges and networks in Open Bidding from having 
such direct relationships. In fact, Google’s policies with other exchanges and networks in this 
regard are so strict that Google has prohibited marketplaces from even discussing pricing with 
publishers. The inability to discuss pricing and terms constrains marketplaces’ ability to operate 
and compete. One advertising competitor compared Google’s business term to a “gag order.”  
222. On top of special pricing, longer timeouts, and a direct billing relationship exception, 
Google further induced Facebook to help it shut down competition from header bidding by 
informing Facebook which impressions are likely targeted to spam (e.g., impressions targeted to 
bots, rather than humans). Facebook does not have to pay for those impressions. Other networks 
have asked Google for the same information, but Google has refused. So now Facebook has a 
further leg up over the competition in Google auctions: Facebook knows which impressions sold 
through Google are fake and worthless. 
223. In the Jedi Blue agreement, Google also promised to use “commercially reasonable 
efforts” to help Facebook recognize the identity of users in publishers’ auctions. The parties agreed 




to benchmark “match rate” commitments, i.e., the percent of users Facebook could identify in 
auctions over the percent of bid requests received. Google promised Facebook an 80 percent match 
rate in auctions for mobile inventory and a 60 percent match rate in auctions for web inventory 
(excluding Safari). Bidders in advertising auctions generally only bid when they recognize the 
identity of the user. As a result, the Jedi Blue benchmark match rates allow Facebook to bid and 
win more often in auctions, providing FAN yet another advantage over other bidders.  
224. Indeed, since signing the agreement, Google and Facebook have been working closely 
in an ongoing manner to help Facebook recognize users in auctions and bid and win more often. 
For example, Google and Facebook have integrated their software development kits (SDKs) so 
that Google can pass Facebook data for user ID cookie matching. They also coordinated with each 
other to harm publishers through the adoption of Unified Pricing rules, discussed in paragraphs 
273-279 below. The companies also have been working together to improve Facebook’s ability to 
recognize users using browsers with blocked cookies, on Apple devices, and on Apple’s Safari 
browser, thereby circumventing one Big Tech company’s efforts to compete by offering users 
better privacy. For instance, according to an April 2, 2019 discussion between Facebook 
employees, Facebook was having trouble matching users on Apple’s Safari browser. Google 
shared that Facebook’s match rates were about the same that Google saw for other auction 
participants. Facebook employees noted, however, that Google was ready to “initiate a detailed 
discussion with Product and Legal to allow FB to collect signals on the client (using a javascript) 
and G passing it to the bid request.” Google offered to help Facebook better identify users using 
JavaScript on publisher properties. By helping Facebook to better identify users in ad auctions, 
Google helps Facebook’s network FAN bid and win more often than other bidders in Google’s 
auctions.  




225. Google also provided Facebook an advantage when it came to Google using 
Facebook’s inside information to beat Facebook in auctions. In entering the agreement, Facebook 
was wary that Google would use information about Facebook’s bids to manipulate auctions. As a 
result, Facebook was explicit in demanding that Google be prohibited from using Facebook’s bid 
data for the purpose of advantaging itself. Dan Rose, Facebook Vice President of Partnerships, 
explained in an email to Mark Zuckerberg that Facebook had “exerted pressure on Google to 
change their auction so that Google is no longer able to advantage their own demand. With these 
changes, we will be able to bid on publisher inventory served by Google on a level playing field.” 
Facebook was big enough to extract this concession from Google, whereas no other auction 
participant has the scale to demand or achieve the same. Thus, in the Jedi Blue agreement, Google 
committed not to use Facebook’s inside information—its bids—to manipulate auctions in its favor 
by adjusting its bids or publisher floors in real time. As discussed in this Complaint, Google 
competes against other auction participants using their inside and non-public information. If 
Google abides by the terms of the Jedi Blue agreement, the exception for Facebook allows FAN 
to win more auctions relative to other bidders.  




Screenshot of contractual terms that prohibit Google from trading using Facebook’s inside 
information (e.g., information about Facebook’s bids): 
 
2. Google and Facebook agree in the Jedi Blue agreement to a secret “Win Rate.” 
226. In the auctions for publishers’ inventory that are the subject of the Jedi Blue agreement, 
Google and Facebook compete head-to-head as bidders. Specifically, Google’s GDN ad network 
and AdMob bid against Facebook’s ad network FAN in these auctions. In this context, Google and 
Facebook compete against each other. Google internally discussed this “head-to-head 
competition.” 
227. The Google and Facebook ad networks for web display and in-app mobile inventory 
(collectively, GDN, AdMob, and FAN) are the largest ad networks in the United States. They are 
frequently the largest competitors for publishers’ inventory in auctions hosted by Google’s ad 
server. 
228. In the Jedi Blue agreement, Google and Facebook agreed to manipulate publisher 
auctions in Facebook’s favor through secret bid, spend, and win commitments. For example, the 
agreement outlines that Facebook will use “commercially reasonable efforts” to bid on at least 90 




percent of auctions in which Facebook recognizes the end user. The agreement also outlines that, 
starting in the fourth year of the agreement, Facebook must spend at least $500 million in its 
auctions annually.  
229. Google and Facebook also agreed in the Jedi Blue agreement to a “Win Rate.” The 
agreement defines the term “Win Rate” as the number of auctions that Facebook wins divided by 
the number of auctions in which Facebook competes (by submitting a bid response), multiplied by 
100. The parties agreed up front on what Facebook’s Win Rate in auctions would be. The Jedi 
Blue agreement specifies that Facebook would have a Win Rate of at least equal to 10 percent. 
The agreement terms require Facebook to bid high enough to win the minimum percent quota of 
10 percent, irrespective of how high others in the auctions bid.  
230. When Facebook “wins” one of these auctions, Facebook is not purchasing ad space for 
the purpose of advertising Facebook’s own products or services. Rather, Facebook’s network FAN 
is acquiring impressions for the purpose of re-selling those impressions to small business 
advertisers across America who buy advertising from Facebook. Some of these advertisers do not 
even know that Facebook delivers their ads on non-Facebook websites and apps.  
231. The Jedi Blue agreement allocates markets, and therefore fixes prices, between Google 
and Facebook as competing bidders in the auctions for publishers’ web display and in-app 
advertising inventory. The agreement allocated a portion of publishers’ auction wins to Facebook, 
subverting the free operation of supply and demand. Furthermore, the bid rate, win rate, and spend 
commitments were designed to meet a “high monthly minimum to ensure volume” that spans 
several years. Facebook is locked in and cannot change its mind and switch back to header bidding 
to compete against Google in the publisher ad server market. 




232. By providing Facebook with what Google called “special deal terms,” combined with 
pre-agreed bid and win rates, Google further manipulated publishers’ auctions. Google already 
manipulates publishers’ auctions by giving Google bidders information and speed advantages. In 
2019, these advantages helped them win the overwhelming majority of publishers’ auctions hosted 
by Google: about 81 percent of Google AdMob auctions for U.S. mobile app inventory, and about 
71 percent of Google ad server auctions for mobile inventory. Now Google offered Facebook a 
Win Rate, information advantages, speed advantages, and other prioritizations, to the detriment of 
other auction participants.  
233. As one would expect with a market allocation agreement, Google and Facebook do not 
disclose their secret match rate, bid rate, or win rate agreements to other auction participants. 
Rather, Google publicly misrepresents that all bidders in publishers’ auctions compete on equal 
footing. “All participants in the unified auction, including Authorized Buyers and third-party yield 
partners, compete equally for each impression on a net basis,” Google publicly markets on its 
website. This, of course, is patently false. It is false not only because of the special terms in the 
Facebook agreement, but also because Google used algorithms to systematically manipulate 
auction outcomes and repeatedly traded on inside information to win auctions.  
234. Given the scope and extensive nature of cooperation between the two companies, 
Google and Facebook were highly aware that their agreement could trigger antitrust violations. So 
they discussed, negotiated, and memorialized how they would cooperate with one another should 
a government entity in the United States or globally start to investigate the agreement under 
antitrust laws. The Jedi Blue agreement permits the parties to terminate the agreement for 
regulatory inquiries, material document requests, a formal antitrust investigation, or a commenced 
antitrust action. If neither party executed those termination options, the agreement permits 




termination “immediately” after either party exhausts its right to appeal. The agreement also 
requires the parties to coordinate on antitrust defenses, such that Facebook must approve any and 
all arguments that Google presents relating to their illegal agreement in its answer to this 
Complaint. The word “antitrust” is mentioned no fewer than twenty times throughout the Jedi Blue 
agreement.  
Screenshot of the Jedi-Blue agreement specifying regulatory and antitrust cooperation: 
 




E. Google forces market participants to re-route trading through Google. 
235. In its efforts to kill header bidding and competition in the exchange market, Google 
went further than colluding with its largest competitor. Google worked tirelessly to stop the 
innovation of header bidding entirely. Google deceived exchanges to use Google’s ad server 
instead of header bidding. Google employees sometimes deceived publishers who chose to use 
header bidding, falsely telling one major online publisher that it should cut off a rival exchange in 
header bidding because of a strain on servers. After the exchange uncovered Google’s act, Google 
employees discussed playing a “jedi mind trick” on the industry and “get[ting] publishers to come 
up with the idea to remove exchanges … on their own.” Google also crippled publishers’ ability 
to measure the efficiency of exchanges in header bidding, limited publishers’ use of exchanges in 
header bidding, and punished publishers and advertisers that used header bidding in Google search 
rankings, where Google has significant scale.  
1. Google trades ahead of bid orders to foreclose exchange competition.  
236. Google first excluded competition from header bidding, and in the exchange market, 
by trading ahead of the bid orders submitted by header bidding exchanges. A publisher like USA 
Today would route their inventory to multiple exchanges through header bidding, then route the 
winning exchange bid into their Google ad server. Google programmed its ad server to let its 
exchange displace the winning header bidding exchange bid by paying one penny more. Put 
another way, Google’s ad server let Google’s exchange peak at the winning header bidding 
exchange’s bid, then displace the trade. Industry participants called this Google’s “Last Look.” 
Other industries call analogous conduct by intermediaries “insider trading” and “front running.”  
237. With Last Look, and Google’s absolute monopoly in the ad server market, Google 
successfully foreclosed competition in the exchange market and ensured a system where Google 
always prevailed. Google’s exchange cherry picked the best impressions, leaving rival exchanges 




the low value impressions left behind by Google’s exchange. According to a confidential Google 
study, Last Look significantly re-routed trading to Google’s exchange and Google’s ad buying 
tools, protecting Google’s market power in both. Google’s internal documents also explain that 
Last Look ensured that header bidding exchanges lose to Google’s exchange. The exception was 
when a publisher set a higher floor for Google’s exchange, a feature that Google would later 
remove from publishers’ control. 
2. Google deceives exchanges to forgo header bidding.  
238. Google unlawfully excluded competition from header bidding and in the exchange 
market by tricking non-Google exchanges to migrate from header bidding to Exchange Bidding. 
In March 2017, Google stated that its exchange would no longer trade ahead of other exchanges 
that bid through Google’s Exchange Bidding program. Market participants cheered Google for 
giving up its “Last Look auction advantage.”  
239. However, Google did not actually stop trading ahead of exchanges. Internal documents 
reveal that Google simply replaced one version of Last Look for another by using a new technique 
that allowed Google to continue to jump ahead of rival exchange bids. Specifically, Google 
deployed a bid optimization scheme based on predictive modeling  
 
With this new bid optimization, Google abandoned Last Look as that term was understood. 
However, Google re-engineered its ability to trade ahead of its rivals. 
240. Google’s new manipulation permitted Google to give up Last Look, as such, but still 
win just the same—revenue neutral for DV360 (+2 percent) and Google Ads (-1 percent). Non-
Google exchanges cannot compete with similar bid optimization schemes because Google’s ad 
server restricts publishers from accessing and sharing their user IDs. Truly giving up Last Look 




would have cost Google too much; Google predicted a 10 percent hit to DV360’s revenue and at 
least a 30 percent decrease in Google Ads’ revenue.  
3. Google deceives publishers to disable rival exchanges in header bidding.  
241. Internal communications between Google employees reveal how Google engaged in 
deception to undermine header bidding and foreclose competition in the exchange market. In one 
instance, the OpenX exchange noticed their auction transactions and revenue in header bidding 
plummet. When OpenX reached out to a publisher to diagnose the problem, the publisher 
explained that Google employees told the publisher to remove the OpenX exchange from header 
bidding to solve a “strain on its servers” and improve the publisher’s yield. However, a senior 
Google employee worried its misrepresentations would make it difficult “to convince [companies] 
to trust us.” Another employee conceded it gave Google a “bad look.” Google employees agreed 
that, in the future, they should find ways to convince publishers to act against their interest and 
remove competing exchanges in header bidding on their own.  
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5. Google obstructs publishers’ use of header bidding through caps.  
243. Google also throttles publishers’ use of header bidding by capping the number of 
permissible “line items”—a feature in Google’s ad server that publishers must use to receive bids 
from exchanges in header bidding. Many publishers requested that Google increase the number of 
permissible line items so that they could properly utilize header bidding. Internally, Google 
discussed charging publishers for increasing line items or keeping line items limits in place as “the 
only tool we have to fight [header bidding].” Google consistently rejected publishers’ requests for 
more line items, or at best, would provide only temporary and limited increases. As one employee 
explained to others, “[w]e need to push these pubs to using Jedi – if imposing more limits pushes 
them more to Jedi – then we should keep those limits in place.”  
244. In a competitive market, an ad server would help publishers use header bidding because 
it will better optimize publisher yield. The OpenX publisher ad server takes this approach, 
permitting publishers’ liberal use of exchanges in header bidding. Instead of increasing line items 
to enhance publishers’ yield, Google’s ad server undermines its own clients’ revenue yield.  
6. Google uses its scale in search to punish publishers that use header bidding. 
245. Google also started using its economies of scale in the search market to strongarm 
publishers and advertisers to stop using header bidding and re-route trading through Google’s ad 
server. Header bidding is only possible if publishers can insert JavaScript code into the header 
section of their webpages. To respond to the threat of header bidding, Google created Accelerated 
Mobile Pages (“AMP”), a framework for developing mobile web pages, and made AMP 
essentially incompatible with JavaScript and header bidding. Google then used its power in the 
search market to effectively force publishers into using AMP. 
246. Although Google claims that AMP was developed as an open-source collaboration, 
AMP is actually a Google-controlled initiative. Google originally registered and still owns AMP’s 




domain, ampproject.org. In addition, until the end of 2018, Google controlled all AMP decision-
making. AMP relied on a governance model called “Benevolent Dictator For Life” that vested 
ultimate decision-making authority in a single Google engineer. Since then, Google has transferred 
control of AMP to a foundation, but the transfer was superficial. Google controls the foundation’s 
board and debates internally whether AMP communications should come from Google or the 
Google-controlled AMP board.  
247. Google ad server employees met with AMP employees to strategize about using AMP 
to impede header bidding, addressing in particular how much pressure publishers and advertisers 
would tolerate. First, Google restricted the AMP code to prohibit publishers from routing their bids 
to, or sharing their user data with, more than a few exchanges a time, thereby severely limiting 
AMP’s compatibility with header bidding. However, Google made AMP fully compatible with 
routing to exchanges through Google’s ad server. Google also designed AMP to force publishers 
to route rival exchange bids through Google’s ad server so that Google could continue to peek at 
their bids and trade on inside information. Third, Google designed AMP so that users loading AMP 
pages would directly communicate with Google cache servers rather than publishers’ servers. This 
enabled Google’s access to publishers’ inside and non-public user data. AMP pages also limit the 
number of ads on a page, the types of ads publishers can sell, and the variety of enriched content 
that publishers can have on their pages. 
248. After crippling AMP’s compatibility with header bidding, Google went to market 
falsely telling publishers that adopting AMP would enhance page load times. But Google 
employees knew that AMP only improves the “median of performance” and AMP pages can 
actually load slower than other publisher speed optimization techniques. In other words, the 
ostensible benefits of faster load times for a Google-cached AMP version of a webpage were not 




true for publishers that designed their web pages for speed. Some publishers did not adopt AMP 
because they knew their pages actually loaded faster than AMP pages.  
249. The speed benefits Google marketed were also at least partly a result of Google’s 
throttling. Google throttles the load time of non-AMP ads by giving them artificial one-second 
delays in order to give Google AMP a “nice comparative boost.” Throttling non-AMP ads slows 
down header bidding, which Google then uses to denigrate header bidding for being too slow. 
“Header Bidding can often increase latency of web pages and create security flaws when executed 
incorrectly,” Google falsely claimed. Internally, Google employees grappled with “how to 
[publicly] justify [Google] making something slower.” 
250. Despite the speed benefits Google falsely touted, publishers did not want to use AMP 
because AMP pages caused their advertising revenue to decline: publishers make less money 
selling advertising on AMP pages than they do on their regular web pages. AMP also degraded 
quality by restricting content and ad types. 
251. Just as publishers have the freedom to make their webpages mobile or desktop 
compatible, publishers still have the freedom to decide whether to build their pages using the AMP 
framework. However, Google uses its scale in search to punish publishers that do not chose AMP. 
Specifically, Google Search ranks non-AMP pages lower in search results and reserves the top 
placements in the “Search AMP Carousel”—the top search results placements with pictures—to 
publishers using AMP.  




Google search results for “Dallas Cowboys”; AMP results are displayed in the carousel along 
the top: 
 
252. Google gave publishers a Faustian bargain: (1) publishers who used header bidding 
would see the traffic to their site drop precipitously from Google suppressing their ranking in 
search and re-directing traffic to AMP-compatible publishers; or (2) publishers could adopt AMP 
pages to maintain traffic flow but forgo exchange competition in header bidding, which would 
make them more money on an impression-by-impression basis. Either option was far inferior to 
the options available to publishers before Google introduced AMP. Just how inferior? According 
to Google’s internal documents, 40 percent less revenue on AMP pages.  
7. Google’s ad server gives exchanges that forego header bidding a leg up. 
253. Google’s ad server excludes competition in the exchange market by withholding 
critical ad server data, called “minimum bid to win,” from exchanges in header bidding. The 
“minimum bid to win” data is the price an auction participant would have had to bid to win a 
particular completed auction; Google’s ad server shares this data with exchanges in Google’s Open 




Bidding program at the conclusion of each auction. Exchanges in Open Bidding use this data to 
adjust their bidding strategy in order to beat exchanges returning bids through header bidding. In 
other words, exchanges in header bidding will lose more while those bidding in Open Bidding win 
more.  
8. Google excludes competition through “nontransparent pricing.” 
254. Google excludes competition by purposefully keeping its auction mechanics, terms, 
and pricing, opaque and “nontransparent.” When marketing its exchange to publishers and 
advertisers, Google has explained that an ad exchange is “just like a stock exchange, which enables 
stocks to be traded in an open way.” However, Google’s exchange is not open at all.  
255. Google’s non-transparent pricing strategy includes obfuscating the take rate that 
publishers and advertisers pay Google. Google tells the small advertisers who use Google Ads to 
bid the price they pay Google for ad space, but not the price the inventory actually cleared for in 
Google’s exchange, the revenue the publisher receives, or the markup Google keeps. In a 
discussion between Google employees about Google Ads’ fees, one employee asked: “Buyers 
don’t know that [we] take a 15 percent fee? I didn’t realize that.” Another clarified that the fee “is 
not transparent.” Even Google employees don’t understand Google’s fees for small advertisers. 
256. Google also obfuscates price transparency for publishers. Overall, evidence suggests 
that publishers selling inventory through Google receive approximately 70 percent of advertising 
revenue paid by advertisers, and in some cases that amount is as low as 58 percent. In other words, 
Google’s take rate is approximately 30 percent and in some cases is as high as 42 percent.  
257. The lack of transparency decreases competitive pressure at different points in the 
supply chain and increases opportunities for rent-seeking and arbitrage. As one senior Google 
employee put it, “[b]y charging non-transparently on both sides, we give ourselves some flexibility 
to react and counteract market changes. If we face tons of pricing pressure on the buy-side, we can 




fall back on the sell-side, and vice-versa.” In other words, Google can charge higher fees at points 
in the supply chain where there is little competition and the lack of transparency around fees 
impedes other firms from coming in and competing with Google by offering the same services at 
lower prices. 
258. The lack of transparency also forecloses competition because it impedes potential and 
actual competitors from assessing a possible return on investment and entering the market to 
compete.  
259. Overall, the lack of transparency prevents more efficient competition that would drive 
greater innovation, increase the quality of intermediary services, increase output, and create 
downward pricing pressure on intermediary fees. 
9. Google is trying to foreclose competition and create a “walled garden” on the 
open web. 
260. Google is excluding competition from header bidding, and in the exchange and ad 
buying tool markets, by trying to create a “walled garden”—a closed ecosystem—out of the 
otherwise-open internet. Specifically, Google’s aim is to limit publishers’ ability to identify and 
track users, and to position itself as the arbiter of identification and targeting on the open web. To 
then sell targeted ads, publishers will be required to lean even more into Google. Google has 
advanced two different projects to achieve this anticompetitive end-goal: the first is Project NERA, 
and the second, Privacy Sandbox. With both, Google’s objective stands in stark contrast to the 
open internet that Google claims to protect.  
i. Project NERA 
261. Project NERA was Google’s original plan to create a closed ecosystem out of the open 
internet. Google documents reveal that Google’s motive was to “successfully mimic a walled 
garden across the open web [so] we can protect our margins.” For Google, Project NERA’s walled 




garden meant two things: controlling the design of publishers’ ad space, then forcing those 
publishers to sell their ad space exclusively through Google’s products. According to internal 
Google documents, this strategy would permit Google to extract even higher intermediation fees. 
A Google employee aptly described Google’s ambition for Project NERA by acknowledging that 
Google wants to “capture the benefits of tightly ‘operating’ a property … without ‘owning’ the 
property and facing the challenges of building new consumer products.” Google’s nickname for 
this walled garden plan was “not-owned-but-operated,” or “NOBO” for short. In other words, 
Google wanted to be able to control and close off independent websites like The Dallas Morning 
News just as Google can control and close off its own sites like YouTube.  
262. To get publishers to give Google exclusive access over their ad inventory, Google set 
publishers up for a lose/lose scenario. First, Google started to leverage its ownership of the largest 
web browser, Chrome, to track and target publishers’ audiences in order to sell Google’s 
advertising inventory. To make this happen, Google first introduced the ability for users to log into 
the Chrome browser. Then, Google began to steer users into doing this by using deceptive and 
coercive tactics. For example, Google started to automatically log users into Chrome if they logged 
into any Google service (e.g., Gmail or YouTube). In this way, Google took the users that choose 
not to log into Chrome and logged them in anyways. If a user tried to log out of Chrome in 
response, Google punished them by kicking them out of a Google product they were in the process 
of using (e.g., Gmail or YouTube). On top this, through another deceptive pattern, Google got 
these users to give the Chrome browser permission to track them across the open web and on 
independent publisher sites like The Dallas Morning News. These users also had to give Google 
permission to use this new Chrome tracking data to sell Google’s own ad space, permitting Google 
to use Chrome to circumvent reliance on cookie-tracking technology. The effect of this practice is 




to rob publishers of the exclusive use of their audience data (e.g., data on what users read on The 
Dallas Morning News), thereby depreciating the value of publishers’ ad space and benefitting ad 
sales on Google’s properties (e.g., YouTube). 
263. Chrome is the leading computer browser in the United States with almost 60 percent 
market share. Chrome has power over publishers because it controls a captive segment of their 
online users; consequently, publishers do not have alternative ways to reach the users that access 
the internet using Google’s browser. 
264. After using Chrome to track publishers’ users, Google turned around and offered to 
give publishers the ability to tap into Google’s now-deeper trove of user data in exchange for the 
publishers’ agreement to give Google exclusive control over their ad space. If publishers did not 
agree to the new exclusivity terms, Google would continue to use Chrome to collect data about 
their users to sell more Google ads at the expense of the publishers’ ad space. For Google, Project 
NERA represented a win-win.  
ii. Privacy Sandbox 
265. As regulatory scrutiny around Google and other Big Tech firms increased globally, 
Google transitioned from Project NERA to “Privacy Sandbox.” Regulators around the world were 
increasingly concerned about the extent to which firms like Google tracked consumers. Of any 
company on the internet, Google was number one in the world when it came to tracking users 
online through cookies. The leader in cookie-based tracking needed a way to deflect any potential 
regulation of its business. To address these concerns, Google would take a new approach to 
building a walled garden out of the open web and ground that approach in privacy language.  
266. Google’s new scheme is, in essence, to wall off the entire portion of the internet that 
consumers access through Google’s Chrome browser. By the end of 2022, Google plans to modify 
Chrome to block publishers and advertisers from using the type of cookies they rely on to track 




users and target ads. Then, Google, through Chrome, will offer publishers and advertisers new and 
alternative tracking mechanisms outlined in a set of proposals that Google has dubbed Privacy 
Sandbox. Overall, the changes are anticompetitive because they raise barriers to entry and exclude 
competition in the exchange and ad buying tool markets, which will further expand the already-
dominant market power of Google’s advertising businesses.  
267. Google’s new scheme is anticompetitive because it coerces advertisers to shift spend 
from smaller media properties like The Dallas Morning News to large dominant properties like 
Google’s. Chrome is set to disable the primary cookie-tracking technology almost all non-Google 
publishers currently use to track users and target ads. A small advertiser like a local car dealership 
will no longer be able to use cookies to advertise across The Dallas Morning News and The Austin 
Chronicle. But the same advertiser will be able to continue tracking and targeting ads across 
Google Search, YouTube, and Gmail—amongst the largest sites in the world—because Google 
relies on a different type of cookie (which Chrome will not block) and alternative tracking 
technologies to offer such cross-site tracking to advertisers. By blocking the type of cookies 
publishers like The Dallas Morning News currently use to sell ads, but not blocking the other 
technologies that Google relies on for cross-site tracking, Google’s plan will pressure advertisers 
to shift to Google money otherwise spent on smaller publishers.  
268. Google’s new scheme is also anticompetitive because it forecloses competition in the 
exchange and ad buying tool markets while simultaneously providing Google with a workaround. 
Non-Google ad buying tools rely primarily on the type of cookies that Chrome is set to block in 
order to track users and target them with ads. Google’s ad buying tools, however, partially 
circumvent reliance on the same type of cookies because Google grants them exclusive access to 
user data from Chrome and Google’s Android mobile operating system. As a result of these 




impending changes, some advertisers are already in the process of preparing to shift their spend 
from competing ad buying tools to Google’s. In addition to increasing its already dominant market 
positions on the buy-side, because Google’s ad buying tools favor Google’s exchange, the 
upcoming changes will further entrench Google’s exchange monopoly. 
269. Google’s new scheme limits competitors’ ability to compete with Google and the 
massive amount of user data that it has accumulated. For over ten years, Google has been the single 
largest tracker of online users using the very type of cookies that Google will now block. Google 
has already amassed massive quantities of user data and associated them with individual profiles. 
Moving forward, Google is also uniquely positioned to continue collecting vast troves of data on 
individual users: Google will continue individually tracking users on their major properties (e.g., 
Google Search, Google Maps, YouTube) and through various workarounds (e.g., via Chrome and 
Android).  
270. In addition to excluding competition in these ways, Google’s new walled garden 
scheme poses a systemic risk to online advertising markets in the United States: it blocks 
publishers and advertisers from transacting through intermediaries that do not have conflicts of 
interest. By blocking cookies, and through proposals in Privacy Sandbox, Google forcibly inserts 
itself in the middle of publishers’ business relationships with non-Google advertising companies, 
cutting off publishers’ ability to transact with rivals without also going through Google. As internal 
Google documents make clear, some of the largest advertisers in America actively try to avoid 
working with Google because of its conflicts of interest. Google operates on the buy-side and the 
sell-side, runs an exchange, and participates in the market as a buyer and as a seller. The equivalent 
in financial markets would be working with a broker that also represents the counterparty, runs the 
exchange, and has a proprietary trading desk—all without ethical walls between business divisions 




to protect its customers’ welfare. In advertising, a lack of transparency exacerbates advertiser 
concerns: Google does not permit adequate third-party audits for things like ad fraud, measurement 
(e.g., render rates), or circulation. Google’s upcoming changes will force market participants to 
rely even more on Google, a conflicted intermediary, as the arbiter of ad transactions. 
271. To summarize, Google’s upcoming cookie changes in the name of privacy are a ruse 
to further Google’s longstanding plan to advantage itself by creating a closed ecosystem out of the 
open web. Project NERA was Google’s first scheme; then, to deflect growing regulatory concern 
over its own privacy and intrusive cookie practices with consumers, Google launched “Privacy 
Sandbox,” new plans to wall off the internet accessed through Chrome. Google’s aim is to further 
squeeze competition in the exchange and ad buying tool markets by restricting competitors’ ability 
to track users and target ads.  
272. At the same time, Google is trying to hide its true intentions behind a pretext of privacy. 
Google does not actually put a stop to user profiling or targeted advertising—it puts Google’s 
Chrome browser at the center of tracking and targeting. Google does not put a stop to Google’s 
tracking of users on Chrome; it does not put a stop to Google’s tracking of users through cookie 
workarounds; it does not put a stop to Google’s tracking of users across the largest sites in the 
world. In fact, the new Google Chrome tracking groups create something akin to a Google social 
credit score based on group identity. As The Electronic Frontier Foundation recently summarized: 
“Today, trackers follow you around the web, skulking in the digital shadows in order to guess at 
what kind of person you might be. In Google’s future, they will sit back, relax and let your browser 
do the work for them. …. The Sandbox isn’t about your privacy. It’s about Google’s bottom line. 
At the end of the day, Google is an advertising company that happens to make a browser.”  




10. Google excludes competition though Unified Pricing rules. 
273. Many publishers would prefer to apply higher price floors to Google’s AdX exchange 
than they apply to other exchanges, since the informational and other disadvantages Google creates 
for other exchanges often mean that AdX is willing to bid more than others. Those higher price 
floors for Google (or the lower price floors for others) require Google to compete more vigorously, 
i.e., bid more, for purchasing impressions. One of Google’s initial efforts to avoid this heightened 
competition came in June 2019, when Google manipulated its core search algorithm to punish 
publishers utilizing higher price floors. It caused some publishers’ search traffic to plummet, with 
one publisher losing half of its search traffic in a single day. Nevertheless, Google repeatedly 
misrepresented to publishers that it was not manipulating search traffic results to punish publishers 
who set higher price floors for Google. But in the end, Google would address the issue more 
directly by imposing Unified Pricing rules, which eliminated differential price floors altogether. 
In effect, Google used its ad server monopoly to exclude competition in the exchange market.  
274. In 2019, Google’s ad server started prohibiting publishers from setting different price 
floors for different exchanges and ad buying tools. As a result, publishers can no longer route their 
ad space to an exchange like AppNexus at a price floor lower than the price floor they apply when 
routing the same impression to Google’s exchange. Nor can a publisher give one bidder (e.g., 
Google Ads) a higher price floor (e.g., $10 CPM), while giving another (e.g., The Trade Desk) a 
lower price floor (e.g., $8 CPM). Google calls these new ad server restrictions Unified Pricing.  
275. Unified Pricing prohibits publishers from using price floors to generate competition 
between Google and non-Google exchanges and ad buying tools. Historically, publishers set 
different price floors for Google in order to generate competition from non-Google exchanges and 
ad buying tools. After Google acquired DoubleClick, Google’s ad server restricted publishers from 
sharing their raw and non-scrambled DoubleClick ad server users IDs with non-Google exchanges 




and ad buying tools. At the same time, Google’s ad server shares those user IDs with Google’s 
exchange and ad buying tools. Consequently, Google’s exchange and ad buying tools had a distinct 
information advantage about publishers’ heterogenous inventory. Non-Google intermediaries’ 
corresponding information disadvantage caused them to bid lower for impressions; for instance, 
they must sometimes bid “blind,” unable to adequately evaluate the value of the impression. To 
create bid competition in their auctions from non-Google ad buying tools, publishers would set 
their price floors higher for Google. But Google’s Unified Pricing rules now block publishers from 
charging Google a rational information risk premium, and they also effectively preclude publishers 
from generating competition from bidders unable to match Google’s information advantages.  
276. Google’s blocking of competition via Unified Price rules has resulted in Google’s 
exchange and buy-side winning an increasing portion of publishers’ impressions, even though they 
pay lower prices. Publisher auction records reveal that Google’s exchange grew its share of 
exchange impressions by 20 percent after the introduction of Unified Pricing rules. For some 
publishers, the Unified Pricing restrictions caused their Google ad server to sell twice as much of 
their inventory to Google’s exchange for half as much as what Google’s exchange historically 
paid. Records also show that Unified Pricing rules result in Google’s ad buying tools tripling and 
quintupling the share of impressions they win. In sum, Google’s Unified Price rules have been 
extremely effective at blocking and reducing competition from non-Google exchanges and ad 
buying tools. 
277. Unified Pricing rules not only prohibit publishers from discriminating between 
exchanges and bidders based on price and yield, but also on non-price criteria like ad quality. 
Publishers cannot favor exchanges and ad buying tools that return higher quality ads.  




278. The Unified Pricing rules also result in Google’s exchange winning more because they 
coerce publishers to transact with Google ad buying tools in Google’s exchange. In other words, 
they require publishers to use Google’s exchange in order to do business with Google’s ad buying 
tools. Previously, publishers could choose to transact with DV360 only in non-Google exchanges 
by increasing DV360’s price floors in Google’s exchange. Unified Pricing rules ended this practice 
and forced publishers to transact with DV360 and Google Ads in Google’s exchange. Forcing 
publishers to transact with Google’s ad buying tools only if they also transact in Google’s exchange 
was one of Google’s main aims with Unified Pricing. 
279. Google misrepresented to publishers its reasons for adopting Unified Pricing. 
Externally, Google falsely declared that abolishing price floors benefited publishers. Privately, 
however, Google recognized that Unified Pricing was “extremely self-serving” and revealed that 
the true objective was to allow “Google buyside and Facebook (after FAN integrates through Open 
Bidding) get access to the same 1st Price auction dynamics.” According to an internal Google 
memorandum summarizing a May 2, 2019 meeting between Google and Facebook, the parties 
discussed publisher pricing floors, and Facebook told Google it would rather publishers not have 
the ability to set price floors. These discussions helped Google later decide to prohibit publishers 
from setting lower price floors for non-Google (or non-Facebook) exchanges, networks, and ad 
buying tools. The Unified Price rules further the collusion between Google and Facebook.  
F. Google forces advertisers to use Google’s ad buying tools. 
1. Google conduct that excludes competition in the exchange market also 
excludes competition in the ad buying tool markets. 
280. The artificial information disadvantages that Google’s ad server and exchange generate 
for non-Google ad buying tools (e.g., cutting off access to publishers’ ad server user IDs) foreclose 
competition in the ad buying tool markets.  




281. The various Google programs discussed in paragraphs 148-154, including the 
Bernanke program, foreclose competition in the ad buying tool markets for small and large 
advertisers.  
282. Likewise, the Unified Pricing rules discussed in paragraphs 273-279 foreclose 
competition and protect Google’s monopoly in the ad buying tool markets. Before Unified Pricing, 
publishers could set different price floors to facilitate competition between Google and non-
Google ad buying tools.  
283. Google’s Last Look conduct, as well as Google’s new replacement scheme, discussed 
in paragraphs 236-240, forecloses competition in the ad buying tool markets.  
2. Google excludes competition in the market for ad buying tools by cutting 
YouTube off from competing ad buying tools.  
284. Google unlawfully maintains its monopoly power in the ad buying tool markets by 
cutting YouTube inventory off from competing ad buying tools. Cutting off YouTube access 
forces advertisers to use Google’s ad buying tools because YouTube, as the leading provider of 
video inventory in the United States, is a “must-have” source of online instream video inventory 
for advertisers. 
285. Google did not always require advertisers to use a Google ad buying tool to purchase 
YouTube ad inventory. Indeed, advertisers could previously purchase YouTube inventory through 
many non-Google ad buying tools. 
286. However, in 2013, Google noticed that its ad buying tool for large advertisers DV360 
was falling behind the competition. Google started to consider withholding YouTube inventory 
from non-Google ad buying tools for the express purpose of pressuring advertisers to use DV360 
and Google Ads. In an internal 2014 Google document, Google strategized that “[e]xclusivity of 
access to YouTube will likely be a significant driver of DBM Video adoption.”  




287. Google also recognized that withholding YouTube from competing ad buying tools 
would give Google’s DV360 and Google Ads power as buyers’ agent to steer advertisers’ budgets 
back to Google’s properties (e.g., Google Search). A 2013 strategy conversation makes this clear: 
“If advertisers feel like they don’t have to work with Google directly to access video inventory—
including YouTube—we will lose our ability to influence decisions about budget allocation.” In 
other words, if YouTube inventory were available exclusively through Google’s ad buying tools, 
advertisers would have to use those tools, which would empower Google to then steer budgets 
back to Google properties (e.g., Search and YouTube). 
288.  Rather than competing in the market on the basis of price or quality, Google decided 
to withhold YouTube inventory from non-Google ad buying tools in order to force advertisers to 
use Google’s tools. 
289. By restricting non-Google ad buying tools from selling YouTube inventory, Google 
also acted against YouTube’s interest. Restricting the pool of buyers for YouTube inventory 
lowered the demand and revenue for YouTube content creators.  
290. The harm to competing ad buying tools is magnified because advertisers (and ad 
agencies) prefer to minimize the number of ad buying tools they use. Advertisers and ad agencies 
bear significant costs and inefficiencies when using more than one ad buying tool for an ad 
campaign. For example, using multiple tools increases the rate at which they inadvertently bid 
against themselves on exchanges, thereby driving up their own advertising costs. As Google 
knows, advertisers can either use more than one ad buying tool (and increase their costs) or use 
just Google’s tools and avoid these inefficiencies altogether. 




291. Cutting off access to YouTube foreclosed competition in the ad buying tool markets 
and protected Google’s market power in these markets. Many DSPs stopped growing, many others 
went out of business, and the market overall has been closed to entry. 
VIII. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
292. Google’s exclusionary conduct has caused a wide range of anticompetitive effects, 
including the exit of rival firms and limited and declining entry rates in the relevant antitrust 
markets (despite the significant profits enjoyed by Google in those markets). Google’s harm to 
competition deprives advertisers, publishers, and consumers of improved quality, greater 
transparency, greater innovation, increased output, and lower prices. 
293. Google’s anticompetitive conduct described throughout this Complaint has adversely 
and substantially affected the Plaintiff States’ economies and the general welfare in the Plaintiff 
States. Google’s illegal conduct has reduced competition, raised prices, lowered quality, and 
reduced output in each of the Plaintiff States. This conduct has harmed the Plaintiff States’ 
respective economies by depriving the Plaintiff States and the persons within each Plaintiff State 
of the benefits of competition.  
294. Google has unlawfully maintained monopolies by using its market power to 
disadvantage the process of competition via tying, exclusionary conduct, and other conduct in at 
least the following ways: 
i. Substantially foreclosing competition in the exchange market by interfering with and 
cutting off access to inventory and advertiser demand;  
ii. Substantially foreclosing competition in the publisher ad server market by tying its ad 
server with its market dominant exchange; 
iii. Substantially foreclosing competition in the market for publisher ad servers and using 
market power in the publisher ad server market to harm competition in the exchange 




market, the market for display ad buying tools for small advertisers, and the market for 
display ad buying tools for large advertisers; 
iv. Substantially foreclosing competition in the markets for display ad buying tools for 
small advertisers and display ad buying tools for large advertisers; 
v. Increasing barriers to entry in the markets for publisher ad servers, exchanges, display 
ad buying tools for small advertisers, and display ad buying tools for large advertisers;  
vi. Harming innovation which would otherwise benefit publishers, advertisers, and 
consumers; 
vii. Harming publishers’ ability to effectively monetize their content, reducing publishers’ 
revenues, and thereby reducing output; 
viii. Maintaining opacity on margins and selling processes, harming competition in the 
exchange and display ad buying tool markets; 
ix. Increasing advertisers’ costs to advertise and reducing the effectiveness of their 
advertising, thereby harming businesses’ ability to deliver their products and services 
and reducing output; and 
x. Improperly shielding Google’s products from competitive pressures, thereby allowing 
it to continue to extract high margins and avoid the pressure to innovate. 
295. This section outlines the effect of Google’s conduct on competition in the publisher ad 
server market, the exchange market, the market for ad buying tools for small advertisers, and the 
market for ad buying tools for large advertisers, as well as the effects on publishers, advertisers, 
businesses, and the general public. 
A. Anticompetitive Effects in the Publisher Ad Server Market 
296. Google’s exclusionary conduct has foreclosed competition in the publisher ad server 
market and created artificial barriers to entry and expansion. Google’s exclusionary conduct in this 




market includes the tying of its ad server to its exchange (and network and ad buying tools), as 
well as its unlawful bid rigging agreement with Facebook. Competing publisher ad servers have 
consequently exited or significantly scaled back their offerings, leaving publishers with little to no 
choice but to license Google’s ad server. Several large public advertising technology firms, 
including Microsoft, Yahoo!, WPP, and OpenX, once competed in this market; all four firms have 
since exited the market. Moreover, the entry of new competition has been remarkably weak for a 
decade, and new entrants are thwarted, because of the Google-created barriers to entry and 
expansion. For instance, Google thwarted Facebook’s potential entry into this market by giving 
Facebook secret auction quotas.  
297. Google’s harm to the competitive process has harmed customers in this market, i.e., 
online publishers. An ad server is an inventory management system that serves a publisher’s 
interest. In a competitive market, publishers would benefit from ad servers competing on price and 
quality (e.g., the extent to which ad servers maximize publishers’ inventory yield). Google’s 
exclusionary conduct and entry barriers have permitted its ad server to charge supra-competitive 
fees (e.g., a 5 to 10 percent fee on gross transactions executed in non-Google exchanges and 
networks) and lower quality below competitive levels (e.g., blocking and interfering with 
competition from non-Google exchanges that increase publishers’ yield).  
298. Leading, long-established, and high-quality news publications have faced challenges 
monetizing via digital advertising, despite large readership and growing subscriber bases. Digital 
publishers were built on the expectation of fast growth in advertising sales, but that expectation 
has remained largely unrealized. In 2019, industry commentary described a pattern of struggling 
publishers heralding the “accelerating deterioration of the sector.” Struggling to meet advertising 
revenue targets, many publishers have had to resort to the downsizing of their workforces and the 




production of less content. By reducing the revenue potential for publishers, Google reduces 
publishers’ incentives and resources to produce content, lowering output in this relevant market.  
299. Google’s harm to the competitive process in the ad server market has also harmed 
publishers’ customers, i.e., individual consumers. Publishers use revenue generated from selling 
ad space to improve the quality of their content, offer more content, and offer more subsidized 
content access (i.e., less expensive subscriptions or free content access). Because Google’s ad 
server charges supra-competitive prices and depresses publishers’ inventory yield, publishers offer 
consumers less content (lower output of content), lower-quality content, less innovation in content 
delivery, more paywalls, and higher subscription fees.  
B. Anticompetitive Effects in the Exchange Market 
300. Google’s exclusionary conduct has foreclosed competition in the exchange market and 
created artificial barriers to entry and expansion. Google’s exclusionary conduct in this market 
includes deceptively blocking, interfering with, and obstructing exchange competition, cutting off 
non-Google exchange access to publishers’ user IDs, manipulating advertiser bids and exchange 
price floors (i.e., manipulating the auction), tying of its ad server to its exchange, ad network, and 
ad buying tools (requiring publishers and advertisers to trade in Google’s exchange), an unlawful 
agreement with Facebook to rig publishers’ auctions with advantages and quotas for Facebook, 
and a long list of conduct that Google pursued with the purpose to “kill” header bidding. 
Competing exchanges have consequently exited the market and new entrants are unable to 
effectively compete. Over ten years ago, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and top Silicon Valley venture funds 
competed in the exchange market, with the AdECN, AdBrite, and ADSDAQ exchanges; all three 
of these exchanges have since exited the market. Competition from new entrants has been weak 
because of the barriers and obstructions to entry Google has created. For instance, competing 
exchanges have tried for market share to compete by lowering their take rates to half and even a 




quarter of Google’s exchange take rates. However, competition is not working: effectively, due to 
Google interference, lowering prices does not permit exchanges to gain market share.  
301. Google’s harm to the competitive process has harmed customers in this market, i.e., 
online publishers and advertisers. In a competitive market, publishers and advertisers would 
benefit from exchanges competing on take rates and quality. Competition would lead to lower take 
rates, benefiting publishers and advertisers. Publishers would retain a greater share of their 
advertising revenue, permitting them to create more content, higher-quality content, and more 
subsidized content access. Advertisers would pay less to purchase ad space, permitting them to re-
invest those cost savings into providing consumers with higher-quality and lower-priced goods 
and services. Google’s foreclosure of competition in the exchange market has permitted its 
exchange to charge supra-competitive fees (~19-22 cut on gross transactions) and lower quality 
below competitive levels. Furthermore, Google’s high take rate does not reflect the magnitude of 
Google’s anticompetitive harm because of the inefficiency Google creates in the allocation of 
impressions. Google has consequently reduced output in the exchange market.  
C. Anticompetitive Effects in the Network Market 
302. Google’s exclusionary conduct has foreclosed competition in the display ad network 
market and the in-app mobile ad network market and created artificial barriers to entry and 
expansion. Google’s exclusionary conduct in these markets includes Google Ads routing 
advertisers’ bids on display ads to only Google’s network, then deceptively re-routing those 
advertisers’ bids to Google’s exchange; it also includes the terms of the Jedi Blue agreement, which 
provide Facebook’s in-app network FAN with “Win Rate” quotas in auctions for publishers’ in-
app inventory. Competing display and in-app networks have exited the market and new entrants 
are unable to effectively compete. Whereas competition in these markets used to be vigorous, 
today, Google and Facebook control these markets.  




303. Google’s harm to the competitive process has harmed customers in this market, i.e., 
small publishers and advertisers. In a competitive market, small publishers and advertisers would 
benefit from networks competing with each other on take rates and quality. Competition would 
lead to lower take rates, benefiting publishers and advertisers. Small publishers would retain a 
greater share of their advertising revenue, permitting them to create more content, higher-quality 
content, and more subsidized content access. Advertisers would pay less to purchase ad space, 
permitting them to re-invest those cost savings into providing consumers with higher-quality and 
lower-priced goods and services. Google’s foreclosure of competition in the network market has 
permitted its display network GDN to charge high double-digit take rates exceeding 32 percent. 
Google’s foreclosure of competition in the in-app network market, per the terms of the Jedi Blue 
agreement, allocates a minimum fixed percent of auctions for publishers’ inventory to Facebook’s 
in-app network FAN irrespective of how high other networks might bid in the same auctions. 
Market allocation through quotas subverts competition between networks for publishers’ in-app 
inventory and fixes prices in the market. Consequently, Google reduces output in these markets. 
D. Anticompetitive Effects in the Markets for Display Ad Buying Tools for Small 
Advertisers and Display Ad Buying Tools for Large Advertisers 
304. Google’s exclusionary conduct has foreclosed competition in the ad buying tool 
markets for both small and large advertisers and created artificial barriers to entry and expansion. 
Google’s exclusionary conduct in these separate markets includes the tying of its ad server to its 
exchange, ad network, and ad buying tools (requiring publishers and advertisers to trade in 
Google’s exchange), cutting off non-Google ad buying tools’ access to publishers’ ad server user 
IDs, manipulating advertiser bids and exchange price floors (i.e., manipulating the auction), and 
the tying of YouTube with its ad buying tools. Consequently, competing ad buying tools have 
exited the market and new entrants are unable to effectively compete. Competition in the ad buying 




tool markets for small and large advertisers used to be robust; today, Google Ads is effectively the 
only remaining choice for small advertisers wishing to purchase display ad space from exchanges. 
And many large advertisers have no choice but to use DV360 because they single home (to reduce 
bidding risk) and because DV360 has exclusive access to YouTube ad inventory, which is a “must 
have.”  
305. Google’s harm to the competitive process has harmed customers in these markets, i.e., 
both small and large advertisers. Ad buying tools, whether for small or large advertisers, are 
supposed to advance advertisers’ best interests (e.g., buying identical ad space for the lowest 
price). In a competitive market, advertisers would benefit from ad buying tools competing on price 
and quality (e.g., the extent to which the tools maximize advertisers’ best interests). Google’s 
exclusionary conduct has permitted its ad buying tool for small advertisers to charge supra-
competitive fees and lower quality below competitive levels (e.g., charging non-transparent fees, 
manipulating advertisers’ bids to purchase ad space for higher prices trading on Google’s exchange 
and network, and arbitraging small advertisers’ bids to extract higher fees). Similarly, Google’s 
exclusionary conduct has permitted Google’s ad buying tool for large advertisers to charge supra-
competitive fees and lower quality below competitive levels (e.g., the lack of adequate auditing of 
Google conflicts of interests and fraudulent impressions). Google’s conduct has consequently also 
lowered output in these markets. 
306. Google’s harm to the competitive process in the ad buying tool markets has also harmed 
advertisers’ customers, i.e., consumers. The fees advertisers would save on ad buying tools and ad 
purchases in the absence of Google’s anticompetitive conduct would result in reduced deadweight 
costs that advertisers would ultimately pass on to consumers. Consumers would benefit through 
better quality and lower priced goods and services. Advertising also allows consumers to learn of 




the range of competitors in a market, their prices, and the nature of the products and services 
offered. When advertising effectiveness is reduced, competition between products and services is 
reduced, and consumers are harmed.  
E. Harm to Innovation 
307. In each of the relevant product markets, Google’s exclusionary conduct has resulted in 
harm to innovation. A critical example of this is how, for many years, Google’s publisher ad server 
depressed publishers’ inventory yields by blocking real-time competition from non-Google 
exchanges. When publishers found a way to work around the restrictions imposed by Google’s ad 
server using header bidding, publishers’ yields jumped by 30+ percent, sometimes even over 100 
percent. It was not until 2018, about 8 years after the invention of real-time bidding, that Google’s 
ad server finally permitted publishers to route their inventory to multiple exchanges in real time. 
In other words, the lack of competition caused by Google’s foreclosure of competition and entry 
permitted Google’s ad server to get away with significantly depressing publishers’ inventory yields 
for almost ten years.  
308. Google’s response to header bidding has further harmed innovation in the exchange 
and publisher ad server markets. Google has used its market power in the publisher ad server 
market and exchange markets to “kill” header bidding, rather than competing on the merits. Header 
bidding helped publishers make more money by enhancing exchange access to and competition 
for publishers’ impressions. By crippling interoperability with this new and beneficial invention, 
Google stifles rather than promotes beneficial innovation in the market.  




IX. CLAIMS  
A. COUNT I – MONOPOLIZATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 
U.S.C. § 2 
309. Plaintiff States repeat and reallege every proceeding allegation as if fully set forth 
herein. 
310. Google wrongfully acquired and unlawfully maintained monopoly power in the market 
for publisher ad servers, unlawfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in the ad exchange 
market and ad network markets, unlawfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in the market 
for ad buying tools for small advertisers, and unlawfully acquired or maintained monopoly power 
in the market for ad buying tools for large advertisers.  
311. Google has willfully maintained and abused its monopoly in the ad server market and 
adjacent markets to, inter alia, restrict publishers from routing inventory to multiple exchanges, 
preferentially route publisher inventory to Google’s exchange, provide Google’s exchange 
exclusive access to high-value inventory, provide information advantages to harm competition, 
structure key aspects of the exchange market to minimize transparency, trade ahead of header 
bidding exchanges, use its data advantages to trade on inside information, deceive publishers to 
encourage them to disable header bidding, cripple publishers’ ability to measure header bidding 
yield, reduce line item capabilities to impede header bidding, redesign how web content is 
presented to make header bidding incompatible, withhold data from header bidding, enter into 
agreements with horizontal competitors to entrench its monopoly position, and exclude 
competition through Unified Pricing. 
312. Google has used its economies of scale in search and search advertising to create and 
maintain a monopoly in the markets for ad buying tools and exchanges. 




313. Google has willfully maintained and abused its monopoly power in the instream online 
video advertising market to force advertisers to use Google’s ad buying tools for both small and 
large advertisers. 
314. Plaintiff States have sustained antitrust injury as a direct and proximate cause of 
Google’s unlawful conduct, in at least the following ways: (1) substantial foreclosure of 
competition in the market for publisher ad servers, and the use of market power in the publisher 
ad server market to harm competition in the exchange market; (2) substantial foreclosure of 
competition in the exchange market via foreclosure of rivals’ access to publisher inventory and 
advertiser demand; (3) substantial foreclosure of competition in the markets for ad buying tools by 
the creation of information asymmetries and unfair auctions enabled by Google’s market 
dominance in the publisher ad serving tools and exchange markets; (4) increased barriers to entry 
and expansion in the publisher ad server, exchange, and demand-side buying tools markets; (5) 
decreased innovation, which would otherwise benefit publishers, advertisers, and competitors; (6) 
harm to publishers’ ability to effectively monetize their content, reductions to publishers’ 
revenues, reduced output, and the resulting harms to consumers; (7) reduced advertiser demand 
and participation in the market from opacity on margins and selling process, and harm to rival 
exchanges and buying tools; (8) increased advertisers’ costs to advertise and reduced effectiveness 
of advertising, which thereby harms businesses’ return on the investment in delivering their 
products and services, reduces output, and further harms consumers; (9) protection of Google’s 
products from competitive pressures, thereby allowing it to continue to extract high margins while 
avoiding competitive pressures to innovate.  
315. For the reasons set forth above, Google has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2.  




316. The Plaintiff States are entitled to equitable relief as appropriate to cure Google’s 
unlawful conduct and restore competition in the relevant markets. Consumers in the Plaintiff States 
are regular users of products in the relevant markets and will continue to purchase such products 
and suffer further injury if Google’s unlawful monopolies are not ended. 
B. COUNT II – ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 
317. Plaintiff States repeat and reallege every proceeding allegation as if fully set forth 
herein. 
318. As detailed above, Google has monopoly power, or at a minimum, a dangerous 
probability of acquiring monopoly power, in the relevant online display advertising markets, 
including the market for publisher ad servers, the ad exchange and ad network markets, and in the 
markets for ad buying tools for large and small advertisers. 
319. Google has willfully, knowingly, and with specific intent to do so, attempted to 
monopolize the relevant online display advertising markets, including the market for ad servers, 
the ad exchange and ad network markets, and the markets for ad buying tools for large and small 
advertisers.  
320. Google has attempted to monopolize the ad server market and adjacent markets to, inter 
alia, restrict publishers from routing inventory to multiple exchanges, preferentially route 
publisher inventory to Google’s exchange, provide Google’s exchange exclusive access to high-
value inventory, provide information advantages to harm competition, structure key aspects of the 
exchange market to minimize transparency, trade ahead of header bidding exchanges, use its data 
advantages to trade on inside information, deceive publishers to encourage them to disable header 
bidding, cripple publishers’ ability to measure header bidding yield, reduce line item capabilities 
to impede header bidding, redesign how web content is presented to make header bidding 




incompatible, withhold data from header bidding, and enter into agreements with horizontal 
competitors to entrench its monopoly position, and exclude competition through Unified Pricing. 
321. Google has attempted to monopolize the markets for ad buying tools and exchanges. 
322. Google has attempted to monopolize in the instream online video advertising to force 
advertisers to use Google’s ad buying tools for both small and large advertisers.  
323. Plaintiff States have sustained antitrust injury as a direct and proximate cause of 
Google’s unlawful conduct, in at least the following ways: (1) substantial foreclosure of 
competition in the market for publisher ad servers, and the use of market power in the publisher 
ad server market to harm competition in the exchange market; (2) substantial foreclosure of 
competition in the exchange market via foreclosure of rivals’ access to publisher inventory and 
advertiser demand; (3) substantial foreclosure of competition in the markets for ad buying tools by 
the creation of information asymmetries and unfair auctions enabled by Google’s market 
dominance in the publisher ad serving tools and exchange markets; (4) increased barriers to entry 
and expansion in the publisher ad server, exchange, and demand-side buying tools markets; (5) 
decreased innovation, which would otherwise benefit publishers, advertisers, and competitors; (6) 
harm to publishers’ ability to effectively monetize their content, reductions to publishers’ 
revenues, reduced output, and the resulting harms to consumers; (7) reduced advertiser demand 
and participation in the market from opacity on margins and selling process, and harm to rival 
exchanges and buying tools; (8) increased advertisers’ costs to advertise and reduced effectiveness 
of advertising, which thereby harms businesses’ return on the investment in delivering their 
products and services, reduces output, and further harms consumers; (9) protection of Google’s 
products from competitive pressures, thereby allowing it to continue to extract high margins while 
avoiding competitive pressures to innovate. 




324. For the reasons set forth above, Google has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2.  
325. The Plaintiff States are entitled to equitable relief as appropriate to cure Google’s 
unlawful conduct and restore competition in the relevant markets. Consumers in the Plaintiff States 
are regular users of products in the relevant markets and will continue to purchase such products 
and suffer further injury if Google’s unlawful monopolies are not ended. 
C. COUNT III – UNLAWFUL TYING IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 
U.S.C. § 2 
326. Plaintiff States repeat and reallege every proceeding allegation as if fully set forth 
herein. 
327. Google’s contractual arrangements and other conduct force publishers and others to 
use Google’s ad server (DFP) if they use Google exchange (AdX). 
328. Google’s DFP and Google AdX are separate products in separate markets. 
329. Google AdX has sufficient market power in the exchange market to coerce publishers 
and others to use DFP even if they would prefer not to do so. 
330. Google’s tying arrangements affect a significant volume of interstate commerce and 
have the effect of substantially foreclosing competition in the publisher ad server market by virtue 
of reducing the number of publishers and others for whom other ad servers can effectively 
compete. Moreover, these tying arrangements allow Google to maintain supra-competitive prices 
for AdX that are ultimately passed on to publishers and others, who are also harmed by virtue of 
having fewer options available at lower prices because of Google’s conduct. 
331. Google’s tying arrangements have caused competing ad servers substantial damages as 
a direct and proximate cause of this unlawful conduct because Google has foreclosed other ad 
servers from competing for potential publishers and others and has deprived ad servers of other 




business for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of Google DFP or other ad server 
products. 
332. Google’s contractual arrangements and other conduct force advertisers and others to 
use Google’s ad buying tools, DV360 or Google Ads, if they seek to purchase ad inventory on 
YouTube. 
333. Ad inventory on YouTube and Google’s ad buying tools (DV360 and Google Ads) are 
separate products in separate markets. 
334. YouTube has sufficient power in the online video inventory market to coerce 
advertisers and others to use Google’s ad buying tools (DV360 and Google Ads) even if they 
would prefer not to do so. 
335. Google’s tying arrangements affect a significant volume of interstate commerce and 
have the effect of substantially foreclosing competition in the ad buying tools markets by virtue of 
reducing the number of advertisers and others for whom other ad buying tools can effectively 
compete. Moreover, these tying arrangements allow Google to charge supra-competitive prices for 
ad buying tools that are ultimately passed on to advertisers and others, who are also harmed by 
virtue of having fewer options available at lower prices because of Google’s conduct. 
336. Google’s contractual arrangements and other conduct force small advertisers and 
others to use Google’s network (GDN) and Google’s exchange (AdX), or at least to not use 
competing networks and exchanges, if they use Google Ads. 
337. Google Ads, Google GDN, and Google AdX are separate products in separate 
markets. 




338. Google Ads has sufficient power in the market ad buying tools for small advertisers 
to coerce advertisers and others to use Google GDN and Google AdX even if they would prefer 
not to do so. 
339. Google’s tying arrangements affect a significant volume of interstate commerce and 
have the effect of substantially foreclosing competition in the network market and ad exchange 
market by virtue of reducing the number of small advertisers and others for whom other 
networks and exchanges can effectively compete. Moreover, these tying arrangements allow 
Google to maintain supra-competitive prices for GDN and AdX that are ultimately passed on to 
advertisers and others, who are also harmed by virtue of having fewer options available at lower 
prices because of Google’s conduct. 
340. Google’s tying arrangements have caused competing networks and exchanges 
substantial damages as a direct and proximate cause of this unlawful conduct because Google has 
foreclosed other networks and exchanges from competing for potential small advertisers and 
others, and deprived networks and exchanges of other business for reasons having nothing to do 
with the merits of Google’s network or exchange products. 
D. COUNT IV – UNLAWFUL AGREEMENT IN VIOLATION OF SECTION I OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
341. Plaintiff States repeat and reallege every proceeding allegation as if fully set forth 
herein. 
342. Google, by and through its officers, directors, employees or other representatives, 
entered into an unlawful agreement with its co-conspirator Facebook in restraint of trade and 
commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, in which they agreed to 
allocate display ad auction wins and to fix display ad prices, as described in this Complaint.  




343. Google’s conduct is a per se violation that restrains trade and harms competition 
through an unlawful agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
344. Google’s anticompetitive acts have had harmful effects on competition and consumers.  
E. COUNT V – SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
345. Plaintiff State of Texas repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully set 
forth herein. 
346. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of Texas Business 
and Commerce Code § 15.01 et seq., including § 15.05(b). 
347. Plaintiff State of Alaska repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google violate the Alaska Restraint 
of Trade Act (“ARTA”), AS 45.50.562 et seq. 
348. Google engaged in and is engaging in unlawful conduct in the course of trade or 
commerce within the meaning of AS 45.50.562 et seq. This conduct has harmed and is harming 
Alaska and its citizens, residents, businesses, and consumers. 
349. As provided for under ARTA, Alaska seeks a civil penalty of up to $50,000,000, 
injunctive relief, damages and penalties, disgorgement, and costs and attorney’s fees.  
350. The State of Alaska seeks relief on behalf of itself, as provided for in ARTA, and as 
parens patriae on behalf of its persons, as provided for in AS 45.50.577, as well as under Alaska 
common law. 
351. Plaintiff State of Arkansas repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as 
if fully set forth herein. 
352. Google’s actions alleged herein violate, and Plaintiff State of Arkansas is entitled to 
relief under, the Unfair Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-201 et seq., Monopolies Generally, 
Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-301 et seq., and the common law of Arkansas. 




353. Plaintiff State of Arkansas seeks and is entitled to maximum civil penalties allowed by 
law, injunctive relief, disgorgement, attorney’s fees, costs, investigative expenses, expert witness 
expenses, and such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
354. Plaintiff the State of Florida repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google violate the Florida 
Antitrust Act, Fla. Stat. § 542.15 et seq. 
355. The State of Florida seeks remedies available under The Florida Antitrust Act 
including: 
a) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.23; 
b) Civil penalties pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.21, which provides that any person other than a 
natural person is subject to a penalty of up to $1 million and that “[a]ny person who 
knowingly violates any of the provisions . . . or who knowingly aids in or advises such 
violation, is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine not exceeding $1 million if a 
corporation”; and 
c) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.23. 
356. Plaintiff State of Idaho repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
357. Google has engaged in Idaho commerce, as that term is defined by Idaho Code § 48 
103(1). 
358. Google’s actions as alleged herein violate the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code § 48 
105, in that such actions constitute monopolization, an attempt to monopolize, and/or a 
combination or conspiracy to monopolize lines of Idaho commerce, as that term is defined by 
Idaho Code § 48 103(1). 




359. Google’s actions as alleged herein violate the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code § 48 
104, in that they have the purpose and/or the effect of unreasonably restraining Idaho commerce, 
as that term is defined by Idaho Code § 48-103(1). 
360. For each and every violation alleged herein, Plaintiff State of Idaho is entitled to all 
legal and equitable relief available under the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-108 and 
48-112, including, but not limited to, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, civil penalties, 
divestiture of assets, disgorgement, expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees, all monetary relief that the 
Attorney General of the State of Idaho is entitled to recover, as parens patriae, on behalf of persons 
of the State of Idaho for any injury directly or indirectly sustained because of each and every 
violation of the Act, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
361. Plaintiff State of Indiana repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully set 
forth herein. 
362. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of Ind. Code §§ 24-
1-2-1 and -2. 
363. Plaintiff State of Louisiana repeats and re-alleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. 
364. The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana is authorized to bring this action on 
behalf of the people of the State of Louisiana for injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties 
pursuant to the Louisiana Monopolies statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 51:121, et seq. 
365. La Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 51:123 states that no person shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine, or conspire with any other person to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce within this state. 




366. Google’s continuing and systematic business practices as alleged herein meant to 
control or manipulate the digital advertising industry constitute a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the state of Louisiana in violation of Louisiana 
Monopolies statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 51:122. 
367. Google’s continuing and systematic business practices as alleged herein meant to 
control or manipulate the digital advertising industry constitute an attempt to monopolize to 
conspire to monopolize trade or commerce in the state of Louisiana in violation of Louisiana 
Monopolies statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 51:123. 
368. Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 51:121 the Plaintiff State of Louisiana seeks to recover 
treble damages, the cost of suit, and attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann.§ 51:128. 
369. Plaintiff the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby reincorporates by reference all other 
paragraphs of this Complaint.  
370. Plaintiff the Commonwealth of Kentucky repeats and realleges each and every 
preceding allegation as if fully set forth herein.  
371. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google violate Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.175. 
372. Google engaged in and is engaging in unlawful conduct in the course of trade or 
commerce, within the meaning of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.175, that has harmed and is harming the 
Commonwealth and its persons. 
373. The Commonwealth of Kentucky seeks the following remedies under Kentucky law 
for violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.175: 
a) Disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 
through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, and common law;  




b) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, and common law; 
c) Civil penalties pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990(8); 
d) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
367.990, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 48.005(4), and common law; and 
e) Other remedies as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
374. Plaintiff State of Mississippi repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. 
375. Google’s acts violate Miss. Code Ann. § 75- 21-1 et seq., and Plaintiff State of 
Mississippi is entitled to relief under Miss. Code Ann. § 75- 21-1 et seq. 
376. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-1 et seq., Plaintiff State of Mississippi seeks and 
is entitled to relief, including but not limited to injunctive relief, damages, restitution, 
disgorgement, civil penalties, costs, attorney fees, and any other just and equitable relief which 
this Court deems appropriate. 
377. Plaintiff State of Missouri repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully 
set forth herein. 
378. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of the Missouri 
Antitrust Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 416.011 et seq. 
379. Plaintiff State of Montana repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully 
set forth herein. 
380. The aforementioned acts and practices by Google were and are in violation of 
Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-101 et 




seq., including, but not limited to, § 30-14-103, and Unfair Trade Practices Generally, Mont. Code 
Ann. § 30-14-201 et seq., including §§ 30-14-205(1), 30-14-205(2), and 30-14-222.  
381. Plaintiff the State of Nevada repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google violate the Nevada 
Unfair Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.010, et seq., and specifically unlawful restraints 
of trade prohibited by Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.060. 
382. As repeatedly alleged supra,  Google engaged in and is engaging in unlawful conduct 
that produced, and continues to produce, harm across the Plaintiff States, including in Nevada.  
Google’s unlawful conduct has occurred in the course of trade or commerce, within the meaning 
of Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.020. 
383. Accordingly, the State of Nevada seeks all available relief under the Nevada Unfair 
Trade Practices Act and common law, including but not limited to: disgorgement, injunctions, civil 
penalties, direct and indirect damages, treble damages, and its costs and attorney’s fees pursuant 
to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.070, Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.160, Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.170, Nev. Rev. 
Stat. §598A.200, and Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.250. 
384. Plaintiff State of North Dakota repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
385. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of North Dakota 
Century Code (N.D.C.C.) § 51-08.1-01 et seq., Uniform State Antitrust Act, including §§ 51-08.1-
02 and 51-08.1-03.  
386. Plaintiff State of South Carolina repeats and realleges each and every preceding 
allegation as if fully set forth herein. 




387. The Attorney General of South Carolina is bringing this action in the name of the State 
pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a).  
388. At all times described herein, Google was engaged in conduct which constitutes “trade” 
and “commerce” as defined in S.C. Code § 39-5-10(b). 
389. Google’s acts or practices regarding South Carolina consumers as alleged herein are 
capable of repetition and affect the public interest. 
390. Google’s acts or practices alleged herein constitute “unfair methods of competition” 
under S.C. Code § 39-5-20. Every unfair act or practice by Google constitutes a separate and 
distinct violation of S.C. Code § 39-5-20. 
391. Google’s acts or practices alleged herein are offensive to established public policy, 
immoral, unethical, or oppressive. 
392. At all times Google knew or should have known that its conduct violated S.C. Code § 
39-5-20 and therefore is willful for purposes of S.C. Code § 39-5-110, justifying civil penalties. 
393. Plaintiff State of South Carolina seeks all remedies available under the South Carolina 
Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) including, without limitation, the following:  
a) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a); 
b) Civil penalties in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-110(a), for every 
willful violation of SCUTPA;  
c) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a) and S.C. Code § 1-7-85; and  
d) Other remedies as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
394. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Puerto Rico repeats and realleges every preceding 
allegation as if fully set forth herein.  




395.  The aforementioned practices by Google were in violation of Puerto Rico Law No. 77 
of June 25, 1964, also known as “Puerto Rico’s Antitrust and Restrictions of Commerce Law,” 10 
P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 257 et seq., and 32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3341.  
396. Accordingly, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is entitled remedies available under 
Puerto Rico’s Antitrust and Restrictions of Commerce Law and 32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3341, 
including injunctive relief, civil penalties, and any other appropriate relief. 
397. Plaintiff State of South Dakota repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
398. The aforementioned practices by Google constitute separate and multiple violations of 
South Dakota statutes §§ SDCL 37-1-3.1 and 37-1-3.2. 
399. For each and every violation alleged herein, Plaintiff State of South Dakota is entitled 
to all legal and equitable relief, and all costs and fees, available under SDCL §§ 37-1-3.1 et seq. 
Such relief includes injunctive relief and civil penalties for the State, as authorized by SDCL § 37-
1-14.2, and monetary relief, as parens patriae on behalf of persons of the State, for injuries 
sustained, directly or indirectly, because of Google’s violations of South Dakota law, as authorized 
by SDCL §§ 37-1-23, 37-1-24, and 37-1-32. 
400. Plaintiff State of Utah repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
401. Google’s acts violate the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code § 76-10-3101, et seq. (the 
“Act”) and Plaintiff State of Utah is entitled to all relief available under the Act for those violations, 
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, civil penalties, disgorgement, attorneys’ fees, and 
costs. 
F. COUNT VI – SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CLAIMS 
402. Plaintiff State of Texas repeats and realleges every preceding allegation. 




403. At all times described herein, Google has engaged in conduct which constitutes “trade” 
and “commerce” defined in § 17.45(6) of the DTPA. 
404. Plaintiff State of Texas has reason to believe that Google has engaged in, and will 
continue to engage in, the unlawful practices set forth herein, has caused and will cause adverse 
effects to legitimate business enterprises which lawfully conduct trade and commerce in this State, 
and will cause damage to the State of Texas and to persons in the State of Texas. Therefore, the 
Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas believes 
and is of the opinion that this matter is in the public interest. 
405. As alleged in more detail above, Google has engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading 
acts or practices in connection with each of its roles within the ad tech stack. In each such role, 
Google at least implicitly misrepresents that it is operating in the best interest of its customer, fails 
to disclose its conflicts of interest, and misrepresents the many ways that Google operates to 
disadvantage its customers.  
406. For example, in its role as an ad server, Google led publishers to believe that it was 
acting in the publisher’s best interest and would help them maximize revenue, when Google does 
not seek to maximize the publisher’s revenue, but its own.  
407. Similarly, in its roles as an ad exchange and ad network, Google misleads both 
publishers and advertisers regarding the actual price of advertisements. Google is deliberately 
opaque and nontransparent in its pricing terms, fails to disclose the fee it collects, and generally 
causes confusion regarding the mechanics, terms, and pricing of its ad exchange and ad network. 
408. Google has also engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading acts or practices in its efforts 
to discourage publishers, ad exchanges, and advertisers from participating in header bidding and 
to manipulate them into participating in Google’s products. Such acts included misrepresenting to 




publishers that including rival exchanges in header bidding would negatively affect the publisher 
(e.g., by putting a strain on the publisher’s servers), falsely telling publishers that the DRS program 
would increase their revenue, manipulating advertisers’ bids and publishers’ floors without 
advertisers’ knowledge or consent, misrepresenting to publishers that Open Bidding would benefit 
them through exchange competition, falsely telling publishers that adopting AMP would enhance 
load times, falsely claiming that header bidding increased latency, falsely representing that 
abolishing price floors in Unified Pricing benefited publishers, misrepresenting that it does not 
manipulate search traffic results to favor publishers where Google makes more ad money, 
misrepresenting that all bidders in Google’s exchanges compete on an equal footing, and 
misrepresenting that Google had removed its Last Look advantage and would not trade ahead of 
their bids. 
409. Google also misrepresents to participants in the ad tech stack and its users alike that 
Google encrypts user IDs in order to protect users’ privacy, when in fact, Google continues to 
infringe on users’ privacy by continuing to access such information in its own ad tech stack 
products. 
410. As alleged in more detail above, Google has engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading 
acts or practices by misrepresenting that it will never sell users’ personal information to anyone 
and by misrepresenting, causing confusion and misunderstanding, and failing to disclose how 
Google uses the information and data of its consumers. 
411. Google has also engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading acts or practices by falsely 
promising users that their WhatsApp messages remained private, by publicly misrepresenting that 
Google did not have decryption keys, and by failing to disclose to users that backing up to Google 
Drive would give Google access to users’ private WhatsApp communications.  




412. Through its false, deceptive, or misleading acts, Google has violated § 17.46(a) of the 
DTPA, including by engaging in conduct specifically defined to be false, deceptive, or misleading 
by § 17.46(b) such as: 
a) Representing that services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, 
benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, 
status, affiliation, or connection which he does not have, in violation of DTPA 
§ 17.46(b)(5);  
b) Representing that services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, if they are of 
another, in violation of DTPA § 17.46(b)(7);  
c) Advertising goods or services with the intent not to sell them as advertised, in violation of 
DTPA § 17.46(b)(9); 
d) Representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which 
it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law, in violation of DTPA 
§ 17.46(b)(12); and 
e) Failing to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the time 
of the transaction with the intent to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the 
consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed in violation of 
§ 17.46(b)(24). 
413. By means of the foregoing unlawful acts and practices, Google has acquired money or 
other property from persons to whom such money or property should be restored. 
414. Plaintiff the State of Alaska repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein, specifically including all allegations in Count VI of this Complaint. The 




aforementioned acts or practices by Google violate the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act (“AUTPCPA”), AS 45.50.471 et seq. 
415. Google engaged in and is engaging in unlawful conduct in the course of trade or 
commerce, within the meaning of AS 45.50.471, that has harmed and is harming the State of 
Alaska, its citizens, residents, businesses, and consumers.  
416. Specifically, Google violated AS 45.50.471(b)(11) and (b)(12) by misleading, 
deceiving, and damaging Alaskans. Among other things, Google omitted material facts, namely 
their anti-competitive conduct, knowing this would harm Alaskans. Plaintiff State of Alaska is 
entitled to relief for these violations under AS 45.50.501, .537, and .551, including injunctive 
relief, civil penalties of between $1,000 and $25,000 for each violation, and costs and attorney’s 
fees. 
417. Further, the State of Alaska seeks restitution to Alaska and/or disgorgement pursuant 
to its statutory and common law.  
418. The State of Alaska seeks relief on behalf of itself and as parens patriae on behalf of its 
persons. 
419. Plaintiff State Arkansas repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein.  
420. Google’s actions violate the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 4-88-101 et seq., and Arkansas is entitled to and seeks relief under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113. 
421. Plaintiff the State of Florida repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google constitute unfair 




methods of competition in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. 
Stat. § 501.204 et seq. 
422. In addition, Google’s actions offend established public policy and are immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers in the State of Florida 
in violation of Fla. Stat. § 501.204 et seq.  
423. The State of Florida seeks all remedies available under The Florida Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act, including, without limitation, the following: 
a) Damages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.207; 
b) Disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.204 et seq.; 
c) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.207; 
d) Civil penalties pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.2075, which provides that anyone who engages 
in a willful violation “is liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each such 
violation.” 
e) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.2105. 
424. Plaintiff State of Idaho repeats and realleges every preceding allegation, including the 
allegations above in Count VI of this Complaint.  
425. The above-mentioned acts and practices by Google violate the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (ICPA), Idaho Code title 48, chapter 6, and the Idaho Rules of Consumer Protection, 
IDAPA 04.02.01.000 et seq., which prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct 
of trade or commerce and which provide efficient and economical procedures to secure the public’s 
protection from unlawful business practices. 
426. At all times described herein, Google has engaged in conduct that constitutes “trade” 
and “commerce” under Idaho Code § 48-602(2) and IDAPA 04.02.01.020.  




427. The Attorney General of the State of Idaho is authorized to bring an action in the name 
of the State against any person who is using, has used, or is about to use any method, act, or practice 
declared unlawful by the ICPA. Idaho Code § 48-606. The Attorney General of Idaho has reason 
to believe that Google has used and is using the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint, 
which violate the ICPA; that Google has caused and will cause adverse effects for the business 
enterprises of the State of Idaho that lawfully conduct trade and commerce; and that Google has 
caused and will cause damage to the State of Idaho and to the persons of the State of Idaho. The 
Attorney General of Idaho therefore believes that this action is in the public interest.  
428. Through its unfair or deceptive acts and practices, Google has violated the ICPA, 
including by engaging in conduct specifically defined to be unfair or deceptive by Idaho Code 
§ 48-603. For example, Google knows, or in the exercise of due care should know, that it was and 
is:  
a) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, 
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a 
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, connection, qualifications, or license that he does 
not have, in violation of Idaho Code § 48-603(5);  
b) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, if they 
are of another, in violation of Idaho Code § 48-603(7);  
c) Advertising goods or services with the intent not to sell them as advertised, in violation of 
Idaho Code § 48-603(9); and 
d) Engaging in any act or practice that is otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive to 
consumers, such as making any claim or representation, or omitting any material or 
relevant fact, concerning goods or services that directly, or by implication, has the capacity, 




tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading a consumer acting reasonably under the 
circumstances, in violation of Idaho Code § 48-603(17) and IDAPA 04.02.01.030. 
429. Google’s unfair or deceptive acts and practices, as alleged above, constitute separate 
and multiple violations of Idaho Code §§ 48-603(5), 48-603(7), 48-603(9), and 48-603(17), and 
IDAPA 04.02.01.030. Google’s separate and multiple violations of these provisions subject 
Google to the remedies outlined in Idaho Code §§ 48-606 and 48-607. 
430. The Attorney General finds that the purpose of the ICPA would be substantially and 
materially impaired by delay in bringing, at this time, these claims under the ICPA. Accordingly, 
he has determined to file these claims, pursuant to Idaho Code § 48-606(3), without first providing 
Google notice of these proceedings or allowing Google an opportunity to appear before the 
Attorney General and to execute an assurance of voluntary compliance or a consent judgment 
under the ICPA. 
431. Plaintiff State of Indiana repeats and re-alleges each and every preceding allegation as 
if fully set forth herein. Acts alleged in Count VI of this Complaint also constitute violations of 
the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1 et seq., including knowing 
violations and incurable deceptive acts. Plaintiff State of Indiana seeks all remedies available under 
the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.  
432. Plaintiff State of Louisiana repeats and re-alleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. 
433. The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana is authorized to bring this action on 
behalf of the people of the State of Louisiana for injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties 
pursuant to the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (LUTPA), La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401, et seq.  




434. LUTPA expressly gives the Attorney General the right to bring an action for injunctive 
relief (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:1407A) and request civil penalties (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:1407(B)) 
and restitution (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:1408(5)). 
435. LUTPA makes unlawful “unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405(A). 
436. Google engages in “trade” or “commerce” within the meaning of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
51:1402(9). Google’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of its trade or commerce 
are offensive to established public policy. 
437. Each and every act in the conduct of trade or commerce by Google that is deemed to 
be unfair or deceptive constitutes a separate violation of the act. 
438. Google’s continuing and systematic business practices alleged herein constitute a 
pattern of unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of in violation of Louisiana Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (LUTPA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405. 
439. Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409, the State of Louisiana seeks to recover 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial; treble damages for knowing violations of 
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401, 
et seq; an order enjoining Google’s unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive practices pursuant to La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1407(A); civil penalties pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1407 and La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51;1722; declaratory relief; attorney’s fees; and any other just and proper relief 
available under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409. 
440. Plaintiff the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby reincorporates by reference all other 
paragraphs of this Complaint. 




441. Plaintiff the Commonwealth of Kentucky repeats and realleges each and every 
preceding allegation as if fully set forth herein, specifically including all allegations in Count VI 
of this Complaint.  
442. The aforementioned acts or practices by Google, in addition to the following acts, 
constitute violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.170.  
443. Google engaged in and is engaging in unlawful conduct in the course of trade or 
commerce, within the meaning of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.170, that has harmed and is harming the 
Commonwealth and its persons.  
444. The above-described conduct has been and is willful within the meaning of Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 367.990. 
445. The Commonwealth states that the public interest is served by seeking a permanent 
injunction to restrain the acts and practices described herein. The Commonwealth and its persons  
will continue to be harmed unless the acts and practices complained of herein are permanently 
enjoined pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.190. 
446. The Commonwealth of Kentucky seeks the following remedies under Kentucky law 
for violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.170: 
a) Damages for its persons under parens patriae authority, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, and common law; 
b) Disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 
through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, and common law; 
c) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
367.190, and common law; 
d) Civil penalties pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990(2); 




e) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
367.990, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 48.005(4), and common law; and  
f) Other remedies as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  
447. Plaintiff State of Mississippi repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. 
448. The aforesaid conduct was not only anti-competitive but was also unfair and deceptive 
to the consumers of the State of Mississippi, therefore Google’s acts violate the Mississippi 
Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-1, et seq., and Plaintiff State of Mississippi is 
entitled to relief under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-1, et 
seq. 
449. Pursuant to the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-1, et 
seq., Plaintiff State of Mississippi seeks and is entitled to relief, including but not limited to 
injunctive relief, damages, restitution, disgorgement, civil penalties, costs, attorney fees, and any 
other just and equitable relief which this Court deems appropriate. 
450. Plaintiff State of Missouri repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully 
set forth herein. 
451. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are unfair and deceptive practices 
in violation of Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 et seq., as 
further interpreted by 15 CSR 60-8.010 et seq. and 15 CSR 60-9.01 et seq. 
452. Plaintiff State of Montana repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation as 
if fully set forth herein, specifically including all allegations in Count VI of this Complaint. The 
forgoing acts and practices by Google were and are in willful violation of Montana’s Unfair Trade 




Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 30 14-101 et seq., including § 30-14-
103, 142(2).  
453.  Google has engaged in and is engaging in trade and commerce within the meaning of 
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-102(8) and unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices within the meaning of Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-103 and Rohrer v. Knudson, 203 P.3d 
759 (Mont. 2009). 
454. Google’s unlawful conduct was willful, and Plaintiff State of Montana is entitled to all 
legal and equitable relief pursuant to, without limitation, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-14-111(4); 30-
14-131; and, 30-14-142(2). 
455. Plaintiff the State of Nevada repeats and realleges each and every preceding allegation 
as if fully set forth herein. 
456. As alleged in Section VII of this Complaint, and further described in Texas’s 
allegations in Count VI of this Complaint, Google’s conduct was and is directed at consumers 
nationwide, including in Nevada, and was overtly deceptive, not merely anticompetitive. 
457. As repeatedly alleged herein, Google has engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading 
acts, practices and/or omissions in connection with each of its roles within the ad tech stack.  In 
all such cases, the alleged acts, practices and omissions were, and are, in violation of the Nevada 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §598.0903, et seq., and specifically the following: 
a) NRS 598.0915(5), a person engages in a deceptive trade practice by representing that 
services have characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations or quantities which 
they do not have, or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or 
connection which he does not have; 




b) NRS 598.0915(7), a person engages in a deceptive trade practice by representing that 
services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, if they are of another standard, 
quality or grade; 
c) NRS 598.0915(9), a person engages in a deceptive trade practice by advertising goods or 
services with the intent not to sell them as advertised; 
d) NRS 598.092(8), a person engages in a deceptive trade practice by misrepresenting the 
legal rights, obligations or remedies of a party to a transaction; and 
e) NRS 598.0923(2), a person engages in a deceptive trade practice by failing to disclose a 
material fact in connection with the sale of goods or services. 
458. At all times, the above-described conduct has been and is willful within the meaning 
of Nev. Rev. Stat. §598.0999. 
459. Accordingly, the State of Nevada seeks all available relief under the Nevada Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act and common law, including but not limited to: disgorgement, injunctions, 
restitution, civil penalties, damages, and its costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 598.0963, 598.0973, and 598.0999. 
460. Plaintiff State of North Dakota repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
461. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of N.D.C.C. § 51-
15-01 et seq., Unlawful Sales or Advertising Practices, including § 51-15-02.  
462. The Attorney General of North Dakota is authorized to bring an action in the name of 
the State against any person who has engaged in, or is engaging in, any practice declared to be 
unlawful by N.D.C.C. § 51-15-01 et seq. The Attorney General has reason to believe that Google 
has engaged in and continues to engage in such practices, constituting separate and multiple 




violations of North Dakota law; that Google has caused and will cause adverse effects for the 
business enterprises of the State; and that Google has caused and will cause damage to the State 
and to the persons of the State. 
463. Google’s separate and multiple violations of N.D.C.C. § 51-15-01 et seq. subject 
Google to the remedies outlined in N.D.C.C. §§ 51-15-07, 51-15-10, and 51-15-11. 
464. Plaintiff State of South Carolina repeats and realleges each and every preceding 
allegation as if fully set forth herein. 
465. The Attorney General of South Carolina is bringing this action in the name of the State 
pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a).  
466. At all times described herein, Google was engaged in conduct which constitutes “trade” 
and “commerce” as defined in S.C. Code § 39-5-10(b). 
467. Google’s acts or practices regarding South Carolina consumers as alleged herein are 
capable of repetition and affect the public interest. 
468. Google’s acts or practices alleged herein constitute “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” under S.C. Code § 39-5-20. Every unfair or deceptive act or practice by Google 
constitutes a separate and distinct violation of S.C. Code § 39-5-20. 
469. Google’s acts or practices alleged herein are offensive to established public policy, 
immoral, unethical, or oppressive. 
470. At all times Google knew or should have known that its conduct violated S.C. Code § 
39-5-20 and therefore is willful for purposes of S.C. Code § 39-5-110, justifying civil penalties. 
471. Plaintiff State of South Carolina seeks all remedies available under the South Carolina 
Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) including, without limitation, the following:  
a) Injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a); 




b) Civil penalties in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-110(a), for every 
willful violation of SCUTPA;  
c) Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a) and S.C. Code § 1-7-85; and  
d) Other remedies as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
472. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Puerto Rico repeats and realleges each and every preceding 
allegation as if fully set forth herein.  
473. The aforesaid conduct was not only anti-competitive but was also unfair and deceptive 
to the consumers of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, therefore Google’s acts violate 10 
L.P.R.A. § 259. 
474. Plaintiff State of South Dakota repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if 
fully set forth herein. 
475. The aforementioned practices by Google were and are in violation of South Dakota 
statute SDCL § 37-24-6(1). 
476. The Attorney General of the State of South Dakota is authorized to bring an action in 
the name of the State against any person who is using, has used, or is about to use any act or 
practice declared unlawful by SDCL § 37-24-6. The Attorney General has reason to believe that 
Google has used and is using the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint, which violate SDCL 
§ 37-24-6; that Google has caused and will cause adverse effects for the business enterprises of 
the State; and that Google has caused and will cause damage to the State and to the persons of the 
State. The Attorney General therefore finds that this action is in the public interest. 
477. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its attorney general who is acting as counsel to 
the Utah Division of Consumer Protection to enforce the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah 




Code § § 13-11-1 et seq., repeats and realleges every preceding allegation as if fully set forth 
herein. 
478. The aforesaid conduct was not only anticompetitive, but also constituted 
unconscionable and deceptive practices to the consumers of the State of Utah, therefore Google’s 
conduct violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. Utah Code §§ 13-11-1, 4, et seq., and 
Plaintiff the State of Utah, Division of Consumer Protection, is entitled to relief under the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code §§ 13-11-1, et seq. 
479. At all times described herein, Google was a “supplier” engaged in “consumer 
transactions” pursuant to Utah Code §§ 13-11-3(2), (6). 
480. Pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code §§ 13-11-1, et seq., 
Plaintiff the State of Utah, Division of Consumer Protection, is entitled to relief including, but not 
limited to, injunctive relief, damages, fines determined after considering the factors in Utah Code 
§ 13-11-17(6), costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and equitable relief which this Court deems 
appropriate. Utah Code §§ 13-11-17, 17.2. 
X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
481. Accordingly, the Plaintiff States request that the Court:  
a) Adjudge and decree that Google has committed violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2; 
b) Adjudge and decree that Google has committed violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1; 
c) Order injunctive relief to restore competitive conditions in the relevant markets affected by 
Google’s unlawful conduct; 
d) Order structural relief to restore competitive conditions in the relevant markets affected by 
Google’s unlawful conduct; 
e) Enjoin and restrain, pursuant to federal and state law, Google and their officers, directors, 
partners, agents, and employees, and all persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf or 




in concert with them, from continuing to engage in any anticompetitive conduct and from 
adopting in the future any practice, plan, program or device having a similar purpose or 
effect to the anticompetitive actions set forth above;  
f) Order Google to disgorge all sums, monies, and value unlawfully taken from consumers 
by means of deceptive trade practices, together with all proceeds, interest, income, profits, 
and accessions thereto; making such disgorgement for the benefit of victimized consumers 
and Plaintiffs; 
g) Order Google to disgorge and return all data and information unlawfully taken from 
consumers by means of deceptive trade practices; making such disgorgement and return 
for the benefit of victimized consumers and Plaintiffs; 
h) Adjudge and decree that Google has committed separate and multiple violations of each of 
the state laws enumerated in Counts V and VI; 
i) Order Google to pay civil fines pursuant to § 15.20(a) of the Texas Business and 
Commerce Code;  
j) Enjoin and restrain, pursuant to the DTPA and/or other State law, Google and its officers, 
directors, partners, agents, and employees, and all persons acting or claiming to act on its 
behalf or in concert with it, from continuing to engage in any false, deceptive, or misleading 
acts or practices and from adopting in the future any acts or practice having a similar 
purpose or effect to the false, deceptive, or misleading actions set forth above; 
k) Order Google to pay civil penalties of up to $10,000.00 per violation for each and every 
violation of the DTPA as authorized by Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.47(c)(1);  
l) Order Google to pay all costs of Court, costs of investigation, and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees pursuant to Section 17.47 of the DTPA and Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 402.006(c); 
m) Order Google to pay damages to the State of Alaska under its parens patriae authority and 
common law; 
n) Order Google to pay disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Alaska statutes and common 
law; 
o) Order injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to ARTA and AUTPCPA, including a 
permanent injunction prohibiting Google from engaging in anticompetitive conduct 
described in this Complaint and unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive, conduct described 
in this Complaint violating AS 45.50.471;  
p) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to AS 45.50.551 and AS 45.50.578; 




q) Order Google to pay costs and attorneys’ fees as permitted by Alaska statutes, court rules, 
and common law. 
r) Order injunctive and other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate pursuant to Ark. 
Code Ann. §§ 4-75-212 and 4-75-315; 
s) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the State of Arkansas of up to $1,000 per violation 
of Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-212; 
t) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the State of Arkansas of up to $1,000 per violation 
of Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-315; 
u) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the State of Arkansas of up to $10,000 per violation 
for each and every violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113; 
v) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of Arkansas all of the State’s expenses, costs, 
and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-75-212, 4-75-315, and 4-88-113; 
w) Order injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.23; 
x) Order payment of civil penalties pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.21; 
y) Order payment of costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.23; 
z) Order payment of damages for consumers under parens patriae authority, pursuant to Fla. 
Stat. § 501.207; 
aa) Order disgorgement and restitution payments pursuant to The Florida Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204 et seq.; 
bb) Order injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.207; 
cc) Order payment of civil penalties pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.2075; 
dd) Order payment of costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.210; 
ee) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the Attorney General of Idaho of up to $50,000 per 
violation for each and every violation of the Idaho Competition Act, as authorized by Idaho 
Code § 48-108(1)(d); 
ff) Order Google to pay all monetary relief authorized by Idaho Code § 48-108(2) to the State 
of Idaho as parens patriae on behalf of persons of the State of Idaho for any and all injury 
directly or indirectly sustained because of each and every violation by Google of the Idaho 
Competition Act; 




gg) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of Idaho all of the State’s expenses, costs, 
and attorneys’ fees, as authorized by Idaho Code §§ 48-108(1)(d) § 48-108(2)(a); 
hh) Grant such further relief to the Attorney General and the State of Idaho as provided for by 
law or equity, including by Idaho Code § 48-112(4), or as the Court deems appropriate and 
just; 
ii) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the Attorney General of Idaho of up to $5,000 per 
violation for each and every violation of the ICPA and the Idaho Rules of Consumer 
Protection, as authorized by § 48-606(1)(e);  
jj) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General on behalf of consumers actual damages or 
restitution of money, property, or other things received from such consumers by Google in 
connection with each and every violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and the 
Idaho Rules of Consumer Protection, as authorized by Idaho Code § 48-606(1)(c);  
kk) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of Idaho all of the State’s expenses, costs, 
and attorneys’ fees, as authorized by Idaho Code §§ 48-606(1)(f);  
ll) Grant such further relief to the Attorney General and the State of Idaho as provided for by 
law or equity, including by Idaho Code § 48-607, or as the Court deems appropriate and 
just; 
mm) Order injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(c)(1); 
nn) Order Google to pay restitution pursuant to Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(c)(2) for money 
unlawfully received through violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act; 
oo) Order Google to pay costs pursuant to Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(c)(4); 
pp) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(g) for knowing 
violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act; 
qq) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-8 for incurable 
deceptive acts done as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead; 
rr) Order injunctive relief to restrain, enjoin and prohibit Google from engaging in any activity 
in violation of the Louisiana Monopolies statutes, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:121, et seq., 
including, but not limited to, the unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices alleged herein; 
ss) Order injunctive relief and other equitable relief, pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 
restraining, enjoining and prohibiting the Google from engaging in any acts that violate 
LUTPA, including, but not limited to, the unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices alleged herein; 




tt) Order that Google pay restitution to all consumers who have incurred a loss due to the 
conduct of the Google through any manner deemed practicable by the Court; 
uu)  Order Google to pay all civil penalties allowed pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1407 
and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1722, for each and every willful violation of LUTPA; 
vv) Order Google to pay attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409 
for violations of LUTPA;  
ww) Order Google to pay damages to the Attorney General of Kentucky under his parens 
patriae authority, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through § 
367.990, and common law; 
xx) Order Google to pay disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. 
Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, and common law; 
yy) Order for injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020, Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 367.110 through Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990 and common law, including a permanent 
injunction prohibiting Google from engaging in anticompetitive conduct described in this 
Complaint violating Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.175, and unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive 
conduct described in this Complaint violating Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.170;  
zz) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990(2); 
aaa) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990(8); 
bbb) Order Google to pay costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 through 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.990, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 48.005(4), and common law; 
ccc) Enjoin and restrain, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-21-1; 75-21-3; 75-24-9; 75-24-11 
and/or other State law, Google and its officers, directors, partners, agents, and employees, 
and all persons acting or claiming to act on its behalf or in concert with it, to correct, prevent 
and deter the recurrence of the anticompetitive actions set forth above, to restore and 
preserve fair competition, and to prevent false, deceptive, or misleading acts or practices; 
ddd) Order Google to pay the Attorney General of Mississippi on behalf of consumers restitution 
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-11 and the Attorney General’s parens patriae 
authority; 
eee) Order Google to pay the Attorney General of Mississippi disgorgement pursuant to Miss. 
Code Ann. §§ 75-24-11 and 75-24-23 and as an equitable remedy pursuant to common law; 
fff) Order Google to pay the Attorney General of Mississippi civil penalties of up to ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation for each and every violation of the MCPA 
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-19(b); 




ggg) Order Google to pay the Attorney General of Mississippi’s costs and attorneys’ fees 
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-19(1)(b) and pursuant to common law; 
hhh) Other remedies as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the 
case and pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-23 and 11-45-11; 
iii) Order structural and other injunctive relief to enjoin, restrain, and prevent and deter the 
recurrence of the anticompetitive actions set forth above and to restore and preserve fair 
competition per Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 416.011 et seq.; 
jjj) Order Google to pay civil penalties in an amount of up to $1,000 for each act in connection 
with each sale or advertisement of merchandise in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 
et seq.;  
kkk) Order structural and other injunctive relief to enjoin, restrain and prevent, and deter the 
recurrence of the unlawful merchandising practices set forth above, including an order to 
disgorge all revenues, profits and gains achieved in whole or in part through violations of 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 et seq.; 
lll) Order an award of restitution, payable to the State of Missouri, to restore all persons in 
Missouri suffering loss as a result of Google’s unlawful merchandising practices in 
violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 et seq., and order additional award equal to 10% of 
such restitution, payable to the State of Missouri to the credit of the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Revolving Fund, as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.140, and to 
pay all costs, including fees, of investigation and prosecution of these claims pursuant to 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.130 and § 416.121; 
mmm) Order Google to pay civil fines of up to $10,000 for each willful violation of Mont. 
Code Ann. § 30-14-103, pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-142; 
nnn) Order structural, injunctive, and all available legal and equitable relief pursuant to Mont. 
Code Ann. § 30-14-101 et seq. and § 30-14-201 et seq.; 
ooo) Order payment of Plaintiff State of Montana’s costs and attorney fees pursuant to Mont. 
Code Ann. § 30-14-131; 
ppp) Order Google to pay (i) treble damages for injury to the business or property of the State 
or its agencies pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.200, and treble damages as provided by 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0999, (ii) all direct and indirect damages sustained by natural and 
non-natural persons, sought by the Attorney General of Nevada under his parens patriae 
authority pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.160, (iii) all direct or indirect damages to the 
general economy of the State of Nevada pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.160; 
qqq) Order Google to pay disgorgement and restitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598.0963 
and Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.170; 




rrr) Order injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.070 and Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §598.0963, including a permanent injunction prohibiting Google from engaging 
in the anticompetitive conduct described in this Complaint; 
sss) Order Google to pay civil penalties pursuant to (i) Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.170, which 
provides that the Attorney General may recover a civil penalty “not to exceed 5 percent of 
the gross income realized by the sale of commodities or services sold by such persons in 
this state in each year in which the prohibited activities occurred,” (ii) under Nev. Rev. 
Stat. §598.0999 of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation, and (iii) Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §598.0973, a civil penalty of not more than twelve thousand dollars five hundred 
($12,500) per violation where the defendant's conduct is directed at a person aged sixty 
(60) or older, or a disabled person; 
ttt) Order Google to pay costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §598A.200, Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §598A.210, Nev. Rev. Stat. §598.0963 and Nev. Rev. Stat. §598.0999; 
uuu) Order Google to pay civil penalties of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for 
each violation of N.D.C.C. § 51-08.1-01 et seq., pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 51-08.1-07; 
vvv) Award the State of North Dakota the costs of this action and its preceding investigation, 
including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided for in the Clayton Act and 
applicable state law, including N.D.C.C. § 51-08.1-08; 
www) Order Google to pay civil penalties of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for 
each violation of N.D.C.C. § 51-15-01 et seq. pursuant to N.D.C.C. §§ 51-15-11; 
xxx) Order Google to pay reasonable attorney’s fees, investigation fees, costs, and expenses 
pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 51-15-10; 
yyy) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of North Dakota, on behalf of persons of the 
State, all damages, compensation, or restitution necessary to restore to such persons any 
money or property that may have been acquired by Google in connection with each and 
every violation of N.D.C.C. § 51-15-01 et seq., pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 51-15-07; 
zzz) Grant such further relief to the Attorney General and the State of North Dakota as provided 
for by law or equity, including by N.D.C.C. § 51-15-07, or as the Court deems appropriate 
and just; 
aaaa) Order injunctive and other equitable relief, civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation, and 
any other appropriate relief pursuant to Puerto Rico Law No. 77 of June 25, 1964, also 
known as “Puerto Rico’s Antitrust and Restrictions of Commerce Law,” 10 P.R. Laws 
Ann. §§ 257 et seq., and 32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3341;   
bbbb) Order injunctive and other equitable relief, civil penalties of up to $5,000 per, and any other 
appropriate relief pursuant to 10 L.P.R.A. § 259, 10 L.P.R.A. 10 L.P.R.A. § 269; 32 P.R. 




Laws Ann. § 334, as well as the payment of all costs of Court, costs of investigation, and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees; 
cccc) Permanently enjoin Google, pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50(a) from engaging in any acts 
that violate SCUTPA, including, but not limited to, the unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices alleged herein; 
dddd)  Order Google to pay civil penalties in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-
5-110(a), for each and every willful violation of SCUTPA; 
eeee) Order Google to pay attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to S.C. Code § 39-5-50 and S.C. 
Code § 1-7-85 for violations of SCUTPA;  
ffff) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the State of South Dakota of up to $50,000 per 
violation for each and every violation of SDCL §§ 37-1-3.1 et seq., pursuant to SDCL § 37-
1-14.2; 
gggg) Order Google to pay all monetary relief authorized by SDCL §§ 37-1-23, 37-1-24, and 37-
1-32 to the State of South Dakota as parens patriae on behalf of persons of the State for 
any and all injury directly or indirectly sustained because of each and every violation by 
Google of SDCL §§ 37-1-3.1 et seq; 
hhhh) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of South Dakota all of the State’s expenses, 
costs, and attorneys’ fees, as authorized by SDCL § 37-1-24; 
iiii) Order Google to pay civil penalties to the State of South Dakota of up to $2,000 per 
violation for each and every violation of SDCL § 37-24-6, as authorized by SDCL § 37-
24-27; 
jjjj) Order Google to grant all relief to the State of South Dakota authorized by SDCL § 37-24-
29 to restore to any person in interest all monies or property, real or personal, that Google 
has acquired by each and every violation of SDCL § 37-24-6; 
kkkk) Order Google to pay to the Attorney General of South Dakota all of the State’s expenses, 
costs, and attorneys’ fees, as authorized by SDCL § 37-24-23; 
llll) Grant such further relief to the Attorney General and the State of South Dakota as provided 
for by law or equity, including by SDCL § 37-24-29, or as the Court deems appropriate 
and just; 
mmmm) Grant declaratory judgment that Google has engaged deceptive acts and practices as 
contemplated by Utah Code § 13-11-4, and as permitted by Utah Code § 13-11-17; 
nnnn) Order Google to pay civil penalties determined after considering the factors in Utah Code 
§ 13-11-17(6); 




oooo) Order Google to pay Plaintiff the State of Utah, Division of Consumer Protection, an award 
of reasonable attorneys’ fees, court costs, and costs of investigation (Utah Code § 13-11-
17.5); 
pppp) Order other equitable relief as may be appropriate; 
qqqq) Grant leave to amend the Complaint to conform to the evidence produced at trial; and 
rrrr) Direct such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
XI. DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL 
482. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), the Plaintiff States demand a trial 
by jury of all issues properly triable to a jury in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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HON. JEFF LANDRY 
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s/ James R. Dugan, II  
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Tel: (775) 684-1100 
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Office of the Utah Attorney General 
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